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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
How can leadership stimulate collaboration between actors in the security ecosystem?  
This is the main question answered in this multiple case-study qualitative research. Security 
ecosystems entail all forms of cooperation within networks of organizations that contribute to 
(national) security. Cases reviewed are The Hague Security Delta, Schiphol Airport and the Air Force 
maintenance ecosystem. A total of fourteen interviews provided the empirical data, supplemented by 
secondary documents. Elements that were studied are: the leadership styles adopted by organizations 
in their interactions and within their own ranks, the governance structures and network forms, the 
relationship between ecosystem culture and organizational cultures, the different growth stages in the 
maturing process of ecosystems, and the ecosystem’s resilience. 
First, this document provides an overview of the academic literature on ecosystems. This revealed that 
business strategy literature expects an ecosystem to have a powerful leading organization, or keystone 
(Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Adner, 2006). This research shows that this is not the case for the ecosystems 
that were studied. Security ecosystems seem to have unique characteristics and are led by a collection 
of organizations together, described as shared leadership or platform leadership. 
In the security domain interdependent organizations interact in an engaging and involving manner to 
set up a cooperation. The organizational leaders purposefully decide to set up a platform or steering 
committee underpinned by a governance structure and formal written documents that outline the 
shared purpose of the collaboration. This requires goal leadership by the leading actors to steer the 
overall ecosystem’s directions. In order to achieve tangible milestones the ecosystem members 
collaborate in workgroups and projects. The ecosystem’s maturing process can be divided in roughly 
three growth stages: the creation, consolidation and the materialization stages. 
This research discovered that challenges for partnerships tend to arise in the middle-management 
layer of larger organizations. To align the interests of all organizational layers the top management 
internally displays directive goal leadership. Between organizations (both on the level of the CEO’s and 
the work floor professionals) the leadership style is primarily engaging and involving.  
The ideal ecosystem cultures are externally oriented culture such as the innovative and community 
cultures. These can be achieved even when the majority of ecosystem members displays internally 
oriented cultures, e.g. a bureaucratic culture. 
Essential for the successful leadership of security ecosystems is the role of individual leaders. Durable 
commitment by the top management and strong trusted relationships between organizations are the 
foundation for any ecosystem cooperation.  Leaders that are able to respect, understand and connect 
with their counterparts and look beyond their organizational boundaries are most likely to succeed. 
The joint pursuit of the shared purpose and the construction of a resilient ecosystem that can cope 
with external shocks demand from leaders to make long-term commitment and to align their internal 
organization’s layers with the ecosystem strategy. Only then can leadership contribute to the 
achievement of synergy, enhanced flexibility, stronger innovation, the minimizing of security threats 
and other motives that altogether underlie the collaboration between partners in security ecosystems. 
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1. – INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
During the Future Force Conference in February 2017 the Dutch Ministry of Defense [MoD] 
underscored the urgency of cooperation between the armed forces and a broad range of actors to 
combat challenges in the field of national and international security. Chief of Defense General 
Middendorp conveys the proposition that the MoD needs to establish collaborations and partnerships 
in an ever increasingly complex security environment, reflecting in a way an ecosystem of inter-
dependent organizations (Mindef, 2017a). The combined efforts of actors with different backgrounds 
and resources contribute to sustainable peace and stability at home and abroad. Defense is only a part 
of this solution. In a national security context the array of involved organizations ranges from classic 
repression and sanctioning (police, law enforcement, and the military) to prevention or crisis response 
(social services, education, medical assistance, other government agencies). 
The ecosystem paradigm takes shape in various collaborations in the security domain, ranging from - 
for instance - the golden triangle approach adopted for the procurement and maintenance of Defense 
materiel (MINDEF & EZ, 2013) to the recently announced Total Force Concept in which boundaries 
between the military, civilians and reservists blur to enhance the MoD’s flexibility and adaptiveness 
(Mindef, 2017b). The Dutch Air Force Commander Lt Gen. Schnitger states that the MoD embarks upon 
a transformation in which the organization is no longer a self-contained actor but becomes a node 
within the security ecosystem that consists of civil, military, formal and informal, virtual and physical 
structures (Schnitger, 2016). For instance, in the domain of counterterrorism a multitude of 
organizations cooperate to prevent radicalization, such as intelligence agencies, the police and the 
military but also education, municipalities and mental health institutions (NCTV, 2016). 
These forms of interorganizational cooperation pose new challenges for organizational leaders and 
policy makers. The interaction between organizations is driven by a search for resources and common 
interests or objectives (Torfing, Peters, Pierre & Sørensen, 2012).   
Interorganizational relations are not primarily characterized by top-down command and control 
(vertical governance), but rather by shared beliefs, interdependency and cooperation (interactive 
governance).The pursuit of common goals through a joint effort of multiple organizations with 
different interests, resources and mandates in an ecosystem constellation requires coordination. 
Issues of cooperation between actors within a network are covered in a vast collection of academic 
literature, for example in the fields of network governance (see Sørensen & Torfing, 2007), interactive 
governance (see Torfing, et al, 2012), public-private partnerships (see Bovaird, 2004; Klijn & Van Twist, 
2007), and network management (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).   
The impacts of the complex and changing context of multi-agency environments on leadership 
approaches have received scholarly attention (see Liddle, 2010; Dulewicz & Higgs, 2005).  
   
The concept ‘ecosystems’ emerged in the past twenty years, primarily in the field of business strategy 
(see Adner, 2017). Today we see that leaders in the public domain have embraced this concept as well 
to describe their working environment, like General Middendorp.   
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This research focuses on the leadership and governance approaches adopted by actors involved in the 
security ecosystem. The ecosystem approach has certain implications for the leadership and 
coordinative efforts of the organizations involved. In business strategy it is assumed that powerful 
companies perform the function of ecosystem leaders who are able to align investments and establish 
shared visions (Moore, 1996, p.26).  This study aims to generate insights on the leadership approaches 
to be implemented by organizations to stimulate cooperation with partners in the security ecosystem.  
Through a qualitative research design I will assess multiple cases within the domain of national security 
on the basis of interviews. A normative theoretical model built from existing literature on ecosystems 
and network governance provides this study with the tools to explore the current leadership 
approaches used by actors in the security ecosystem. The results can contribute to a better 
understanding of the suitable forms of leadership and governance within a security ecosystem.  
To sum up: relevant theory that is used in this study will be about the properties of ecosystems, the 
leadership on an organizational level, the ecosystem’s culture, and on the governance of networks. 
1.2 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
The collaboration of actors in the security ecosystem takes place in an increasingly complex and rapidly 
changing context that exerts challenging influences on the collaborations between actors. Increased 
connectedness and high speeds of information processing as a result of technological evolution shape 
the security environment (Schnitger, 2016). These developments impact governments’ ability to 
adequately respond to potential security threats. To cooperate in an ecosystem with other actors the 
organizations responsible for national security have to adapt and undergo technological, social and 
cultural innovations (Schnitger, 2016).   
Cooperation of the classic security custodians (i.e. Defense or the police) with other public or private 
organizations are nothing new. More recently, the growing threats in the national sphere arising from 
terrorism and cyber-attacks create new dynamics and forge new dependencies between actors in the 
security ecosystem.  
Imperfect coordination and lack of leadership may give rise to ineffective execution of tasks, possibly 
resulting in security risks and underperformance. Shortcomings in the collaboration between actors 
may increase risks and expand opportunities for adversaries to manifest themselves. This can lead to 
the exploitation of weaknesses or blind spots in the field of security, putting citizens and critical 
infrastructure at risk.   
 
This study aims to contribute to the improvement of cooperation within the security ecosystem 
through the development of insights on the appropriate leadership mechanisms and governance 
configurations that best fit the relationships between actors in the ecosystem. Collaboration between 
these actors is crucial to determine their success. Collaboration is shaped by individuals within these 
organizations, such as policy makers and executives. Providing insights on the suitable forms of 
leadership and governance structures helps organizations to improve their contribution to the 
ecosystem and to enhance overall performance of the ecosystem as a whole. 
However, according to some scholars the concept of ecosystem is often applied to transactional 
relationships between organizations that do not constitute a true ecosystem with all its inherent 
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features (Adner, 2017). Some attention must therefore be given to what exactly constitutes an 
ecosystem approach before we proceed to establishing a framework for effective organizational 
leadership and network governance. 
Research aim  
The first aim of this research is to identify what constitutes an ecosystem approach. This study’s main 
concern is then to establish recommendations for ecosystem leadership and governance that stimulate 
cooperation between organizations in the context of national security.  
The main question for this research is thus: 
How can leadership on an organizational level stimulate collaboration between actors in the security 
ecosystem?  
The following subquestions serve to provide a complete answer to the main question.  
 What constitutes a(n) (security) ecosystem?  
 What constitutes network governance?  
 What are essential features of ecosystem leadership?  
 Which leadership styles are necessary in a security ecosystem approach?  
 How is the network of actors in the security ecosystem built and what shared purpose is 
pursued? 
 What is the suitable form of network governance for the collaboration of actors in the 
security ecosystem? 
 What are the different growth stages of (security) ecosystems? 
 What are the differences between the hierarchical layers in an organization in relation to 
the ecosystem cooperation? 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
The research design used for this assessment of leadership and governance in the context of the 
security ecosystem is a qualitative multiple case study. The data is collected through interviews using 
a semi-structured interview guide that can be found in Appendix A.  
First, the existing academic literature is exploited to create a theoretical framework of organizational 
leadership and governance modes for ecosystem cooperation between multiple organizations. Some 
attention is devoted to explain the concept of the ecosystem in order to assess to what extent the 
cases under review actually fulfill the conditions of deserving the label ‘ecosystem’.  
The normative framework serves as the foundation for the interview guide that is used to gather data 
from leading individuals within the relevant organizations, reflecting the elite-interview approach. The 
research design thus combines a theory testing method and an exploratory approach. The interviews 
provide a means to compare practices with the insights gathered from literature, and allow us to 
discover new findings that may contribute to current knowledge. 
The following cases will be under review, shown in table 1. The cases receive more detailed information 
in the Results chapter. 
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Table 1 – An overview of the cases 
Case (Ecosystem) Involved 
organizations  
Common goal 
 
Platform Beveiliging & 
Publieke Veiligheid –
Schiphol Airport [BPVS] 
 
Schiphol Group, 
Marechaussee, customs, 
municipality, airlines, 
ministries, government 
agencies 
Improvement and 
management of 
Schiphol’s security 
The Hague Security 
Delta [HSD] 
Businesses, government 
actors, education 
institutions, research 
institutions 
Innovation of security 
solutions and fostering 
economic activity 
 
Air Force maintenance 
 
The Royal Netherlands 
Air Force, aerospace and 
defense industry, 
research institutions, 
government agencies 
 
 
Achieving availability, 
affordability and 
flexibility of the Dutch 
Air Force’s fleet, and 
increased economic 
advantages for the 
involved businesses. 
 
 
 
1.4 RELEVANCE 
ACADEMIC RELEVANCE 
This study aims to contribute to academic debate by generating new insights about the suitable 
leadership and governance approaches in an ecosystem with very specific characteristics.  
As a network of different semi-autonomous organizations, with different goals and different power 
dimensions, such an ecosystem needs alternative approaches to leadership. Ecosystem literature 
suggests there is a keystone, an important component of the system. Business strategy suggests there 
is an ecosystem leader who directs other actors. However, keystones or ecosystem leaders do not lead 
the ecosystem alone. Leadership and change literature suggests an important role for a shared or 
common purpose, but provides little insight into what the characteristics of purpose are and how it 
works with leadership. Insights from network governance and platform leadership receive an 
abundance of scholarly attention but nowhere is there a study that connects both governance 
questions (forms, structures and routines) to organizational leadership attributes in a (national) 
security environment.  
In order to help such ecosystems it is interesting to look into examples of existing ecosystems to 
understand the approaches to leadership and governance used. 
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SOCIETAL RELEVANCE 
This study contributes to the generation of new insights on the coordination of collaborations between 
organizations active in the security domain. The findings thus contribute to the enhancement of 
organizational effectiveness in the field of national and international security. It is of vital importance 
that security actors, for example the intelligence agencies, law enforcement, the police, municipalities, 
social services, businesses and others cooperate in an optimal way to prevent harms to critical 
infrastructure, citizens or the functioning of our economy. Recent terrorist attacks inspired by Islamic 
fundamentalism were carried out by so-called home grown terrorists who were able to plan and 
prepare these attacks under the radar of government authorities. Blind spots such as ‘Molenbeek’ in 
which defense and law enforcement agencies had insufficient capacity to detect and prevent security 
threats are a possible consequence of poor coordination and lacking leadership between organizations 
in the ecosystem. A wholly different threat comes from the cyber domain which can have an enormous 
impact on the functioning of society and economic development. Protection against these digital 
threats cannot rely solely on state agencies, which leads the Dutch government to cooperate with 
private companies and research institutions (Ministry of Security & Justice, 2014).  
Generating insights how to lead these ecosystems and enable all involved actors to achieve their 
common goal thus contributes to safety and security.   
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2. - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study aims to develop insights about the types of leadership that stimulate collaboration between 
actors in the security ecosystem. This research aim contains three theoretical components that require 
further explanation: (1) the concepts of leadership in this organizational context also referred to as 
platform leadership; (2) the network governance approach that characterizes the joint efforts of 
actors; (3) and the concept of ecosystem which is a metaphor that needs further clarification.   
What is an ecosystem?  
The ecosystem paradigm’s ‘founding father’ James F. Moore uses the following definition:  
“An economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and 
individuals—the organisms of the business world. The economic community produces goods 
and services of value to customers, who are themselves members of the ecosystem”   
(Moore, 1996, p.12).   
There are various concepts brought forward by scholars to describe cooperation and transactional ties 
between actors in the field of public policy and service delivery. Networks of organizations are 
responsible for the production of goods or services, which are often associated with wicked problems. 
Network governance entails the sharing or connecting of information, resources, activities and 
competencies of at least three organizations to jointly realize a certain outcome (Kenis & Provan, 2008, 
p.296). (For a comprehensive overview of literature on network governance see Molin & Masella, 
2016). 
  
The ecosystem approach has inherent features that are similar to the network approach but has its 
origins in business strategy literature, in contrast to network governance which has its roots in public 
policy and administration. This study borrows the concept of ecosystems from business literature and 
exploits its theoretical insights to study actors in the field of national security. This is a novel utilization 
of the concept and forms this study’s contribution to theory building.  
   
First, this chapter gives an overview of the accumulated knowledge on ecosystems that is relevant to 
the study of the security ecosystem. Second, the concept of the security ecosystem is explained. Third, 
this chapter covers theory on leadership and culture on an organizational level that – combined with 
insights on ecosystems and network governance - produces the main foundation for the data collection 
through interviews. Fourth, a brief explanation of network governance is given which establishes a link 
between ecosystems and similar forms of network cooperation.  
In sum, after establishing a theoretical foundation built up out of these three components – network 
governance, ecosystems, and organizational leadership – this chapter concludes with a conceptual 
model. This forms the theoretical normative model that is used to assess the cases under review in this 
research. Furthermore, this chapter closes with the stipulative definition of the security ecosystem as 
used in this study.  
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2.2 THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH 
ORIGINS 
This section provides the theoretical knowledge on the ecosystem approach by explaining the concept, 
shed light on its origins and outline common features to be able to identify ecosystems in practice. As 
Adner and Kapoor (2010) point out the construct of the ecosystem receives attention in both business 
strategy and practice. The use of the term ecosystem to describe relationships between firms 
operating in the same field has its origins in the works of Moore (1996); Iansiti and Levien (2004); and 
Adner (2006). Individual corporations have been the primary unit for analysis but over the years the 
focus has shifted to business ecosystems that consist of corporations, individuals, and communities 
which are interconnected and interdependent for the attainment of innovation (Baldwin, 2012). 
Corporate partners form networks in which firms jointly act to pursue goals which results in either 
collective success or collective failure. The key challenge for ecosystem players is to manage assets 
outside of their direct control (Iansiti & Levien, 2004).   
 
ETYMOLOGY  
The ecosystem metaphor borrowed from biology is now used by social science scholars to describe 
complex networks of actors that are connected through the pursuit of common gains (Mars, Bronstein 
& Lusch, 2012, p.274).  
The main strength of the term ecosystem is to convey the importance of joint effort of an entire 
network for the achievement of business goals, not just a corporation's individual conduct. Moore 
(1996, p.26) defines the business ecosystem as an economic community built on a platform of 
interrelated organizations and individuals which constitute organisms in the business environment. 
Another important property has its roots in the biological meaning of the term ecosystem: it has a 
dimension of self-organizing processes (Valkokari, 2015, p17). The analogy of a biological ecosystem 
for understanding business ecosystems is put forward by Iansiti and Levien (2004, p.8) for different 
reasons: like their biological counterpart business networks are characterized by (1) a large number of 
interconnected participants who depend on their mutual effectiveness and survival; (2) consisting of 
multiple entities with differing interests forming a larger collective; (3) long term resilience and 
robustness; and (4) the ecosystem’s structure is heterogeneous consisting of varying connected 
clusters.  
In contrast to the biological ecosystems in nature, Mars et al (2012, p.274) argue that ecosystems of 
collaborating organizations can be purposefully designed instead of being the product of natural 
selection and emergence. This point assumes that purposeful actors can coordinate the cooperation 
between actors in an ecosystem and expand or reduce its scope. 
KEYSTONE STRATEGY   
In the words of Valkokari (2015, p.19), the business ecosystem is to be viewed as a collection of firms 
and organizations which produce and capture value through the linking of its resources while the 
ecosystem operates around a focal firm or is connected to a platform. Most scholars bring forward the 
idea of having an ecosystem leader, a keystone player or a similar leading entity that coordinates the 
network of actors (Mars et al., 2012; Valkokari, 2015; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Weber & Hine, 2015). The 
classical work of Iansiti and Levien (2004, p.4) on business ecosystems, The Keystone Advantage, 
emphasizes the importance of a keystone or leading ecosystem firm that improves the overall 
performance of the entire ecosystem through its individual conduct.   
  
Classic examples of keystone entities reviewed in their book are large influential platform-defining 
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keystones such as Wal-Mart and Microsoft which are able to connect with thousands of different 
organizations to create, distribute and sell their products. A main focus of Iansiti and Levien (2004) is 
the development of the business environment in the second half of the 20th century.   
Cooperation between firms in their supply chains was first mainly characterized by vertical integration, 
as large corporations owned most of the assets necessary for the production process. This mantra of 
vertical integration has been replaced by forms of collaboration and networking between firms which 
have evolved into all sorts of network structures (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p.6).  
   
A good example of an industry characterized by the ecosystem construct is the IT ecosystem which has 
been studied in various publications (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016; Wareham, Fox & Cano Giner, 2014; 
Iansiti & Richards, 2006). This industry consists of multiple segments that manufacture components, 
systems, and services resulting in an impressive level of interaction among hundreds of firms involved 
in the design, production, distribution and implementation of a product. This example represents a 
network collaboration that epitomizes the ecosystem approach (Iansiti & Richards, 2006, p.79). The 
example also highlights the potential advantage of ecosystems: they allow companies to create value 
that no single company could create independently (Adner, 2006, p.98).  
    
Most relevant for this study into the security ecosystem is Iansiti & Levien’s (2004) message that 
today’s world with its inherent interconnectedness and interdependencies between organizations can 
be characterized as a vast collection of networks, and the ecosystem paradigm provides a useful lens 
to view these collaborations between actors. Leadership in ecosystems is crucial for the network’s 
overall health. The keystone entity has a critical role to play in determining the health and stability of 
the ecosystem and to effectively manage what the network of actors has to offer (Iansiti & Levien, 
2004, p.10). The success of individual efforts depends on the success of other actors operating in the 
same external environment (Adner & Kapoor, 2010, p.310). As a result of today’s connectedness and 
networked structures every actor is embedded in a system of actors whom enjoy a shared fate (Iansiti 
& Levien, 2004, p.19). It is therefore crucial, especially in light of today’s increased geopolitical 
instability and growing terrorism threats, that we develop insights on effective leadership in the 
ecosystems responsible for guarding our national security. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ECOSYSTEM 
Now that the ecosystem concept’s origins are explained this section covers the elements of an 
ecosystem as laid down in academic literature in order to prepare these general insights on business 
ecosystems for using the construct to research national security ecosystems. These findings can also 
be used to identify ecosystems in the empirical world.  
The following characteristics of the ecosystems construct are presented in this section:  
 Conception: how does an ecosystem arise? 
 Four elements that comprise every ecosystem: Activities, Actors, Positions and Links. 
 Resilience: how does an ecosystem cope with changes? 
 Interdependencies: why do members interact in an ecosystem? 
 Keystones: who is in charge of the ecosystem? 
 Shared purpose: what common objective binds ecosystem members? 
CONCEPTION  
The first point to address is the conception of an organizational ecosystem. According to Mars et al 
(2012) the difference with biological ecosystems is the idea that organizational ecosystems are not 
necessarily the product of self-emergent, natural bottom-up processes but rather the result of actors’ 
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self-interested motivations and the social structure. They can develop from the top down or from the 
bottom up depending on the initiative of agents (Mars et al, 2012, p.274). The main point is that 
organizational ecosystems are neither fully self-emergent nor completely purposefully engineered. 
Man-made ecosystems always have a degree of intentional organizing and selection or exclusion of 
participants (Valkokari, 2015, p.21). The key strategic challenge for organizations is thus to make 
effective use of its surrounding ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Adner, 2016). From the viewpoint 
of individual ecosystem participants the equilibrium in an ecosystem may not always be optimal, which 
may induce both competition and cooperation. These dynamics influence the selection and adaptation 
of species (Valkokari, 2015, p.20). 
Adner (2017, p.40) makes a distinction between the business ecosystem as ecosystem-as-affiliation 
and the ecosystem-as-structure. The former regards ecosystems as communities of associated actors 
defined by their network and platform affiliations, the latter regards ecosystems as configurations of 
activity defined by a value proposition.    
The focus on affiliation describes the ecosystem in accordance with definitions that have been 
presented thus far, emphasizing elements such as interdependence of actors in a network, the 
presence of a keystone entity or platform leader organization, and reaping overall gains through 
synergy. The ecosystems-as-structure focuses on activity and identifies actors in the ecosystem that 
have to cooperate to achieve a desired outcome in the form of a value proposition (Adner, 2017, p.41). 
  
In this study, national security and the protection of a country’s citizens and infrastructure is the 
intended value proposition of security ecosystems.  
ELEMENTS  
Adner’s (2017) structuralist approach to ecosystems can help to identify and assess real life examples 
of the security ecosystem and it covers the necessary elements for an ecosystem to operate 
successfully. Four elements contribute to achieving the intended value proposition as depicted in 
Figure 1:  
 
Positions, which specify where in the flow of activities across the system actors 
are located and characterize who hands off to whom.  
 
Links, which specify transfers across actors. The content of these transfers can 
vary—materiel, information, influence, funds. Critically, these links need not 
have any direct connection to the focal actor. 
 
Activities, which specify the discrete actions to be undertaken (i.e. input to be 
delivered by the actors) in order for the value proposition to materialize.   
 
Actors, which are the entities (organizations) that undertake the activities. A 
single actor may undertake multiple activities; conversely, multiple actors may 
undertake a single activity.      
                                                                                                          (Adner, 2017, p. 43).  
 
Figure 1 – Elements 
of ecosystems 
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Adner (2017, p.42) argues that “the ecosystem is defined by the alignment structure of the multilateral 
set of partners that need to interact in order for a focal value proposition to materialize”. Alignment 
refers to the degree to which actors are content with their position despite differing interests and 
objectives. A condition for a successful ecosystem is that all actors are satisfied with their position 
(Adner, 2017, p.42). This proposition is contrary to Valkokari’s (2015) assertion that for individual 
participants there is always a degree of dissatisfaction with their current position relative to other 
ecosystem members which induces both cooperation and competition.  
 ‘Multilateral’ refers to the idea that an ecosystem is not composed of a bundling of bilateral 
interactions but that there is multilaterality. ‘Set of partners’ refers to the condition that all actors 
involved are necessary participants for the achievement of success. If one of these crucial nodes is 
missing or disconnected, then the desired outcome is at risk.  
What makes Adner’s (2017) contribution useful for this study is his focus on the attainment of a desired 
outcome or value proposition. This focus on activity and the use of a desired end goal as starting point 
are useful insights to analyze ecosystems. It addresses what input is needed from the actors in order 
to realize the ecosystem’s desired output. Important implications for ecosystem leadership are that 
coordination of actors is crucial to align their positions and that all the necessary actors must be 
involved in delivering their contribution to the proposed value proposition. An ecosystem leader is 
successful if he is able to identify and involve all necessary actors and then aligns these partners to 
pursue the same end goal. 
RESILIENCE   
An inherent feature of ecosystems is the required balance between stability and evolvability, especially 
for technology ecosystems. This required resilience is a central notion, which refers to the ecosystem’s 
ability to maintain its own inertia while being capable of coping with exogenous shocks with an innate 
generative ability to evolve endogenously (Wareham, Fox & Cano Giner, 2014, p.1197). Like their 
biological counterparts, organizational ecosystems need to endure in changing environments and 
ought to have a high degree of robustness to face external shocks (Iansiti & Richards, 2006, p.84). 
  
Determinants of ecosystem robustness can be found in classical literature on business strategy. For 
instance, Iansiti and Levien (2004) emphasize the need for ecosystem firms to integrate, innovate and 
to adapt to changes. Integration capability refers to the ability of an organization to combine the 
effects of different competencies both within and outside the control of the company (Iansiti & Levien, 
2004, p.170). Integrating different competencies from multiple actors in a network opens up 
opportunities for innovations and renewal of existing organizations. The key challenge in innovation is 
in acquiring new capabilities among the collective of ecosystem actors and using them effectively to 
create change (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p.185).   
Furthermore, in a turbulent environment, integration and adaptation determine innovation. The key 
point made here is that an ecosystem’s strength and resilience are to a certain extent determined by 
integration capabilities. This entails combining novel and existing competencies, internal and external 
assets, and continuously evolve and expand an organization’s position within the ecosystem by 
connecting formerly loose nodes (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p.188).   
  
An organizational ecosystem’s resilience is also affected by its degree of nestedness. The higher the 
degree of nestedness, the bigger the likelihood of facing contingencies that need to be acted upon in 
the event an ecosystem member fails. The presence of emergency plans such as swiftly switching to 
another supplier in the case of the previous supplier failing strengthens an ecosystem’s resilience 
(Mars et al, 2012, p.276). Having a set of partners with some degree of overlap thus improves 
resilience. Two more determinants are the degree of embeddedness and the level of diversity in an 
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ecosystem. The former refers to the binding of actors through economic and non-economic 
arrangements of exchange, the latter refers to the variation in actors’ capabilities present. The more 
diverse the array of partners, the lower the level of dependency on any one particular function or actor 
(Mars et al, 2012, p.276). Thus, nestedness, embeddedness and diversity confer more resiliency.  
INTERDEPENDENCIES   
The next inherent characteristic of ecosystems is the considerable degree of interdependence 
between the ecosystem participants. Today’s interconnectedness inevitably creates inter-
dependencies and thus ecosystem participants enjoy a shared fate (Iansiti & Levien, 2004).  Since 
organizations cannot rely solely on their internal competencies they have to collaborate with partners. 
In business, these multifaceted interdependencies generate highly complex interactions between 
various stakeholders in the supply chain (Iyer & Basole, 2016, p.27). Furthermore, when it comes to 
innovation within an ecosystem, we have already discussed that a single organization is dependent 
upon the innovations brought forward by other players in the ecosystem in which that organization is 
embedded (Adner, 2006).   
 
An example  
The development of the A380 Airbus airliner provides an example to illustrate the inescapable 
interdependencies between actors involved in this project. Adner and Kapoor (2016, p.307) show the 
numerous interactions between ecosystem actors that are necessary to create this innovation in 
aviation. This new aircraft consists of components that required innovations from Airbus itself and its 
suppliers. Moreover, the project’s success also depended on ecosystem actors outside Airbus’ control 
such as airports which have to innovate their facilities to accommodate this oversized jetliner, 
regulators whom are occupied with developing new 
safety regulations, and flight training simulators 
that have to install updates to train flight crews. The 
authors’ key message is that all ecosystem partners 
are required to deliver innovations in order for the 
focal ecosystem leader (i.e. Airbus) to be successful 
in realizing its value creation (Adner & Kapoor, 
2016, p.307).  
The security ecosystem is confronted with similar 
challenges, especially in the field of technology 
development and procurement projects. The 
potential of examples falling within the scope of the 
security ecosystem will be dealt with in a later 
section but it is obvious that Airbus deals with 
similar challenges as, for instance  the defense and 
security industry.  
Interdependence also stresses the need for alignment of the multilateral set of partners by an 
ecosystem leader, as was mentioned earlier. Airbus’s example serves to emphasize the need for the 
focal firm to align all partners to the end goal.   
ECOSYSTEM LEADERS, PLATFORM FIRMS AND KEYSTONES.    
An ecosystem in business consists of (1) a platform firm that orchestrates the directions of the 
ecosystem and (2) many complementor firms that participate in it (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016, p.2). To 
stick with the previous example of Airbus, the A380’s ecosystem platform firm would be Airbus and 
the complementor firms would be the suppliers of the engines, the landing gear, the flight instruments 
Figure 2. An example of an ecosystem guided by a keystone 
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but also the airports, airlines and regulators.   
Platform firms adopt the role of a keystone and provide a predictable platform on which other 
ecosystem players can depend. These platform organizations deploy a keystone strategy which is a 
strategy aimed at improvement of the ecosystem’s health and enhanced performance of the company. 
The core element of this strategy is management of external assets, shaping the structure of the 
external network, and guarding external health (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p. 82).   
What makes keystone organizations so powerful is their ability to recognize the potential that arises 
from being a hub in a business network, and by increasing the ecosystem’s efficiency and productivity 
through sharing data, intellectual property and assets (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p.83).   
Ultimately this makes creation of new products by adding third parties to the network and connecting 
them with potential partners in the ecosystem more efficient. This also has benefits for integration 
capabilities and potential for innovation, which in turn enhances an ecosystem’s robustness and 
potential for niche creation.  
For a keystone organization to be successful it has to create value within the ecosystem and then share 
the value within the ecosystem. Value creation and value sharing are the two key elements of a 
keystone strategy. The idea behind creating and sharing value with other ecosystem participants is the 
enabling of operating leverage. Operating leverage can be achieved by sharing assets (physical, 
intellectual, or financial) with partners (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p.92). Conditional to the ecosystem’s 
success is the keystone’s capacity to provide a platform that other actors in the ecosystem can leverage 
to add value to their product or service in a co-evolutionary process (Weber & Hine, 2015, p.33). 
In sum, organizations that take the role of keystone are able to establish their position as the hub of 
their ecosystem by cooperating with a network of partners to realize their goals. The challenge is to 
leverage the competencies and assets of a network as a whole. This means that ecosystem leaders 
must understand how to manage assets they do not directly own but which are essential for success. 
Figure 2 represents an ecosystem in which the smaller blue nodes represent ecosystem members such 
as complementor firms or followers. The leading organization, or keystone, acts as the platform firm 
and is connected to all ecosystem organizations. The keystone sets the direction, aligns all participants 
and creates and shares value. All nodes are interconnected and thus represent the high degree of 
interaction and possibilities for value creation. 
SHARED PURPOSE   
A common objective or shared purpose is what drives an ecosystem. Adner (2017) formulates it as a 
value proposition that actors pursue, this definition is mostly relevant for business enterprises but less 
so for actors in a security ecosystem. What is important is the sense of urgency among ecosystem 
members that they all share the same fate as a result of interdependency and interconnectedness 
(Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p17). For ecosystem leaders it is essential to align partners and establish a 
shared vision across the ecosystem. The joint effort of creating a shared purpose is related to platform 
leadership. Through shared leadership keystone organizations can foster the creation of a shared value 
(Mäkinen & Dedehayir, 2012). The whole idea behind adopting an ecosystem strategy is to reap gains 
through joint effort that would not be possible to achieve independently (Mars et al, 2012).  
The challenge for the security ecosystem is to align all members to pursue the common goal of 
establishing a safe and secure society, even though some members are driven by individual interests 
or other considerations which may or may not always be compatible with the ecosystem’s top priority.  
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2.3. THE SECURITY ECOSYSTEM 
This section covers the features of the security ecosystem based mainly on publications of 
organizations such as government publications and think tank reports. In current academic literature 
there is hardly any peer-reviewed material to be found on this specific type of ecosystem. This section 
makes clear that the security ecosystem differs from ecosystems in business and technology.  
 
In this study what is meant by the security ecosystem is the collection of organizations that contribute 
to the prevention or resolving of (potential) threats to (national) security in the Netherlands. This 
overarching ecosystem is responsible for providing security through successful execution of  its  
functions and consists of smaller subsystems. These smaller ecosystems can be identified by the main 
activity they evolve around, such as border control or counterterrorism, or the main product or service 
to be delivered, such as innovative cyber security solutions. An ecosystem can also be centered around 
an object of critical infrastructure, such as Schiphol Airport or the Port of Rotterdam.  
Although the ecosystems paradigm has its roots in business practice and commercial enterprises there 
has been a trend in recent years to label the interdependencies between organizations in the domains 
of defense and national security as the `defense ecosystem´ or ´security ecosystem´. General 
Middendorp embraces the ecosystem approach and calls upon the defense ecosystem members to 
adopt the role of platform firms, “like Android” (FFC, 2017, p.25). The General’s key takeaways of the 
recent Future Force Conference are to further develop Defense as a platform for practical innovation, 
to make the Defense organization better approachable for partners and new potential nodes in the 
ecosystem, and to invest in comprehensive planning (FFC, 2017, p.26).   
In an ever increasingly connected world the Defense organization has become part of networks in 
which information flows are crucial to enable cooperation with governmental and non-governmental 
actors to achieve common goals through unity of effort (Schnitger, 2016, p.303).  
Based on the statements made by the MoD’s top officials we may assume that the Defense 
organization regards itself as the keystone entity or platform firm. In a recent report, the Hague Centre 
for Strategic Studies [HCSS] stresses that national defense organizations should engage in more and 
more partnerships and invest in a portfolio of cooperation partners that goes far beyond strictly 
military organizations. Besides traditional long-term formalized partnerships there should be more 
exploration of new loosely coupled and open forms of cooperation with partners, especially in a digital 
sphere (HCSS, 2016, p.12). In line with the insights on business ecosystems the HCSS authors 
emphasize the need for national Defense organizations [NDO] to leverage the outcomes of the rapid 
and high-quality innovation cycles in the private sector. The challenge for NDO’s is to simultaneously 
strengthen and draw strength from its ecosystem. It should at the same time share its capabilities with 
partners in order to foster cooperation and innovation, and have system integration processes to 
harness open innovation. The former is difficult since a defense organization has to maintain and 
protect its system integrity and prevent potential adversaries from learning too much. The key point 
made by HCSS experts is that in the current information age the defense organization is no longer the 
prime defender of national security but should position itself as the custodian of a broader ecosystem 
in which actors contribute to security. “Only a diverse and resilient ecosystem can mobilize enough 
variety, agility, and mass to deal with the challenges at hand” (HCSS, 2016, p.15).  
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TYPES OF ECOSYSTEMS 
Valkokari (2015) outlines 3 ecosystem types in Table 2: innovation, business and knowledge 
ecosystems. This section adds a fourth type: the security ecosystem.  
 
 
Table 2: The three ecosystem types.  (Source: Valkokari, 2015, p.21) 
From the viewpoint of organizations operating in security ecosystems there are elements to be found 
among all three types in Table 1 that apply to the security ecosystem. However, important differences 
stress the need to identify a separate distinct type. Valkokari (2015) differentiates between the 
ecosystem concepts based on the shared intention or baseline, i.e. what outcomes do the participants 
pursue? An important condition for organizing an ecosystem is that there is agreement among its 
members about its shared purpose (baseline) and its logic of action (Valkokari, 2015, p.22). Another 
important contribution by Valkokari (2015) is that ecosystems can consist of multiple sub-systems and 
that ecosystem members can function simultaneously in multiple ecosystems with changing roles. 
If we consider provision of national security as the shared purpose of an ecosystem then a multitude 
of relevant organizations can be identified in the context of The Netherlands. Think of organizations 
such as Defense, intelligence agencies, the police and law enforcement, criminal justice, border control 
and customs, emergency response agencies, public health organizations, and critical infrastructure 
protection.  
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An example of a holistic national 
security ecosystem is given in Figure 3. 
The coordinating organization could be 
a national security council, the national 
government, or a similar entity 
depending on the administrative and 
political structures of the country. For 
the Netherlands the current 
coordinating body is the National 
Coordinator for Security and 
Counterterrorism [NCTV], part of the 
Ministry of Security and Justice. 
Currently a debate takes place in the 
national security policy arena on who 
should be in charge of national security 
coordination. According to the The 
Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy [WRR] Dutch policy 
makers urgently need to set up a 
National Security Council. Headed by 
the prime minister, it should comprise 
members of the military command and 
the ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Development Cooperation, and 
Security and Justice (WRR, 2017). 
Within this overarching ecosystem we can zoom in on smaller ‘sub-ecosystems’, for instance the 
various collaborations that the Defense organization has with research institutions and the industry 
for the development of new technological weapons systems. In these instances the MoD acts as a 
platform for innovation and fulfills the role of launching customer for the industry’s innovation. This 
policy is formalized in the Defense Industry Strategy, a policy tool developed by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the MoD (Mindef, 2013). Another policy is the MoD’s Strategy, Knowledge and 
Innovation Agenda (SKIA) which aims at enhancing the MoD’s innovative strength and strengthening 
the knowledge infrastructure through cooperation with research institutions such as TNO, NLR, 
MARIN, universities and Clingendael (Mindef, 216). These types of public-private collaborations 
between Defense and its partners resemble Valkokari’s (2015) innovation and knowledge ecosystems.  
Figure 3. The national security ecosystem (Source: PwC internal 
Powerpoint) 
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In other instances the MoD is 
merely an ecosystem member, 
e.g. by providing security and law 
enforcement for airports 
performed by the Marechaussee 
and intelligence agencies (MIVD). 
These relationships resemble the 
role of a (business) ecosystem 
member. If we zoom in on the 
protection of critical infra-
structure, e.g. an airport, we arrive 
at a security ecosystem that 
revolves around a specific 
function. 
Figure 4 captures the main players 
in a fictional security ecosystem 
evolving around the protection of 
critical infrastructure (in this case 
a civilian airport), which could be a 
realistic representation of the 
ecosystem’s main organizations. 
Maintaining maximum security 
forms the shared purpose or 
proposed value creation to which 
all nodes in the ecosystem contribute in a joint effort. The main point conveyed here is that the 
national security ecosystem consists of smaller subsystems, which can be ecosystems by itself.  
   
Furthermore, we can distinguish between the different elements of national security, such as cyber 
security or counterterrorism to identify ecosystems. Execution of these tasks include certain 
organizations and exclude others and thus these collaborations can be regarded as separate sub-
ecosystems within the overarching security ecosystem contributing to the shared purpose of national 
security.  
We can connect this to Adner’s (2017) ecosystems-as-structure approach which starts with a value 
proposition and then seeks to identify the set of actors that need to collaborate in order for the plan 
of action to be realized, e.g. protection of a country’s digital infrastructure which shall require the 
police, the national government and intelligence agencies to cooperate, but also –more importantly -  
businesses in IT and consultancy firms. Examples of ecosystems can also be identified by focusing on 
concrete infrastructure, e.g. airports, ports, nuclear power plants, etc. These objects require a 
multitude of organizations to cooperate for effective protection, hence they constitute independent 
separate security ecosystems.  
 
 
Figure 4. An example of an ecosystem evolving around an airport 
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2.4 LEADERSHIP IN ECOSYSTEMS.  
This section covers insights on the leadership of ecosystems in order to lay a foundation for the 
interview questionnaire. The goal of this research is to establish insights on how leadership can 
stimulate cooperation among members of the security ecosystem. Figure 5 depicts the ecosystem 
approach as presented in the academic literature that this chapter covers.  
LEADER AND FOLLOWERS 
In the previous sections it was explained that in current literature there is a distinction made between 
leading members of an ecosystem, often called ‘ecosystem leader’ (Moore, 1996), ‘keystone’ (Iansiti & 
Levien, 2004; Iansiti & Richards, 2006, Mars et al, 2012), ‘platform firms’ (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016), 
‘focal firms’ (Adner, 2017) and followers often labelled as ‘complementor firms’(Wareham, Fox & Cano 
Giner, 2014; Adner, 2017).  Most of these definitions stem from business literature but the general 
point is that in every type of ecosystem there is a leading organization that coordinates the ecosystem 
in which multiple members participate, as visualized in Figure 5. We are talking about leadership on 
an organizational level, so how can a keystone organization coordinate and facilitate cooperation 
among organizations in the security ecosystem?  
Besides ecosystem leaders the majority of the collection of members consists of niche players. Niche 
players are responsible for most of the innovations and subsequent value creation, they perform 
specialized functions and thus are crucial to the holistic performance of the ecosystem (Mäkinen & 
Dedehayir, 2012, p.3). In the case of security ecosystems a niche player could be a private IT business 
that delivers high-tech services to the government to protect its digital assets from cyberattacks. 
 
Figure 5: The ecosystem approach: following actors evolve around the leading platform organization, i.e. the 
keystone 
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ATTAINING AND MAINTAINING ECOSYSTEM LEADERSHIP   
Traditional business scholars have argued that powerful companies perform the function of ecosystem 
leaders which are able to align investments and establish shared visions (Moore, 1996, p.26).   
As mentioned earlier, the prime task of a keystone organization is to create value and then share value 
within the ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p.91). This takes shape through the sharing of assets upon 
which other members can leverage. Providing a stable and predictable core around which the rest of 
the ecosystem can organize itself is essential for increasing stability (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p.120). 
What is also important is strategizing and planning with the intent to forecast future conditions and to 
establish arrangements developed to mitigate risks and diminish uncertainty (Mars et al, 2012, p.278).  
At the heart of the ecosystem strategy is the ability to align all members to pursue the common goal. 
Furthermore, being able to grasp the leadership role depends on the keystone’s aspiration and on the 
agreement among all members on which the value proposition depends (Adner, 2017, p.48). The 
leading entity does not have to be a single organization, this can also be a consortium of organizations 
which reflects the potential of shared leadership (Adner, 2017, p.48).   
  
An organization’s performance is highly dependent upon the capacity to control assets outside its own 
direct influence. In order to maintain a keystone position power should be exercised indirectly and in 
cooperation with others in the ecosystem to create value for all its participants. This means sharing of 
assets and providing for robustness, enhancing productivity and allowing for niche creation (Iansiti & 
Levien, 2004).   
Especially relevant for security ecosystems is Mars et al’s (2012) proposition that organizational 
ecosystems include contingency plans to enact should a key actor or organization fail. Here lies a 
responsibility for the leading organization to create arrangements to avoid this risk.  
 
PLATFORM LEADERSHIP   
The ecosystem approach is best served through deployment of a platform leadership mode. Often 
organizations operate around a focal firm or are connected to a platform, this then constitutes its main 
locus of coordination (Valkokari, 2015, p.21). But what constitutes a platform in this sense?  
Scholar Benkler (in Kelly, 2015, p.8) describes it as: “a technical and organizational context in which a 
community can interact to achieve a specific purpose.” The keystone provides a platform on which 
other members can connect and this opens up opportunities for followers and niche players to create 
value (Weber & Hine, 2015, p.33). Table 1 on page XX discusses the logic of action that is expected to 
be present in the three distinctive ecosystem types. The key message is that there is either a platform, 
a hub or a form of knowledge exchange on which actors depend.  
Important elements to support a well-functioning ecosystem platform are: 
 
 A governance structure: including a set of protocols that outlines who can participate, what 
roles participants might play, how they interact, and how disputes get resolved.  
 
 A set of protocols or standards that structure connection, coordination and collaboration 
among ecosystem members.                                                                                    (Kelly, 2015, p.80) 
 
The keystone organization has to take into account the wellbeing of the ecosystem as a whole and its 
members, and simultaneously maintain its competitive advantage and powerful leadership position. 
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An organization that is able to recognize and comprehend its own ecosystem and other external 
organizations that may exert influence can enjoy a competitive advantage. This increases an 
organization’s maneuvering speed and allows it to leverage resources from other ecosystem 
participants that otherwise would remain unrecognized (Weber & Hine, 2015, p.39). 
Furthermore, a keystone organization’s main duty is to establish predictability and stability of the 
operations within the ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004). In business literature it is mentioned that 
keystones face challengers within their ecosystem, i.e. ecosystem members that wish to take the lead 
and thrust the incumbent keystone off the throne (Adner, 2017, p.51). Cusumano and Gawer (2002) 
refer to these companies that want to be platform leaders as ‘wannabes’.  
The keystone is the organization to whose vision of structure and roles others defer. It formulates and 
enforces the ecosystem’s governance rules, determines timing, and is the greatest receiver of the 
advantages arising out of successful partner alignment (Adner, 2017, p.48). The ecosystem members 
that follow the keystone agree to these terms and acknowledge their follower position. The vision of 
the platform leader is essential for the directions followers – or complementors – take in their 
development of innovations (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002, p.58).  As Adner puts it: “Succesful leadership 
is thus contingent on willing followership” (Adner, 2017, p.48).  
A keystone or ecosystem leader thus has to generate a shared purpose among all the members. 
Establishing a shared purpose simultaneously strengthens the keystone’s leadership position and the 
ecosystem’s overall competitiveness (Mäkinen & Dedehayir, 2012).   
 
MANAGE DEPENDENCE   
Another important consideration for the platform leader 
adopting an ecosystem strategy is the assessment of 
interdependence risks. As a result of interdependency and 
connectedness an organization has to be aware of which 
components of the system it depends on for its success (Adner, 
2006). As we have seen in the Airbus A380 example, an 
innovation in the ecosystem depends on a multitude of previous 
innovations delivered by other players that might not be under 
full control of the keystone (Adner & Kapoor, 2016). Assessing 
the risks to estimate the successfulness of a potential 
cooperation between partners is crucial. Adner (2006) offers an 
insightful example of four organizations collaborating, all with an 
expected success rate of delivering their promised contribution 
of 90%. This constitutes an expected chance of success of 
(0,9x0,9x0,9x0,9) 66% for the entire project. In the case of a weak 
link, for example if an organization has to deliver a highly 
insecure commitment with a 50% rate of failure, the entire 
project’s estimated success rate drops substantially (Adner, 
2006).        
To mitigate this risk, and thus enhance an ecosystem’s 
robustness, it is important to carry out thorough due diligence, 
limit dependence on one single partner, or employ incentives to 
bind partners. In the domain of national security this aspect is a 
Figure 6: The elements of platform leadership 
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primary concern for the coordinating body since weak links in the security ecosystem can be exploited 
by potential adversaries. 
Figure 6 on the left depicts the main elements of platform leadership as covered in this chapter. These 
are the factors to be taken care of by the keystone organization in charge of the ecosystem’s 
governance. Addressing these challenges enable platform leadership. 
LEVERS OF PLATFORM LEADERSHIP 
Cusumano and Gawer (2002) provide keystone organizations with advice – or ‘levers’ – to overcome 
challenges in coordinating an ecosystem platform that supports both the leader and the follower firms. 
The following five elements need consideration: 
 Scope: The keystone organization needs to decide what to do itself through in-house 
capabilities and what to leave to the market (other ecosystem members or complementors), 
or choose a middle way. These decisions are highly strategic and require the keystone to think 
through its dependencies, the sharing of assets and its control over others. This lever is 
represented in the ‘Mitigate interdependence risks’ disk in Figure 6. 
 
 Openness: The quest for innovation inherently features the trade-off between openness and 
secrecy. The platform leader decides what to share (technology, data, other assets) with 
others, thus facing potential risks posed by competitors. This factor is related to the creation 
and sharing of assets, this element is covered in the ‘Create and share value’ disk.  
 
 Nature of interaction: This element entails the platform and interface designs that structure 
how subsystems within the network collaborate. The higher the degree of modularity, the 
easier it is to specialize. This factor touches upon the presence of clear standards and protocols 
as depicted in the bottom disk in Figure 6.  
 
 External relationships: The interaction with other ecosystem members depends on two 
variables: consensus within the platform and control over the platform. The challenge for the 
platform leader is to balance between these forces. A degree of control is essential to maintain 
compatibility of the contributions delivered by complementors. However, a certain consensus 
is required for the platform leader to be the legitimate leading firm. To guard consensus across 
the platform it is essential to have trust and recognition of mutual dependency.   
The platform firm can contribute to this by sharing technology with partners, respecting a 
complementor’s territory and business model, and gaining credibility through acting on behalf 
of the whole industry. This conduct could mean sacrificing short-term gains but contributing 
to the performance of the ecosystem as a whole. These factors pertaining to external 
relationships are represented in the ‘Create trust’, ‘Goal consensus’ and ‘Create and share 
value’ disks of Figure 6. 
 
 Internal organization: Within a platform leading organization there may be parts of the 
organization whose logic is to compete with complementors in the ecosystem, while other 
parts work towards consensus and partnership with those same complementors. A solution 
could be the separation of these different organizational logics into different branches or 
divisions (creating intra-organizational ‘Chinese Walls’), each with their particular role towards 
external organizations. Thus, it is important for platform leaders to signal a neutral and 
independent appearance. This aspect does not fit into one particular disk in Figure 6 but 
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contributes in general to the creation of trust, the sharing of assets and maintaining 
predictability and stability.  
 
2.5 LEADERSHIP, CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
It is often argued that leadership by individuals has an impact on organizational performance and on 
the organization’s culture. Fiedler (1996, p.242) makes the bold proposition that a leader’s 
effectiveness to a large extent determines the organization’s success or failure. Since leadership 
influences organizational performance and culture, and vice versa, it may potentially impact the 
ecosystem’s culture and interaction. In order for an organizational ecosystem to be successful a 
combination of leadership, structure and culture is required. Individual leaders within these 
organizations display certain leadership styles and competencies. As such, this study looks into how 
the context of an ecosystem in which an organization participates is linked to the appropriate 
leadership displayed by individuals. We have already discussed the platform leadership mode 
employed by organizations. This section further highlights the role of individual leaders (e.g. senior 
executives) within those organizations. 
LEADERSHIP STYLES 
The relationship between leaders and organizations is a dynamic one. Leadership impacts the strategic 
choices adopted by the organization and the organizational context influences its leadership. Dulewicz 
& Higgs (2005) treat three dimensions of leadership: an intellectual dimension, a managerial dimension 
and an emotional and social dimension. Furthermore, the scholars identified three broad leadership 
style categories: 
 Engaging leadership. A style based on a high level of empowerment and involvement 
appropriate in a highly transformational context. Such a style is focused on producing radical 
change with high levels of engagement and commitment. 
 
 Involving leadership. A style that is based on a transitional organization which faces significant, 
but not necessarily radical changes in its business model or “modus operandi”.  
 
 Goal leadership. A style that is focused on delivering results within a relatively stable context. 
This is a Leader-led style aligned to a stable organization delivering clearly understood results.
        
(Dulewicz & Higgs, 2005, p. 114). 
We employ this categorization of leadership styles in this study, and complement it with a similar 
categorization of leadership styles offered by Ogbonna and Harris (2000) in their study on leadership 
style, organizational culture and performance, derived from empirical evidence of UK companies.  
 Engaging leadership displays similarities with Ogbonna & Harris’ (2000) participative 
leadership. This style consists of – inter alia – consulting subordinates before making decisions 
and taking into account subordinates’ advice and suggestions.  
 Involving leadership resembles Ogbonna & Harris’ (2000) supportive leadership in which 
superiors work to create an enjoyable working environment for subordinates, look out for 
individual wellbeing and treat everyone as equals.   
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 Instrumental leadership (Ogbonna & Harris, 2000) or goal leadership are highly similar in the 
sense that working towards the accomplishment of a certain objective is essential. The 
superior provides clear task descriptions and lays down strict guidelines on the procedures and 
steps to be carried out. Timelines and performance standards are common.  
LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Ogbonna and Harris (2000, p.767) demonstrate that the relationship between leadership style and 
performance is mediated by the nature of organizational culture. Despite some criticism in the 
academic field there is evidence that organizational culture is associated with organizational 
performance. Ogbonna and Harris’s (2000) findings in their empirical research among UK firms provide 
interesting insights. A key finding is that organizations with externally oriented cultures generate 
better organizational performance. Furthermore, strongly held values are appropriate only if the 
culture is geared towards the external environment.  
Ogbonna & Harris (2000, p.773) employ the following categorization of cultures:  
 Competitive: characterized by a focus on goals and tasks. Achieving production goals is critical. 
Individuals are not very personally involved. 
 
 Innovative: these firms are highly dynamic and entrepreneurial. Individuals take risks and are 
committed to innovation and development. Growth and facing new challenges are important. 
 
 Bureaucratic: characterized by formal rules, policies and structures. The emphasis is on 
stability and permanence. Work is coordinated and administrated to achieve smooth 
operations. 
 
 Community: characterized by strong commitment, loyalty and social cohesion. The bond with 
the firm is very personal, and colleagues are like family. Human resources are a priority.  
A common challenge for senior executives is the alignment of organizational culture towards strategic 
demands. Ogbonna and Harris (2000, p.782) argue that efforts should be aimed at creating external 
focus since competitive and innovative cultures that are susceptible to external circumstances enhance 
organizational performance. Their empirical evidence underwrites that both competitive and 
innovative cultures possess an emphasis on external positioning and responsiveness, which in turn 
improves organizational performance. Another implication is that creating a culture that is externally 
oriented is significantly influenced by the degree to which a leader supports followers and includes 
subordinates in decision-making processes (Ogbonna & Harris, 2000, p.783). 
In contrast, internally oriented cultures such as the bureaucratic culture prove to be harmful for 
organizational performance. In order for the culture to deliver long-term competitive advantage, the 
culture must be able to work with external contingencies and display adaptiveness.   
Thus, influencing an organization’s culture is best possible through employment of particular 
leadership styles. Empirical evidence indicates that leadership styles are predictors of competitive and 
innovative cultures, which in turn demonstrate a positive effect on performance (Ogbonna & Harris, 
2000, p.782).  
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Especially in rapidly changing environments the leadership style should support change since 
sustainable effectiveness depends on an organization’s agility. Without effective leadership it is 
impossible for organizations to change with the required speed and to identify new behaviors and 
capacities that arise out of the external environment (Lawler III & Worley, 2012). In connection to the 
section on leadership styles this line of argumentation seems to suggest that a participative style and 
a supportive style may be preferable in an ecosystem environment since these styles contribute to 
creating an externally oriented culture which is vital for the interaction with partners.   
 
In sum, this paragraph’s key message as depicted in Figure 7 is that the effect of leadership style on 
the organizational performance is mediated by the organization’s culture. An externally oriented 
culture (i.e. a competitive or innovative culture) helps the organization to adapt quicker and respond 
to innovations which in turn enhances performance. To arrive at this culture a senior executive’s 
leadership style that involves and supports the organization’s lower ranks may be the preferred choice. 
  
 
 
 
2.6 RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
This section explores the field of network governance and delineates the ecosystems approach lens 
from other constructs in academic literature that describe interdependencies and relationships 
between multiple organizations. The ecosystem concept is merely one of many ways to describe 
interactions between interdependent organizations.  
Adner (2017, p.54) outlines constructs such as platforms (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002), networks and 
alliances (Gulati, 1999), or supply chain and value chains (Simchi-Levi, 2005) to describe similar 
cooperations and transactional ties.  
Figure 7 – The function of leadership style, culture and their effect on organizational performance. (based on Ogbonna & Harris, 2000).  
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In the domain of public administration the construct of network governance is commonly utilized to 
analyze coordination between multiple interdependent actors. Networks of governmental, private and 
civic actors are implemented to increase integration and coordination and to ultimately increase public 
sector efficiency (Molin & Masella, 2015, p.494). As noted in the introduction chapter, network 
governance entails the sharing or connecting of information, resources, activities and competencies of 
at least three organizations to jointly realize a certain outcome (Kenis & Provan, 2008, p.296). For 
example, to combat a massive crisis such as a terrorist attack it is imperative that all the activities of 
the fire departments, the police, medical emergency teams, the municipalities, the military, companies 
and citizens are executed in a coordinated fashion (Kenis & Provan, 2008, p.297). 
DELINEATION OF ECOSYSTEMS VERSUS OTHER STRUCTURES   
This section delineates the ecosystem construct from other interdependency constructs, such as 
networks, social chains, joint ventures, partnerships, consortiums and public-private-partnerships 
[PPP].   
Networks 
The main differences with the ecosystem construct are (1) that networks are always purposefully 
established instead of being self-emergent, and (2) that the network governance literature used in this 
research has its roots in public administration instead of business and strategy literature like the 
ecosystem approach and its components of keystones and platform firms.  
Furthermore, Valkokari (2015, p.19), makes the point based on an article by Heikkilä and Kuivaniemi 
(2012) that the major difference between the concepts of networks and ecosystems lies in the variety 
of actors; ecosystems are said to include more actors than a network. Heikkilä & Kuivaniemi (2012) 
claim that business networks are groups of firms that cooperate to design, build and deliver products. 
The business ecosystem, however, includes partners, subcontractors but also complementors, 
competitors, customers and government entities, incubators, investors and knowledge institutions 
(Heikkilä & Kuivaniemi, 2012, p.19). It seems that an ecosystem is more inclusive and has a broader 
scope. However, both terms are often used to describe the same phenomenon. 
Social Chains  
In a similar vein with networks there is the concept of social chains. Visser (2016, p.186) describes 
social chains as “a temporary, but structural, cooperation pattern of a large number of independent 
parties concerning a dominant chain problem, geared to producing a social product”. Social chains are 
further characterized by exposure to constant changes, interdependence between the participating 
organizations, absence of an enforcing authority and irrational decision-making (Visser, 2016, p.186). 
The metaphor of social chains is often employed to emphasize the sequential connections between 
the different nodes (i.e. organizations) within the chain. An example of a social chain is the criminal 
justice system which entails the first step of arresting a suspect up until the sanctioning and ultimately 
the release and rehabilitation of convicts back into society. Involved organizations are the police, 
forensics, public prosecutors, courts, correctional facilities and probation departments (PwC, 2013, 
p.7).  
Visser (2016, p.23) argues that the concepts of chains and networks can be employed as complements 
to emphasize different aspects of interorganizational cooperation. ‘Network’ emphasizes decision-
making and agreements between organizations, ‘chain’ focuses more on processes and their 
coherence. Conceptualizing cooperation between organizations as social chains directs the attention 
to the functional and logical dimension, i.e. processes and activities delivered by the chain 
organizations. 
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The term ‘chain’ in laymen’s terms implies a temporal sequentiality and a linear process which has 
received criticism (Kort, Van Twist & In ‘t Veld, 2000). However, as noted already, chains and networks 
are very similar and contain reciprocity and dynamic processes. In a social chain the organizations that 
deliver the steps in a chain’s process form a network (PwC, 2013).  
When we compare the concept to ecosystems some differences stand out. For instance, social chains 
lack an overarching dominant authority, thus no single organization has any power over others 
(Grijpink, in Visser, 2016, p.27). This is in contrast with literature on ecosystems in which a leading 
organization (often called ‘keystone’) is always present. Another feature that demands attention is the 
irrationality of decision-making in social chains as a result of the absence of central authority and the 
presence of different goals and interests for every particular organization (Grijpink, in Visser, 2016, 
p.27). In ecosystem literature there is no mentioning of this phenomenon but since the interactions 
among ecosystem members are similar to social chains, and ecosystem leadership by a keystone can 
become contested and challenged by other ecosystem members, imperfect rational decision-making 
could be a factor.  
JOINT VENTURES, (PUBLIC-PRIVATE) PARTNERSHIPS AND CONSORTIUMS  
 
Joint venture  
Adner (2006) seems to suggest that joint ventures between firms in a supply chain are located within 
an ecosystem. A joint venture is a cooperative business enterprise entered into by at least two firms 
with the objective to roll out a project or other commercial endeavor. It creates either a separate entity 
or -  if the parties remain independent - it entails a joint venture agreement (Murray, 2017). This 
suggests that this type of cooperation is highly formalized, project-focused and purely based on 
business interests.  
Partnership 
A partnership entails a legal arrangement where two or more individuals own a business together 
which creates a single business entity. Both parties invest in the business to pursue a particular goal.  
Public-Private-Partnerships 
PPP’s generally are legally formalized forms of cooperation between private and public parties 
(Stadtler, 2012, p.80). Instead of purely being led by hierarchy and/or contract mechanisms these 
partnerships are characterized by interdependency based on trust and reciprocity, thus a ‘network’ 
form of organization (Powell, in Stadtler, 2012, p.80). PPPs are often employed in domains in which 
traditionally the government used to be fully responsible. PPPs can assume two organizational forms: 
(1) a concession or contract form in which the design, building, finance and maintenance of e.g. 
infrastructure projects are integrated, or (2) a partnership form in which different activities and 
projects are integrated to generate synergy (Klijn & Van Twist, 2007).   
Consortium 
A more loose arrangement is the consortium, in which multiple distinct business entities take part. This 
variant is often employed in non-profit domains. The parties agree to pursue some common obligation 
as laid down in the consortium contract but remain independent and have no say over other parties’ 
actions that are not related to the consortium (Murray, 2017).  
Summing up  
Stadtler (2012) describes networks as institutional arrangements of legally autonomous organizations 
that come together through the establishment of social contracts or agreements, rather than legally 
binding contracts. This definition may include joint ventures, PPPs and consortia. These three 
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structures may be present within a network and an ecosystem. It could be that ecosystem members 
choose to further formalize their relationships by entering into a consortium agreement, or engage in 
a joint venture. This does not diminish the influence of the surrounding ecosystem in which the 
organizations operate, it merely formalizes interorganizational relationships to enhance cooperation. 
In contractual partnerships there is a clear transactional component of party A delivering X to party B 
and vice versa. The ecosystem concept is more abstract and concerns the achievement of a shared 
purpose (e.g. security) which entails the sharing of assets between organizations. A consequence of 
this interdependency may be a formalized agreement to share certain data, tools, funding and so on. 
  
In sum, in practice there seems to be overlap between 
networks and ecosystems. The terms are being used 
interchangeably to address network-style interactions. 
It is important to note that ‘ecosystem’ is often used as 
a popular term or ‘buzz word’ to describe networks. 
Inside the ecosystem some organizations can engage in 
formalized contractual cooperation to pursue specific 
goals, such as joint ventures or consortiums. These 
structures describe the (legal) relationship between 
entities but do not constitute separate ecosystems.  
 
 
 
 
THREE FORMS OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
The previous section made clear that networks and ecosystems are very similar. Thus it is interesting 
to learn from existing network governance literature. Unfortunately the existing knowledge on 
ecosystem governance in a public domain is scarce. Therefore this section covers the governance of 
networks which may also be relevant for ecosystem leadership since both concepts are so much alike. 
Kenis and Provan (2008, p.301) developed three forms of network governance shown in Figure 8.  
Figure 7. Visualization of concepts fitting into the ecosystem   
Figure 8: Three forms of network governance. (Source: Kenis & Provan, 2008). 
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In a self-regulating network (or ‘Shared governance’) the coordination of common activities happens 
on behalf of network members themselves. There is no leading entity that governs the cooperation. 
The upside of this is that network members are committed and participate intensively. The downside 
is a high degree of inefficiency, the difficulty of reaching consensus and that there is no clear external 
appearance to third parties (Kenis & Provan, 2008). 
The Lead Organization network reflects vertical relationships of suppliers and customers, resembling 
a supply chain. The cooperation is shaped by common goals and interaction but one member 
organization within the network takes the lead and coordinates important activities and decisions. This 
can be, for instance, the government entity that subsidizes the activities. Enabling and facilitating 
activities of network participants is the key task for the lead organization in order to achieve the 
network’s goals (Kenis & Provan, 2008). This form of network governance is very similar to the 
construct of ecosystems, especially the concept of a keystone organization or ecosystem leader. Kenis 
and Provan’s (2008) concept of lead organization network provides a useful lens to regard network 
approaches in the sphere of national security in which a government organization is often the network 
coordinator. 
A network administrative organization [NAO] is similar to the lead organization network form but 
instead of having a leading organization that participates in the network an NAO consists of having a 
particular entity with the sole purpose of managing and coordinating the network. Its exclusive task is 
to govern the network. The NAO can be a public organization or a non-profit which does not participate 
in the network’s primary process (Kenis & Provan, 2008). This third form of network governance also 
provides relevant insights on ecosystem-style cooperations between organizations in the domain of 
security. 
CONTINGENCY FACTORS INFLUENCING NETWORK FORMS   
For the network to be effective in 
attaining its common objective, 
there should be a match between 
the forms of network governance, 
and at least four contingency 
factors. These are (1) the number 
of network members and (2) the 
need for network-level 
competencies (i.e. administrative 
and networking capacities as well 
as assets), given the fact that the 
larger the network’s scale the 
more difficult its management 
becomes (Stadtler, 2012, p.81). 
The other two factors are (3) the 
level of goal consensus and (4) 
the level of trust (Provan & Kenis, 
2008).  
Figure 9 locates the three 
network forms according to the 
four contingency factors by 
Provan & Kenis (2008).  
 
Figure 9:  Four contingency factors 
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In the Lead Organization (or ‘hub-organization’) form a single entity influences key decisions and 
coordinates the essential activities (Stadtler, 2012). The number of participants should be moderate 
since the lead organization has limited partnership-level competencies. Trust between partners can be 
low but the dyadic levels of trust with the lead organization are required to be strong. Furthermore, 
the network partners are required to agree with the main direction as set out by the leading 
organization. Some level of goal consensus is therefore essential (Stadtler, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 
2008).  
The self-regulating network form requires a small number of members and high levels of trust and goal 
consensus. The need for network competencies is low. The network’s governance relies on the 
commitment of all its partners. As soon as the number of members grows and the need for network 
competencies, levels of trust and goal consensus increases, an NAO form becomes a better alternative 
(Stadtler, 2012, p.83).  
In an NAO the network partners mandate a separate administrative entity that is responsible for the 
coordination of the network. The need for partnership-level competencies is high, as well as its number 
of members. Both goal consensus and level of trust may be moderate (Stadtler, 2012, p.83).  
Based on Provan & Kenis (2008) the table in Figure 10 by Stadtler (2012) presents the four contingency 
factors or predictors of effectiveness. The table also outlines the expected management of design 
challenges and locus of decision-making and coordination.  
 
Figure 10 – Forms of network governance and their main elements (Source: Stadtler, 2012, p.82).  
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2.6 SUMMARY & CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
This chapter’s last section summarizes the key elements. The ecosystem construct has been presented 
with special focus on its origins, its characteristics, its platform leadership and different forms of 
ecosystems. Special attention has been given to the security ecosystem. The ecosystem concept has 
similarities with network governance, a branch of literature that has been covered to delineate the 
ecosystem approach from network approaches and to benefit from insights of both fields.   
According to the literature, a keystone organization leads the ecosystem and stimulates cooperation 
among all members. Aspects of this leadership have been covered and conditions that influence the 
cooperation within networks were presented. Figure 11 represents a conceptual framework built upon 
the content of this chapter to visualize the causal relationships between leadership and the stimulation 
of cooperation between ecosystem members. 
Building upon this chapter’s content we come up with the following definition of the security 
ecosystem:  The security ecosystem is a network of interdependent organizations in which a leading 
keystone organization stimulates and coordinates cooperation through platform leadership to 
pursue a shared purpose that contributes to national security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
Figure 11 – Conceptual Model 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
This chapter outlines the methodology used in this qualitative multiple case study to gather and 
process empirical data. The following elements are covered: the research design and strategy, an 
explanation of the multiple case study strategy, the case selection, and the validity and reliability of 
the results. 
3.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY  
 
This study’s central research question is: How can leadership on an organizational level stimulate 
collaboration between actors in the security ecosystem?  
To help decide which research strategy and data collection methodology fits this particular study we 
follow the process as depicted in the so-called research onion by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2008).  
The illustration presents the different layers of research issues to be decided upon, each layer 
representing a stage in the decision process.  
 
                                                         Figure 12: The Research Onion (source: Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009) 
The research philosophy in this study leans towards interpretivism since the aim is to understand the 
meaning of leadership in a particular organizational context. This requires interpreting the answers 
given by participants, and understanding the meaning attached to words. 
This research’s approach is a deductive qualitative case study. However, we also employ an inductive 
style since the empirical findings will provide new insights to contribute to theory and to adapt our 
conceptual thinking accordingly. Hence, this investigation combines deductive and inductive 
reasoning. Empirical data (inductive) leads to the emergence of concepts and existing concepts 
(deductive) lead to the definition of the relevant data that need to be collected (Yin, 2011, p.94). 
Multiple cases are investigated to explore and contribute to the theory on coordination of national 
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security ecosystems in practice. The next section covers the arguments for choosing the case study as 
the research strategy.  
The previous chapter produced an overview of academic literature on leadership in relation to 
ecosystems and network governance. These findings culminated into a conceptual framework that 
forms the foundation for questions in the interview guide in Appendix A. Through interviews with 
individuals representing the organizations participating in the security ecosystems the empirical data 
is collected. The primary data collection method will thus be the semi-structured interview, supported 
by secondary data derived from document analysis.  The time horizon is cross-sectional since the data 
gathering is conducted on one particular moment (e.g. one interview per organization involved in the 
ecosystem).  
MOTIVES FOR STRATEGY 
The empirical inquiry involves the attempt to understand a phenomenon in its real-life context and 
these contextual conditions (i.e. the security ecosystem and its composition of organizations) require 
the research strategy’s ability to represent the views and perspectives of participants (human 
beings). This purpose of capturing human perspectives and covering contextual conditions in which 
humans are the central subject of research makes a qualitative approach desirable (Yin, 2011). 
The argumentation for utilizing a qualitative case study strategy is founded upon the objective of this 
research to understand how a social phenomenon (i.e. leadership on an organizational level) works in 
reality. Moreover, the research question (a “how?” question) demands an in-depth description of this 
phenomenon for which a case study is a suitable research method. Adding to that, this investigation 
assumes no control over the contemporary set of events that are being studied but the investigator 
does have access to data and persons that are relevant to the research question. The former rules out 
an experimental research method and the latter makes a historical method less suitable which leaves 
the third main method of approaching ‘how’ questions the only remaining option: the case study (Yin, 
2009). This makes a case study the recommended choice of method. 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The case study research method consists of a particular research design which resembles a blueprint 
for this research and addresses the following factors: (1) what questions to study, (2) what data are 
relevant, (3) what data to collect, and (4) how results are analyzed (Yin, 2009).  
This qualitative research started off with a literature review in order to understand the concepts of 
ecosystem, platform leadership and a delineation and comparison with similar concepts such as 
networks and social chains. This exploration of existing literature showed that there is no theory yet 
on leadership in security ecosystems. Hence, this study receives an exploratory design. The exploratory 
design is suitable for exploring new phenomena, to identify variables and especially when a guiding 
framework is absent and measures, variables and instruments are not well known (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2006, p.75). To a certain extent the treatment of the cases under review and an analysis of their 
workings will be descriptive.  
The research reflects an exploratory iterative process which entails that the researcher reflects upon 
findings that are discovered and continuously learns from new empirical data, which leads to 
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adaptation of the conceptual model. The objective is then to come up with a framework built up out 
of theory and empirical data to contribute to the improvement of leadership in security ecosystems. 
The question to study has been covered in the Introduction chapter. The data that are relevant depend 
on the specifics of each case. The main sources of empirical data are the answers given by participants 
during interviews and the content of documents concerning the involved organizations. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Case studies can rely on several sources, such as interviews, direct observation, documentation, 
archival records, participant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin, 2009). The bulk of empirical data 
in this study will be gathered through interviews, supported by the analysis of the content of 
documents. Furthermore, the author was invited to attend a meeting of all partner organizations in 
the Schiphol Airport case which is a form of (participant) observation.  
For the research to be sound it is crucial to select the correct data collection and sampling techniques. 
Interviews 
The type of interview used in this study is the semi-structured or qualitative interview which carefully 
scripts the interaction between an interviewer and a participant but also allows for a conversational 
mode of interviewing and employs open-ended questions. In a structured interview the researcher 
uses a formal questionnaire, takes on the role of an interviewer and employs a consistent form of 
conduct during every interview (Yin, 2011, p.133). In a semi-structured interview the use, the order 
and possible omitting of interview questions is more flexible and depends on the particular interview 
and the conversation flow (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009, p.320). In the qualitative interview the 
researcher aims to better understand the participant’s circumstances and his/her meanings. 
Combining the formal pre-scripted interview form with a conversational style and open-ended 
questions reflects the focused interview form. The set of questions in a focused interview is derived 
from the case study protocol (Yin, 2009). The case study protocol in the appendix contains the 
interview guide, the field study procedures and an overview.  
Documentary analysis  
Part of the resources used will be of secondary nature. Secondary data such as written documents, 
newspaper articles or information from organizations´ websites can be used besides the primary data 
retrieved from interviews (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009, p.258).  
CASE SELECTION 
The selection of cases that researchers employ in their interview research is important for determining 
whether and how interview data can be used to strengthen the research’s validity. This section covers 
the sampling tactics used in this research. Ultimately this study contains three cases that reflect 
security ecosystems in line with the literature: The Hague Security Delta, Schiphol Airport, and the Air 
Force’s maintenance ecosystem. 
Doing preliminary research through interviews is a good way of establishing a clear picture of the 
relevant organizations or people to talk to during the main study. Preliminary interviews help to get a 
sense of the relevant avenues for research and to refine concepts and hypotheses before the 
researcher commences with the main study, i.e. empirical data gathering through interviews (Lynch, 
in Mosley, 2013, p.34).   
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This research benefitted from the help of consultants at PwC as a preliminary investigation and as an 
opportunity to gain access to potential cases. These initial exchanges of ideas cannot be considered 
formal interviews but they were helpful in identifying potentially interesting examples of security 
ecosystems in The Netherlands and for assessing the likelihood of being able to arrange interviews 
with a representative sample of the case population.  
Sampling 
The sampling, or case selection, is about selecting the relevant elements from the total population. In 
this study the total population would entail all security ecosystems.  In qualitative case studies based 
on interviews there are considerable limitations such as time and resources that force the researcher 
to draw samples that are insufficiently large to represent the total population ((Lynch, in Mosley, 2013, 
p.38). Another holy grail in scientific research is the randomization of the population sample which can 
be difficult to achieve when doing qualitative interview-based research.  
 Lynch (in Mosley, 2013) gives us three non-random sampling strategies to use for this study: 
 Purposive sampling  
This form of sampling requires some knowledge on relevant characteristics of the population 
and selecting cases accordingly in order to realize at least some level of representativeness, or 
purposively selecting exceptional cases that deliver outcomes contrary to the hypotheses.  
 Convenience sampling  
This entails interviewing persons that are easy to connect with. This could be as a result of 
prior relationships or another arrangement that does not require much investment. 
 Snowball sampling 
This third type – also referred to as ‘respondent-driven sampling’ – entails the accumulation 
of new respondents in a sample as a result of prior interviewees introducing the researcher to 
new respondents.  This creates a chain of connected respondents that may be very relevant 
to the research but may also harm representativeness of the population.   
 
This case selection uses all three sample approaches. First, relevant cases are identified in the national 
security domain. Second, the participating organizations within the ecosystems need to be identified. 
Third, the researcher employs the sampling tactics by looking within his own and within PwC’s network 
and by exploiting connections with people at those organizations. Having access to at least one 
important node in a security ecosystem was a condition for being able to arrange the first interviews. 
For the Hague Security Delta case this was arranged independently by the author through contacting 
the organizations directly. The other two cases required an introduction of some sort through PwC. 
THREE CASES 
This multiple case study contains three cases that represent very different security ecosystems with 
different levels of maturity. This section briefly explains the motives for the selection. Table 2 
presents an overview of the cases’ characteristics and the number of interviewees. 
 Schiphol Airport: The cooperating organizations that guard and protect the international 
airport – being a paramount object of critical infrastructure – represent a mature and fairly 
traditional subject to investigate within the domain of security. The involvement of a broad 
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range of actors (Marechaussee, NCTV, Schiphol Group, municipality Haarlemmermeer, 
national government, Customs, Openbaar Ministerie, KLM and other businesses), all operating 
on Schiphol airport, makes this case a likely representation of a security ecosystem in 
accordance with the theory as outlined in the Theory chapter. The platform in which the 
collaboration between parties is formalized is named Beveliging & Publieke Veiligheid Schiphol 
[BPVS].  
 
 The Hague Security Delta: In this platform businesses, governments, and knowledge 
institutions work together on innovations and knowledge in the field of cyber security, national 
and urban security, protection of critical infrastructure, and forensics. This relatively young 
initiative (HSD was founded in 2012) presents a rich opportunity to investigate how 
organizational leaders have built and still develop cooperation between actors in these rapidly 
changing fields, e.g. cyber security. Furthermore, preliminary research gives the impression 
that HSD could be a classic example of a business ecosystem driven by security purposes.  
 
 
 Air Force maintenance ecosystem: this ecosystem contains all actors that contribute to the 
affordability, availability and flexibility of the Air Force’s fleet with a focus on maintenance. 
Often presented as the ‘golden triangle’, this ecosystems consists of the Royal Netherlands 
Air Force, original equipment manufacturers [OEM] such as Boeing or Pratt & Whitney, and 
the aerospace & defense industry (mostly SME’s) and research institutions (e.g. NLR). The 
ecosystem is less formalized than the other two cases but provides an arrange of (bilateral) 
partnerships and different gradations of cooperation. 
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Ecosystem Main 
purpose 
 
Topics Size Structure Number of 
respondents 
Background  
Platform 
Beveiliging & 
Publieke 
Veiligheid 
Schiphol 
Improvement 
and 
management 
of security of 
Schiphol 
Airport 
Innovation of 
security 
solutions for 
Schiphol 
8 core 
partners + 
several 
organizations 
involved on 
ad-hoc basis 
Light formal 
governance 
protocols.  
Equal basis. 
 
4 
1 Core partner 
 
1 BPVS official 
 
The Hague 
Security Delta 
 
Innovation of 
security 
solutions and 
(regional) 
economic 
growth 
 
Cyber 
security, 
urban 
security, 
critical 
infrastructure, 
forensics, 
national 
security. 
 
> 250 
partners 
11 Founding 
partners 
+- 28 
premium 
partners 
+-  200 
Network and 
Alliance 
partners 
 
 
Clear 
structure 
and 
protocols. 
Multiple 
tiers of 
partners 
and 
membership 
structure. 
 
7 
 
4 Founding 
partners 
 
1 Premium 
partner 
 
1 HSD Office 
representative 
 
1 Education / 
human capital 
related partner 
 
Air Force 
maintenance 
ecosystem 
Achieving 
availability, 
affordability 
and flexibility 
of the Dutch 
Air Force’s 
fleet, and 
economic 
advantages for 
the involved 
businesses. 
Aircraft 
maintenance, 
component 
maintenance, 
logistics, 
warehousing. 
Depends on 
scope. 
At least 15 
key partners. 
Governance 
protocols, 
different 
layers.  
Bilateral 
agreements. 
3 1 Air Force 
2 Businesses 
Table 3. Overview of case characteristics. 
CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
This section covers the components that make up a case study protocol inspired by Yin (2009). First, 
we cover an overview of the case study project. Second, we explain the field study procedures. Third, 
the case study questions are presented in the form of the interview guide that we use. The last 
components entails the case study report but that is not covered here since this complete thesis is the 
final report.  
The case study project  
The project (i.e. this Master’s thesis) objectives are to find out about the leadership practices in 
security ecosystems and to come up with a normative theoretical framework for leadership that 
stimulates cooperation between organizations within a security ecosystem. This objective is instigated 
by both the capstone thesis project and PwC Consulting for which this research is carried out as part 
of a graduate internship. For PwC the findings about leadership in security ecosystems are useful to 
use as the foundation for advice presented to clients operating in a security domain. 
44 
 
Field study procedures  
Access to the key organizations for arranging interviews will be taken care of through the connections 
of PwC. Practical requirements such as audio-recording tools and software are also in place. Guidance 
and assistance is given by the Leiden University thesis supervisors and the internship coordinator at 
PwC.  
The following schedule is adhered to:  
Date   Progress goal  
March & April 
 
 
Research proposal preparation 
Searching and reading literature 
Formulating research goal, central question and objectives 
May  Onboarding at PwC  
Meeting with relevant people within PwC and discussing ideas on avenues for 
research and case selection 
Literature review 
 
Last week of May  Theoretical framework finished & updated introduction.  
Conceptual model finished 
 
June   
Case selection and description  
Methodology chapter finished 
Planning & setting up interviews & collecting primary documents.   
Formulating interview guide based on theory chapter 
 
July & August  Conducting the interviews & analyzing secondary sources 
Processing interviews -> transcripts 
Respondent validation 
September  Processing interviews and categorizing findings. 
Analysis.  
Room for additional interviews 
 
October  
  
End of October  
Conclusion, updating the introduction and conceptual model  
Editing lay-out 
Executive summary, foreword, cover page, bibliography 
 
Final version submitted 
  
Yin (2009) recommends the preparation of case study questions on different levels ranging from the 
questions to be asked from participants in the interviews to the questions that are employed for the 
entire research. The latter are presented in previous sections and in the introduction chapter. The 
former are given in the interview guide. This guide consists of the questions to be answered by 
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respondents in the interviews but also guides the researcher through the entire process of conducting 
an interview. See Appendix A for the interview guide.  
3.3 RELIABILITY 
This section covers measures taken to enhance the reliability of this research. Reliability is about 
demonstrating to outsiders that this research was done correctly and would render similar results 
when repeated by other scholars.  
In order to guard this study’s replicability it is necessary to be transparent by explaining every step in 
the research process and to record all data. The latter is taken care of by recording the interviews and 
maintaining a log of the verbal transcripts. Respondent validation will be employed if things are not 
fully clear in order to receive feedback from participants and thus to enhance reliability of the 
statements.  
 
The case selection consists of an explanation of the motives for choosing particular cases. Cases are 
selected on their merits and relevance to the theoretical concepts in order to collect insights from 
representative security ecosystems in The Netherlands. Within this selection a further selection was 
made by assessing which cases promised to be most suitable in terms of connections to the right 
people. 
Enhancing reliability in this research also involves the inclusion of different participants in the 
interviews to crosscheck statements and to look for possible contradictions.  
A frequent challenge to the reliability of interview data is that people report on their own actions, not 
necessarily portraying the real story of what happened. This is a clear weakness of relying on interviews 
which can be minimized by relying on multiple independent respondents and comparing their answers. 
Another measure is to maximize the information strength of the researcher. This means that the 
researcher is well prepared and has gained as much knowledge as possible on the subject matter of 
the case study. 
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4. RESULTS 
In this chapter the results of the data collection are described. The data collected through interviews* 
and content analysis of documents enables a description of the reviewed cases. This chapter is 
categorized into the three cases under review: The Hague Security Delta, Schiphol Airport, and the Air 
Force maintenance ecosystem.  
The first section introduces the ecosystems and describes which partners are involved , how they relate 
to each other and what main purpose thrives their collaboration. The second section covers the 
leadership styles identified by the interviewees and explains how decision-making takes place in the 
ecosystem. Section number three deals with the culture perceived by the respondents and relates this 
to their own organization’s culture. The fourth section covers the formal side of the ecosystem 
governance and goes into detail about the ecosystem’s growth stages, the governance structures and 
network style. The last section deals with the ecosystem’s resilience.  
The interviews are conducted on an anonymous basis and the verbal interview transcripts therefore 
remain confidential since their content would potentially risk the loss of participants’ anonymity. 
Therefore the transcripts are not included in the appendix.  
 
*The respondents consist of a mix of males and females. For the sake of anonymity all the given answers are presented as if expressed by a 
male interviewee (e.g. “He argues that..”).  
4.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
 
This section briefly summarizes the most important findings per case. The next chapter – Analysis – 
provides a cross-case analysis and relates the findings to the theoretic models and definitions from 
existing literature as described in the Theory chapter.  
THE HAGUE SECURITY DELTA 
The HSD is a security cluster that connects over 250 public and private partners in order to foster 
cooperation and innovation in the field of security. Its main purpose is two-sided: contributing to 
national security and to economic prosperity. With seven interviews this case is covered by a rich 
collection of different perspectives which provides a reliable representation of the population. 
 
The ecosystem consists of different tiers of partners which is manifested in a membership structure. 
There is no consensus about the leadership style but it seems that almost all interviewees expect a 
degree of goal leadership from the ecosystem’s leader(s) in order to set clear programming and focus 
areas for the cluster to pursue. This is to be accompanied by leaders that allow participation and foster 
engagement, leaders that are able to connect with others. Trust and personal involvement are vital 
ingredients as well. 
The strategic decision-making occurs on HSD board level which consists of the eleven founding 
partners. The daily operations are carried out by the HSD Office which also prepares policy and 
planning. The Office acts as a facilitator and broker between (potential) partners, in which they are 
very successful. An important note is that partners that invest the most effort in networking and 
seeking opportunities with other partners receive the most benefits from the ecosystem.   
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A combination of an innovative and a community culture is ideal for HSD according to most 
interviewees. Both cultures reflect HSD but they are accompanied by a level of bureaucracy as a result 
of the presence of the government and large business enterprises. The presence of businesses also 
brings a competitive culture but this is mitigated by the context and the shared interests. HSD aims at 
fostering collaboration for innovation in the pre-competitive stage which reduces competitive 
tendencies. Interestingly, most interviewees said to have a bureaucratic culture in their own 
organization which apparently is not an obstacle for fostering an innovative community culture in the 
ecosystem as a whole.   
The sharing of assets is limited according to most interviewees but this is nuanced by the interviewee 
from HSD Office itself. In projects closed off from others there is a great deal of sharing which is 
enabled through trust and legal assurances.  
Most important growth stages have been the creation, the consolidation and the current stage of 
materialization in which the HSD shall have to deliver concrete big results. The appropriate leadership 
style evolves accordingly, the suitable style being very much goal oriented in the early phase of the 
HSD ecosystem. 
Most interviewees regard the HSD as a combination of an NAO and a Lead Organization. The HSD Office 
is considered to adopt both lead roles. Interviewees assert that a self-regulating network is ideal but 
in practice impossible to achieve.   
 
The ecosystem’s resilience seems to be solid as a result of the considerable amount of knowledge that 
the 250+ partners contribute. However, the HSD is vulnerable if multiple large players should withdraw 
or if the government subsidies are reversed. Not all interviewees are convinced that the HSD is fully 
self-supporting yet. 
SCHIPHOL AIRPORT – BPVS  
 
Schiphol Airport’s security matters are coordinated in the BPVS (Beveiliging & Publieke Veiligheid 
Schiphol) platform, which consists of all the public and private actors that perform actions that are 
related to the airport’s integral security. The findings in this research are based on four interviews with 
senior level representatives of partner organizations. A secondary source used is a publication of the 
NCTV about the BPVS ecosystem which contains an interview with Schiphol’s CEO. 
The platform’s main purpose is the management and improvement of Schiphol Airport’s security. The 
cooperation is only slightly formalized with a terms of reference document. The heads of organizations 
meet on a biannual basis to decide on the strategic policy and to develop creative solutions for security 
challenges. The BPVS steering committee meets on a regular basis and its workgroups are set up per 
subject area to implement projects.   
The decision-making takes shape on the basis of consensus and all partners have an equal impact. 
However, the NCTV and Schiphol Group are considered to be the most powerful depending on the 
context. The two organizations share the rotating presidency over the BPVS. 
The top-level BPVS meetings exert a goal setting leadership style which directs the workgroups lower 
down the chain what projects to take up. Within these workgroups the leadership style is more 
engaging and involving. However, the realization of concrete project goals in these workgroups also 
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requires directive leadership. One interviewee did not believe in the applicability of any particular 
leadership style since all members jointly reach agreements. It seems that engaging and involving 
leadership are equally present, supplemented by goal leadership when a powerful organization takes 
the lead, e.g. the NCTV. 
The ecosystem’s culture is innovative since the organization’s leaders have to come up with creative 
solutions to counter security challenges. The community culture is also visible since they are mutually 
dependent and collaborate intensively. The partners know each other very well on a personal level. 
They all experience the urgency of cooperation and their mutual interests in ensuring the airport’s 
smooth operation.  
Assets are shared, for example to implement projects. The best example is the establishment of the 
CCTV infrastructure which was realized through a public-private partnership financed by Schiphol 
Group and the NCTV. This represents an important milestone for the BPVS platform, as is also the case 
for the Joint Inspection Centre. 
The ecosystem’s growth stages can be divided in a pre-platform stage (the Commission Oord’s formal 
investigation in the wake of the diamond robbery crisis), a creation stage (BPVS is created under the 
leadership of Ruud Oord), a consolidation stage in which the cooperation takes shape and the first 
milestones are accomplished (e.g. the CCTV system), and its current stage in which new topics are 
introduced as a result of the threats arising in the external environment (e.g. cyber security and 
terrorism). We can define this as a revitalization stage, which does not imply that the BPVS was inactive 
in any way but merely points out that new topics and challenges are introduced. Important 
achievements are that the BPVS has increased the efficiency of security processes, lowered crime rates 
and has created a more open culture among partners.  
In the early phases the impact of individual leaders was crucial for the achievement of the first 
milestone (CCTV infrastructure) and the start of the platform itself. This required the setting of clear 
goals and providing focus. Furthermore it needed an individual leader such as Ruud Oord whom is said 
to be responsible for the successful creation of the BPVS and who is a true connector.  
Interviewees disagree on the form of the network governance style. There are elements of Lead 
Organization since the NCTV and Schiphol Group are more powerful. The NCTV is able to enforce 
actions in certain contexts. Most of the time the collaboration between partners can be regarded as a 
self-regulating network. Therefore a hybrid between both forms best describes the ecosystem. 
Dependencies between partners are great and the ability for partners to fill the gap in case an 
organization fails to step up to its tasks is very limited. This poses a risk to the ecosystem’s resilience. 
However, partners are held accountable and issues are addressed in the platform or on a bilateral 
basis. This has never led to major issues and despite shortages of staff and resources there has not 
been a major shortcoming as a result of these contingencies.  
AIR FORCE MAINTENANCE ECOSYSTEM 
The parties that are active in the MRO (maintenance, repair, overhaul) of the RNLAF weapons systems 
make up the air force maintenance ecosystem. The findings in this research are based on three 
interviews with one senior officer (RNLAF) and two directors from businesses (SME’s) that are partners 
of the RNLAF at Woensdrecht Air Base.  
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The ecosystem’s main purpose is enhancing the availability and affordability of the RNLAF’s weapons 
systems. The industry serves the RNLAF by offering its flexible capacity. For the private businesses 
involved there are commercial motives in terms of generating revenue but most important to benefit 
from the RNLAF as launching customer and its warm relationships with OEMs.  
The partnerships are worked out bilaterally and consist of a reconnaissance stage, a transition stage 
and an operational stage. The reconnaissance provides the basis for mutual goals and the scope of the 
cooperation after which a letter of intent is agreed upon. To manage the operational stage a steering 
committee is set up, consisting of the executives of the industry partner and the RNLAF. 
The RNLAF is able to steer the ecosystem to a certain extent but its influence on OEMs is limited. OEMs 
have a powerful position as monopolists and exclusive owners of data and licenses. The lower tier in 
terms of power are the SME’s in the aerospace and defense industry.  
Between the partners the leadership styles are engaging and involving in order to arrive at mutual 
commitment to the bilateral partnership. The leadership style within the organizations is primarily goal 
leadership, supplemented by engaging and involving leadership. Resistance to changes and to the 
partnership with external parties is most often present in the middle level management. In order to 
align the middle level management the C-level displays directive leadership. SME’s adopt an engaging 
leadership style in their interactions with the RNLAF since they cannot directly demand actions. Their 
main challenge is to build trust, to stimulate the RNLAF to cooperate through sharing experience and 
knowledge, and to prove that they can contribute to increasing flexibility. 
The ecosystem’s culture is innovative. However, SME’s experience the RNLAF as bureaucratic and 
resembling a community. The interviewees’ self-assess their organizational cultures as innovative. One 
interviewee perceives the OEMs as primarily bureaucratic cultures whom claim to be innovative but 
are actually old fashioned large bureaucratic corporations. The SME’s display more agility and speed, 
and are truly innovative. 
Assets are shared, for instance the use of spare capacity of the RNLAF’s facilities by industry partners. 
Since this case differs from the other two ecosystems in the sense that there is no clear formal 
demarcation of what the ecosystem actually is (as opposed to the HSD and BPVS platforms) the 
ecosystem growth stages are not clear. However, the bilateral collaboration between the RNLAF and 
industry partners does reflect clear stages: The partnership’s growth stages can be divided into a 
reconnaissance stage, a transition stage and an operational stage. The scope and goals, and the 
concrete milestones to be achieved are all formulated in a letter of intent. An important factor for 
success is the individual leadership displayed by the top-management and their courage to undertake 
entrepreneurial actions.  
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4.2 THE HAGUE SECURITY DELTA 
The HSD case is covered in seven interviews with people representing their organization. One 
respondent represents the HSD Office itself, the remaining six respondents represent organizations 
that are active participants in the HSD cluster. The interviewees represent a diversified mix of 
organizations. For the sake of anonymity the names of participants and their organization will remain 
confidential but it should be noted that this section’s findings are based upon interviews with 
respondents from two major private businesses  (founding partners), one research institution closely 
involved in the founding and design of the HSD organization, one education institution, one ministry 
and one local government. Their personal positions are either on a senior executive level, meaning 
that they represent their organization in formal contacts with(in) HSD, or on an operational level 
serving directly under the senior board level  which enables a reliable assessment of how things work 
in the cooperation with other partners in the ecosystem. The next table provides information on the 
participants with respect to their anonymous participation in this research. 
Interview Type of organization Type of position Relation to HSD 
A1 Education / Knowledge 
institution 
Senior executive / 
advisor 
Enables the 
universities to join 
forces and strengthens 
the HSD’s human 
capital. 
 
A2 Large Corporation Portfolio Manager Founding partner 
A3 Local government Programme 
Manager 
Founding partner 
A4 Research Institution Senior Executive Premium partner and 
closely involved in the 
launch of the HSD 
A5 Ministry Senior government 
official 
Founding partner 
A6 Large corporation Senior executive Founding partner 
A7 HSD Office Senior executive HSD Office runs daily 
operations, brokers, 
facilitates and 
prepares policy and 
planning. 
Table 4 – Characteristics of interviewees 
WHAT IS THE HSD? 
The Hague Security Delta positions itself as the “ (..) leading security cluster of Europe. In this Dutch 
cluster – with important regional hubs in The Hague, Twente and Brabant – companies, governments 
and knowledge institutions work together on innovations and knowledge development in the security 
domain.” (HSD, 2017, p.9). HSD is managed by the HSD Office and functions as a platform that connects 
the three different branches of partners in order to foster cooperation. HSD currently consists of over 
250 partners ranging from multinational companies to small start-ups, and including national and local 
governments, universities and research labs, and international organizations (HSD, 2017, p.10). HSD’s 
main functions are the establishment of an agenda to create focus on key security themes, connecting 
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parties through matchmaking and networking, facilitating knowledge transfer and providing partners 
with tools and advice, and brokering agreements between parties (HSD, 2017). 
The following sections provide a coherent description of how the respondents describe their 
experiences with – inter alia - cooperating in their ecosystem, the leadership style, network 
governance and ecosystem resilience. The structure of the interview questionnaire is adhered to. 
THE ECOSYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND MAIN PURPOSES  
 
Cooperation 
The respondents’ qualifications of their cooperation are diverse. There is no clear cut answer and many 
angles are brought forward. In general, most respondents seem satisfied and describe the cooperation 
as ‘good’ or ‘smart’ but critical remarks are voiced too. “The cooperation is built on the premises that 
all organizations want to participate because they made a conscious decision to become members, it 
requires organizations to put effort into it (..) paying a financial contribution works as an incentive for 
organizations to make that decision consciously and to invest in the cooperation to make it a profitable 
investment” (Interview A7).  
Several interviewees bring up the Triple Helix approach which is a cooperation model for public actors, 
private companies and research institutions. Most of the criticism voiced by interviewees has a 
connection with the presence of these three branches of partners. “There are tensions between the 
education and research institutions and the other (commercial and government) partners” (Interview 
A1). Furthermore, a government interviewee addresses the tensions between the national 
government’s goals and the local government’s goals (Interview A5). Another interviewee emphasizes 
that the private sector and knowledge institutions are actively engaged but that this cannot be said of 
the national government which is “looking from the sidelines” (Interview A4).  
Positive remarks often reflect the HSD’s strength in creating shared interests and connecting supply 
and demand which fosters innovation and increases employment for the region. For one large private 
company the cooperation enables the company to achieve innovation and connect with smaller and 
more agile parties through partnerships (Interview A2). Another interviewee who holds a seat in the 
HSD’s supervisory board briefly describes the cooperation as “formal, like you would expect from 
board meetings” (Interview A6). However, he does not enjoy a feeling of true commitment by all 
members, no strong sense of cohesion. He does assert that every partner feels a sense of urgency and 
there is agreement on the shared interests but it is very complex to generate an equal level of 
satisfaction for all parties since their organization’s interests are not similar (Interview A6).  
Another interviewee provides an example of the sense of urgency: “The urgency is clear: every three 
seconds somewhere in the world a new form of malware is developed. My own staff of IT analysts can 
never keep up with that, so we all have to cooperate! Other parties have their expertise in different 
niches” (Interview A2).  
Main purpose 
The official HSD documents describe HSD’s goal as follows: “to stimulate cooperation between 
businesses, governments and knowledge institutions in the security domain so that knowledge is 
shared and mutual innovations are developed with an eye to the future. Goal is to increase (digital) 
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security, strengthen the international competitiveness of the Netherlands and create more jobs.” 
(HSD, 2017).  
The interviewees provide a broad variety of purposes that underpin their commitment to cooperate 
in the HSD. Ranging from pure commercial motives (interview A2 and A6), the purpose of educating 
cyber security professionals of the future and thus developing knowledge and human capital (interview 
A1), to public policy related purposes such as increasing employment levels (interview A3), and 
fostering innovation and enhancing the linkage of supply and demand in the security domain (interview 
A4). However, every interviewee also explicitly stresses the importance of jointly strengthening 
national security through the cooperation in HSD. There seem to be no issues among actors in 
recognizing the urgency and importance of this shared purpose.   
  
Nevertheless, all parties involved assert that there are conflicting goals that undermine that joint effort 
towards a single purpose. Not all different goals are necessarily in conflict with each other, such as the 
pursuit of innovation and the local government’s ambition to increase employment levels. But, and 
this is a recurrent theme, the presence of multiple actors with different interests creates tensions and 
blurry relationships. Not all interviewees feel comfortable with cooperating with potential 
competitors, depending on the context and subject. This is true for businesses among each other, 
businesses vis-à-vis research institutions but also between government actors. This brings us to the 
next section on differences between partners.  
In sum, the HSD’s main purpose is two-sided. It has a societal purpose of generating solutions for 
security challenges in order to better protect citizens, and an economic purpose consisting of: 
valorization of knowledge (research institution’s goal), increasing revenues and profits (businesses’ 
goal) and to create jobs (local government’s goal) (Interview A7).  
Different tiers of partners 
In the HSD the membership structure clearly distinguishes between founding partners, premium 
partners and network partners. These are paid memberships that are accompanied by certain 
privileges. The fourth option is an alliance partnership which is intended for non-profit organizations. 
The founding partners displayed in Figure 13 each deliver one board member to the HSD Office which 
co-decides on the main strategy and focus areas of the HSD cluster as a whole. Four interviewees from 
four different founding partners are represented in this research.  
Figure 13 : HSD Founding partners. Source: (HSD Facts and Figures 2016, HSD website).  
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The premium partners in Figure 14 are the middle tier, these parties pay a smaller contribution to the 
HSD and enjoy somewhat different privileges. They have limited influence on the cluster’s strategic 
directions compared to the founding partners. One of the interviewees represented this tier of 
partners. 
 
 
The third and fourth categories are the network partners and alliance partners. The former category 
consists of approximately 170 different organizations, mostly small businesses and local government 
authorities. The latter category contains non-profits.  
When asked about their view on the differences between tiers of partners as laid down in the 
partnership structure most interviewees recognize differences between partners in terms of impact or 
other size and power-related factors. One interviewee from a large corporation does not experience 
differences between tiers of partners other than the fact that founding partners occupy a seat on the 
HSD board and decide on the roadmaps (Interview A2). Another interviewee argues that the 
differences between tiers are not clearly visible but that the presence of many parties does reduce 
focus since they bring along their own specific interests and goals (Interview A5).  
One interviewee makes a distinction between the formal side of the division into three partnership 
subscriptions and the practical side of the actual actions undertaken by partners. What is most 
important is not solely an actor’s formal partnership status but how much he invests in the network in 
terms of time and energy to build connections and seize opportunities (Interview 3 and 7). Interviewee 
A4 argues that a few big players are involved and lots of smaller ones that are dependent upon the 
powerful. However, it remains of vital importance to invest in the network in order to harvest results 
regardless of size. Partners that just pay their annual contribution and decide to wait for things to 
happen will not enjoy much benefit from HSD.  
Within the tiers there are factors that cause some partners to dominate more than others. For 
instance, one interviewee asserts that since the HSD is a political environment containing government 
actors this results in dynamics in which those leaders with extensive political and administrative skills 
or experience are able to dominate more. Another consequence of the government’s presence is that 
for some subjects it generates uncomfortable situations when also having foreign businesses at the 
table, for example when the Ministry of Defense wishes to discuss projects (Interview A6).  
 
Figure 14 : HSD Premium partners. Source: (HSD Facts and Figures 2016, HSD website).  
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ECOSYSTEM LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING  
Leadership styles 
The questions regarding leadership styles proved to be challenging for interviewees to respond to. 
There is no consensus at all and the answers differ across the respondents. Some interviewees simply 
state that all leadership styles that are presented in the question (engaging, involving, goal leadership) 
are visible in HSD.  
Interviewee A1 cannot say he feels involved by the HSD, but assures that it is important to know each 
other, to speak the same language and to connect with people. Competitive behavior is damaging to 
the ecosystem (Interview A1). Interviewee A2 opts for the involving leadership style, supported by the 
engaging style. He asserts that the entire structure of the HSD is aimed at sharing knowledge and 
involving others, reflecting a community of connected people. The third interviewee distinguishes 
between the different projects in HSD. Some require a different leadership style than others. In a 
project concerning partners with strong expertise a directive leadership style is unsuitable since the 
participants know best what to do. The focus then should be on facilitating and creating connections 
(Interview A3). 
Interviewee A4 emphasizes that the partners involved in the HSD should receive the credits and public 
exposure for accomplishments, not the HSD office itself. It seems that this respondent stresses that 
the HSD’s executive committee should perform a humble facilitating role as platform custodians. He 
envisages a role for the HSD’s leaders to formulate clear goals and to lay down outlined programs of 
major themes on which the HSD should focus. In a sense this requires a directive leadership style. 
However, he also emphasizes leaders’ ability to empower people and to connect on a personal level 
(Interview A4). This is supported by Interviewee A5 who first emphasizes an engaging and involving 
leadership style but that a need for clear goals and focus simultaneously demands a directive goal 
leadership style. He also formulates a ‘non-interventionist’ style which reflects the interactions 
between HSD partners. For instance, the often conflicting interests and conflicting goals are ignored 
and left out of discussions which seems to block progress (Interview A5).  
Interviewee A6 resolutely opts for a highly directive goal leadership style to describe the HSD board. 
All the board members are established executives and government leaders employing a directive style. 
The current chairman demands active participation and employs a directive style. According to the 
interviewee there ought to be more inspirational leadership and thought leadership to inspire and 
challenge the well-established senior board members of HSD, to generate fresh energy. This could be 
arranged by inviting guest speakers or experts in for instance the field of hacking. 
The insights from the interviewees on leadership style have an interesting connection with the growth 
stages of the ecosystem. This relationship will be analyzed in the next chapter. For example, one 
interviewee said the following: “ (..) Now it is an engaging and a goal leadership style. In the early days 
it was more goal leadership. Nowadays organizational leaders pay more attention to the common 
interests of everyone” (Interview A7).   
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Leaders’ impact on joint pursuit of the shared purpose? 
When confronted with this question some of the interviewees provide answers about personal 
leadership styles and personality traits. Others elaborate on the role of HSD Office and approach this 
question from the perspective of coordinating the interaction between partners.  
The first interviewee stresses the importance of individual leadership and knowing your network 
partners on a personal level (Interview A1). Interviewee A3 further adds the importance of building 
trust between partners which takes time and energy to build. Trust grows through cooperation and 
knowing each other, which leads to new collaborations between partners that did not previously know 
each other. This ultimately enables innovations for which trust is crucial (Interview 3). Besides knowing 
each other, having a sense of ownership is important as well (Interview A1). 
A recurrent factor mentioned by the interviewees is the role that they envision for the HSD’s board. 
Interviewee A4 advises the HSD to programme more in the sense of selecting clear goals about the 
content or subject areas to focus on. Interviewee A2 provides a similar argument which entails that 
the founding partners ought to gather information from all ecosystem members in order to know what 
occupies them and what their level of knowledge is. Based on these findings the board should decide 
what themes to focus on, setting the frameworks and directions for HSD.   
This argument for directive leadership from the major partners is supported by the assertion that it is 
impossible to set the agenda with that many partners so the big players should (Interview A2).  
Besides more focus on goals interviewee A4 mentions a clear focus on finance. As a result of various 
sources of funding goal diffusion arises. He therefore pleads for establishing a clear programme with 
a finance structure. The major corporations can function as a sounding board. “Thus, HSD needs clear 
directive goals, one single purpose with selected sources of finance. (…) This requires a directive 
leadership style in order to foster a community culture in the end” (Interview A5).  
Another suggestion is the introduction of a code of conduct in order to guard healthy relationships and 
the sharing of information in a safe manner without generating conflicts of interests (Interview A6).  
In sum, four interviewees mention in different wording the importance of setting clear goals and 
establishing focus, and they expect the HSD’s board to provide this (Interview A2,A4,A5 and A6). 
Furthermore, interviewee A5 adds that a strong identity is vital. Trust and having personal relationships 
are also frequently mentioned as a recipe for creating a joint effort towards a shared purpose 
(Interview A1 and A3).  
Decision-making and the governance structure  
This section deals with the respondents’ views on the decision making within the HSD ecosystem. In 
this context, we refer to the decision-making in the HSD board that consists of the founding partners. 
Since the treatment of this aspect overlaps with the interview question on the formal governance 
structure of the HSD both are presented here. 
First, a distinction is visible between those interviewees that are in the HSD board themselves and 
those who are not. The latter often have no clear view on the decision-making process. 
The interviewees representing HSD founding partner organizations describe that decision-making on 
the strategic directions and roadmaps happens on an equal footing and in consensus (Interview A2).  
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“It has never happened that I strongly opposed the decision-making because it seems logical what we 
do” (Interview A6).  
Regarding the formal governance structure the HSD describes itself as “The HSD Foundation exists of 
the HSD Board, HSD Executive Board and the HSD Office. Besides, several HSD partners, including the 
Municipality of The Hague, Chamber of Commerce, RVO and InnovationQuarter, support the cluster 
with their expertise. They form a strong network that has been essential for the cluster’s growth.” 
(HSD, 2017).  
According to an interviewee the HSD Board – which is the decision-making body on strategic policy – 
acts like a supervisory board for the executive board (Interview A6). They are occupied with strategic 
directions and usually meet on a quarterly basis. The day-to-day operations are run by the HSD Office. 
The HSD Office is responsible for preparing and making policy in accordance with the Board’s vision. 
The board members give their approval and are able to steer towards a certain direction to 
accommodate new developments within the network or in the security domain (Interview A3). The 
primary lead role on a daily basis is executed by the HSD Office, headed by director Richard Franken.  
Besides the formal decision-making it should be noted that one interviewee explains how the most 
actively involved partners have the strongest influence on the agenda, the annual plan and the 
strategic direction. “Those parties that present themselves most actively as stakeholders by offering 
solutions on the supply side, or influencing the formulating of demands on the demand side, can 
influence HSD’s agenda” (Interview A7). This supports the remarks made by other interviewees 
regarding the effort invested in the cooperation which determines the level of influence one has. 
ECOSYSTEM CULTURE 
Culture 
The interviewees were asked on their opinion about the ecosystem’s culture, and were presented the 
four categories as described in the theory chapter: an innovative culture, a competitive culture, a 
bureaucratic culture and a community culture.  
The first relevant finding is that almost all interviewees agree on the ideal culture for HSD: a 
combination of an innovative and a community culture. However, all four cultures seem to be present 
according to some. One respondent describes it as “HSD wants the innovative and community cultures. 
However, obviously it is also competitive because businesses are present, and to a certain extent it is 
bureaucratic since government actors and large corporations bring this culture inevitably” (Interview 
A7). Some interviewees regard HSD as clearly having an innovative culture combined with a 
competitive culture (Interview A1 and A5). Others stress the combination of an innovative culture and 
an inevitable bureaucratic culture (Interview A2 and A3).  
Important to note is that a couple of interviewees stress the impact of the context on the culture.  
The founding partners experience a different culture among each other than the dozens of small start-
ups that cooperate. One interviewee representing a large corporation expects that these small 
businesses cooperate in a more community-like fashion which is what the cyber security domain needs 
(Interview A6).  
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The dynamics between parties change when initiatives transfer from the pre-competitive stage to the 
competitive stage. As soon as multiple corporations enter the tendering process for a project they are 
clearly competitors in pursuit of winning the tender bid. However, HSD focuses on fostering 
cooperation and subsequent innovation in the pre-competitive stage.  
In sum, the majority of interviewees experience an innovative culture often combined with elements 
of a community culture and to some degree there is competition between partners. As a result of the 
presence of large corporations and government entities there are bureaucratic influences that seem 
to be inevitable.  
Individual organization’s culture 
This section deals with the assessment of interviewees’ own organizational culture. Are the partners 
also considered to be innovative and community-oriented or can the individual organizations reflect a 
different dominant culture than the HSD’s partners collectively? 
The latter seems to be the case. Four out of seven interviewees acknowledge that they reflect a 
bureaucratic culture. Both large corporations involved in this study provide similar answers: they are 
large organizations which inevitably is accompanied by a degree of bureaucracy but depending on the 
division or department they also are exceptionally innovative (Interview A2 and A6). The Ministry and 
the local government involved in this study are bureaucracy prototypes but one interviewee also adds 
that his department is nevertheless externally oriented (Interview A3).  
Two interviewees are outspoken about their organization reflecting the community culture (Interview 
A1 and A7). No interviewee explicitly referred to his organization as reflecting a competitive culture. 
 
ECOSYSTEM FEATURES   
 
Sharing assets 
This section briefly explains whether interviewees believe the partners in HSD share their assets. The 
short answer to this question is: barely. All but one interviewee deny that the partners share assets. 
This requires further examination, especially since the general expectation is that this type of 
cooperation necessitates sharing of assets. Interviewee A7 explains that since HSD partners cooperate 
in the pre-competition phase this does enable the sharing of assets which is dependent on the 
organization’s leadership. When partners choose to intensify collaboration on specific projects they 
also share assets. As interviewee A7 talks about the sharing of assets: “The more they trust each other, 
the more this happens. HSD creates the necessary conditions and this can result in innovation projects 
which are closed off to the rest of the ecosystem. Within these projects the parties can invest and 
among parties there is a high degree of sharing of assets. It is a trusted community” (Interview A7).  
Growth stages and milestones 
The first growth stage was the initial phase of setting up the HSD with a selected number of sizeable 
partners using an alignment strategy to connect new partners (Interview A7). The ecosystem is coupled 
with a partnership structure (i.e. the different paid ‘subscriptions’ for partners) thought out by 
Twynstra Gudde (Interview A1). The initiative thus started out with a few large organizations. 
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Furthermore, the HSD became physically tangible in the campus location which rents its offices to the 
HSD partners. “The heart of the ecosystem is the physical environment, along which the ecosystem is 
built, coupled with the partnerships structure” (Interview A1).  
For some, the physical location constitutes milestone two, the HSD’s creation being milestone number 
one (Interview A2). The early days were about making the HSD well known to the outside world, adding 
more partners and pursuing quick wins. Two interviewees mention that the initial phase also drew 
many “cowboys” eager to earn money through short-term added value in cyber security (Interview A1 
and A4).  
The second stage can be summarized as the consolidation stage. Several interviewees mention that 
this stage was about attracting more partners, creating visibility and proving that it is a durable 
endeavor. It was also about finding a common direction with all the public and private parties involved. 
The ecosystem grew from an initiative by a selected few big players to a self-guiding one (Interview 
A6).  
One interviewee asserts that since the governance has become heavier there has been a decline in the 
dynamics in the ecosystem. And since the governance does not programme enough the quality of the 
leadership has diminished (Interview A4).  
A third stage can be identified since some interviewees mentioned – independently of each other -  
that the HSD is currently in a materialization stage. This phase is about delivering tangible results in 
the form of projects or e.g. a national testbed, or the HSD taking up the role of a regulatory body in 
cyber security (Interview A6). Another interviewee treats inclusiveness as a key challenge for HSD 
today. “How do you keep everyone on board?” (Interview 2). This requires HSD programmes.  All the 
players should enjoy the benefits and added value of participating (interview A4).  
Thus, the current phase is the materialization of results; concrete added value such as more jobs and 
growing revenues which is taken care of through realizing results in HSD’s programming. This requires 
tangible examples that contribute to the two-sided main purposes (Interview A7).  
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GOVERNANCE STYLE AND RESILIENCE  
Network governance style  
 
This section deals with the network governance 
constellation based on Kenis & Provan’s (2008) three 
forms.  The illustration was presented to interviewees 
whom were asked to choose the form they recognized 
most in the HSD. The replies are diverse and different 
arguments were put forward. Some interviewees 
mentioned hybrid forms (e.g. elements of an NAO 
combined with self-regulating elements) or that it 
depends on the context in which HSD partners cooperate. 
 Self Regulating Network: Interviewee 7, but not exclusively. 
 Lead Organization: Interviewee A6. 
 NAO: Interviewee A1,A 4 and A5.  
 A combination of NAO and Lead Organization: Interviewee A2 and A3. 
 A combination of a self-regulating network and a Lead Organization: interviewee A7. 
The intention behind HSD is to become a self-regulating network in the long term (Interviewee A7). 
Interviewees agree that the ideal situation is to have a self-regulating network since this better reflects 
the business culture and the broader developments in society of the breakdown of barriers and 
hierarchical structures (Interview A2).  For the ecosystem’s continuity and sustainability it is best to 
have a self-regulating network since the ecosystem is otherwise too dependent upon powerful leading 
organizations that may withdraw (Interviewee A1). This argument is also relevant for the next section 
on the ecosystem’s resilience.  
The interviewees that regard HSD as an NAO provide a reasoning that emphasizes HSD Office’s role as 
a broker or connector. HSD Office is the NAO. They connect potential partners and facilitate the 
collaboration but they do not possess the (technological) knowledge themselves. Furthermore, not all 
collaborations run through them (Interviewee A4 and A5). The proponents of the combination of NAO 
and Lead Organization provide similar arguments (Interview A2 and A3).  
Interviewee A6 strongly opposes the NAO, saying that the HSD Office is both active as a governing 
entity but also runs operational matters as a Lead Organization.  
The combination of a self-regulating network and a Lead Organization is proposed by interviewee A7 
and receives support by interviewee A2. The ideal situation would be a self-regulating network but in 
order to arrive there an organization has to take the lead. Interviewee A5 opposes the idea of a self-
regulating network since “you need a captain”. The network requires an “engine” because otherwise 
“nothing happens” (Interview A7).  So the HSD Office acts as the Lead Organization. However, the HSD 
is a networked organization itself. The foundation cooperates as a network partner with the Dutch 
Chamber of Commerce, InnovationQuarter, Municipality The Hague, Startup Delta, Robo Valley and 
others. In a sense, HSD itself is part of a self-regulating network (Interview A7).  
Figure 15. Kenis & Provan’s (2008) three network governance styles. 
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When asked why he thinks that interviewees provide a variety of answers to this question interviewee 
A7 explains that this is not surprising since it depends on partners’ experience in dealing with the HSD 
Office. Those partners that dealt with HSD Office in arranging the interactions with other partners may 
consider HSD Office as a leading organization. Those partners that utilize the ecosystem and connect 
with partners without HSD Office’s intervention – which happens very often – may provide different 
replies to this question (Interview A7).  
Ecosystem’s resilience, dependencies and contingencies 
This section portrays interviewees’ opinions on the resilience or robustness of the HSD ecosystem in 
terms of being able to cope with shocks such as the withdrawal of partners or insufficient performance 
on the part of specific partners. How do ecosystem partners cope with risks such as a high dependency 
on another organization that delivers certain valuable or unique contributions?  
Interviewees A1, A3 and A5 assert that HSD is not (fully) resilient and is still very much dependent on 
one or more partners. Interviewee A1 expresses his worries about the HSD’s vulnerability caused by 
its dependency on subsidies and the participation of several powerful players. Interviewee A3 confirms 
HSD’s dependency on local government subsidy and stresses the importance of collecting more 
resources from partners to reduce dependency. Interviewee A5 confirms that the HSD is currently not 
self-supporting. If financing is withdrawn or as soon as multiple big players (founding partners) 
withdraw it is over (Interview A5).  
However, interviewees A2 and A6 express full confidence in HSD’s resilience as a result of its strong 
triple helix constellation which ensures that other partners will fill in the gap if someone withdraws. 
Both interviewees represent a large corporation in the HSD Board. “The ecosystem is absolutely 
resilient. If we withdraw, one of our competitors will replace us. Nobody is irreplaceable” (Interview 
A6).  Interviewee A4 furthers adds to this that the resilience depends on the size and contribution of 
the partner involved: “If one partner withdraws there will be enough knowledge and power in the HSD 
with over 200 members to fill that gap. If three or four large parties withdraw it will hurt though”.  
Interviewee A4 asserts that the HSD depends on the partners more than vice versa. The smaller parties 
need the HSD but the large corporations do not. They can go about doing their business independently 
and do not need the HSD as a vehicle to gain market entry or connect with clients and partners on a 
bilateral basis circumventing the HSD. The HSD’s resilience thus depends on establishing added value 
to entice the large corporations to stay involved and to enjoy tangible added value. Interviewee A7 
adds to this that every partner decides for himself to participate or not. Keeping them involved 
depends on managing relations and expectations and delivering clear results in generating activities.  
This concludes the results section for the HSD case. The next section presents the findings of the 
Schiphol Airport case. 
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4.3 SCHIPHOL AIRPORT - BPVS 
 
The Schiphol Airport case is based on four interviews with partners of the platform Security and Public 
Safety Schiphol [BPVS]. This public-private partnership platform was set up in early 2006 as a result of 
the Commission Oord’s recommendations to the House of Parliament (Tweede Kamer) after its 
investigation into the armed robbery in which diamonds (worth €80 million) were stolen on Schiphol’s 
premises (NCTV, 2012).   
Table 5 – BPVS ecosystem overview 
 
The table above provides an overview of the interviewees taking into account the anonymous 
participation which limits the level of detail given about their respective positions. The first interviewee 
is a senior executive who represents his public organization in the biannual meetings of the BPVS. The 
second interviewee works solely for the BPVS platform and thus provides a rich source of information 
for this study since he also knows the workings of the platform in the concrete projects and meetings 
that arise out of the biannual top level BPVS platform gatherings. The third and fourth interviewees 
are both director-level executives for their respective public entities and are both active in the BPVS 
steering committee and at least one workgroup. As an additional form of data collection the author 
was present at one of the steering committee meetings to observe the actual real life functioning of 
the ecosystem in practice. 
 
 
 
 
Interview Type of organization Type of position Relation to BPVS 
B1 Public Organization Top level official. 
Member of BPVS 
platform 
Contributes to law 
enforcement  
 
B2 Secretariat Facilitator / 
manager 
Programming, agenda-
setting, preparation of 
meetings and follow-
up 
 
B3 Public Organization Top level official. 
Member of BPVS 
steering committee 
and chairman of a 
BPVS workgroup 
Law enforcement / 
border control 
B4 Public Organization Top level official.  
Member of BPVS 
steering committee 
and chairman of a 
BPVS workgroup 
Law enforcement / 
border control 
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WHAT IS THE BPVS?  
 
The platform has developed into a vehicle for 
strategy and policy decisions on safety and 
security of Schiphol Airport. The C-level meetings 
consist of all the top executives of the partners 
and occur on a biannual basis.  These are called 
the BPVS platform meetings. Individuals such as 
Dick Schoof (NCTV), Jos Nijhuis (CEO Schiphol 
Airport) and general Van den Brink 
(Marechaussee) participate in these meetings. 
Daily operations and policy formulation are 
conducted in the BPVS steering committees and 
workgroups, which are organized under the BPVS 
platform to implement projects or carry out 
further research. All the relevant partners are 
involved; in the public domain these are the 
Ministries of Security & Justice (NCTV), Internal 
Affairs, Infrastructure and Environment, the 
Human Environment &  Transport Inspectorate, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND), 
the General Intelligence & Security Service 
(AIVD), the municipality of Haarlemmermeer, the 
police, Customs (Douane), the Public Prosecution 
Service (OM) and the Koninklijke Marechaussee 
[KMar]. 
In the private domain partners are Schiphol Group, KLM, airfreight companies and private security 
businesses. These parties work together in a joint effort to come up with policy solutions to improve 
the integral security of Schiphol (NCTV, 2012). See Figure 16 for an overview.  
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE BPVS ECOSYSTEM 
This section provides a coherent description of how the respondents describe their experiences with 
cooperating in their ecosystem, what main purpose thrives their collaboration, and how the different 
partners relate to each other.  
Cooperation 
All interviewees are very satisfied with the cooperation between all partners. They stress the aligned 
interests and the urgency of achieving maximum security. The crisis that led to the creation of the BPVS 
is mentioned as well. All relevant security and safety actors participate and collaborate. Three 
interviewees explicitly argue that this cooperation is better than at similar objects such as the Port of 
Rotterdam or other airports abroad. “People know each other on a personal level” (Interviewee B1). 
In some instances there are colliding interests of security versus efficiency. Discussions can get a bit 
heated by this is all fine (Interviewee B4).  
Figure 16. The Schiphol Airport security ecosystem: BPVS. 
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Main purpose 
The platform’s main purpose is the management and improvement of Schiphol Airport’s security. All 
interviewees are convinced that this is experienced by every partner as the main purpose. The 
diamond robbery was the crisis that became the starting point for setting up the platform. Not the fact 
that such an impressive amount of diamonds was stolen but the fact that armed gunmen were able to 
gain access to the airport’s airside was the major cause for concern for policy makers (Interview B1). 
This ultimately led to political outrage and an investigation that led to the recommendations that today 
underlie the BPVS platform. The BPVS’ platform itself is about networking and reaching agreements 
(Interview B4). Interviewee B3 connects two purposes: “we want to have a safe and secure airport on 
all terrains. At the same time it has to be a smooth running airport”.  
In an interview Schiphol Airport’s CEO Jos Nijhuis explains that protecting Schiphol’s integrity entails 
striking a balance between effectiveness (controlling risks) and efficiency. Many parties cooperate 
and are depending on each other. This requires central direction. €250 million is spent annually on 
security measures (NCTV, 2012, p.4).    
Different tiers of partners 
Formally there are no different layers of partners. However, interviewee B2 notes that “per subject 
the interests are different”. For instance in the context of counterterrorism the NCTV is the proper 
authority and can enforce regulations upon other organizations.  
Interviewee B3 argues that there is a difference in how partners interact between the steering 
committee and the workgroups. The workgroups cover operational topics which means that 
organizations have to deliver, in terms of resources and people. “This generates different discussions. 
Who pays what?” (Interview B3). However, interviewee B4 asserts that his experience is that in the 
operational-tactical sphere parties find agreement more easily since they all have an interest in smooth 
operations. On a strategic level the bigger interests are more manifest. The recurrent conflict between 
KLM and Schiphol Group serves as an example of this. In operational topics they both cooperate fine 
(Interview B4).  
In the platform itself there are equal relationships and decisions are taken with full agreement of all 
parties. Within the BPVS the NCTV and Schiphol Group cooperate most closely. They are both BPVS’s 
founding fathers. 
ECOSYSTEM LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING 
Leadership styles 
Interviewee B1 distinguishes between the different organizational layers of the BPVS platform and 
their leadership style. “At the top, in the platform itself, the leadership styles are goal setting. But lower 
down the chain, in the executive committees, the style is more participative” (Interview B1). The 
platform sets the goals but the implementation is accompanied by a more engaging style. Interviewee 
B3 adds another distinction between the steering committee and the workgroups. The workgroups 
require parties to achieve certain goals, thus they can have a more directive leadership style since 
things need to be done (Interview B3). However, engaging leadership is important to warm up all 
parties for the higher cause of the BPVS (Interview B3).   
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Interviewee B4 is convinced that the leadership style is purely about involvement, thus involving 
leadership. He distinguishes between the public and private parties, arguing that the commercial 
parties in BPVS are more directive.  
 
Interviewee B2 believes neither leadership style characterizes BPVS since all participating partners are 
represented by officials on a director level on the basis of equality and consensus among all members. 
They gather to reach agreements on solutions for issues such as long waiting lines but they do not 
manage or direct people in a hierarchical fashion (Interview B2).  
Leaders’ impact on joint pursuit of the shared purpose? 
Within BPVS most issues or conflicts between particular parties  are resolved on a bilateral basis. These 
bilateral interactions result in agreements that are then presented in the platform as a whole 
(Interview B1). The interviewee stresses the importance of the common purpose which is ingrained in 
every partner.  
Interviewee B2 again emphasizes the influence of personal leadership as was shown in the CCTV 
example. This required commitment by both executives to achieve that goal and to avoid being the 
laughing stock in the political debates as a consequence of the diamond robbery. This requires leaders 
to “jump over their own shadow” (Interview B2). This can be defined as listening to stakeholders and 
giving priority to the common interest.  
The observation of the BPVS Steering Committee provided an additional perspective which confirms 
the remarks made by the interviewees. The members presented their own experiences as chairmen of 
the workgroups  and updated their counterparts on recent developments and expected challenges. 
During the meeting suggestions and ideas for further cooperation were exchanged and the platform 
seemed to provide the starting point for further bilateral and multilateral collaboration.  
Decision-making and the governance structure 
Figure 17 represents BPVS’s 
organizational structure 
consisting of the platform, the 
steering committee and the 
workgroups.  
The BPVS platform decides in a 
collective meeting. All parties 
have the freedom to put subjects 
on the agenda for which the BPVS 
programme manager acts as a 
guardian to ensure that the topics 
discussed are relevant for the 
platform. The agenda is decided 
upon by Schiphol Group and the 
NCTV (Interview B2). They share 
the rotating presidency that 
Figure 17 – The BPVS structure 
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consists of six month turns.   
Smaller issues that do not affect all partners are usually taken up on a bilateral basis.  
Differences of opinion are solved on an informal man to man basis. There is no formal decision 
procedure and no voting rights. All agreements are made on consensus (Interview B3 and B4). There 
are very few formal governance structures. One example is the rotating presidency between the NCTV 
and Schiphol Group (Interview B1). The only institutional foundation underlying the platform is a terms 
of reference [TOR], which is a list of agreements no longer than an A4 sheet which formulates the main 
purpose, the stakeholders, etc. (Interview B2).  
In the workgroups the partners are assigned based on their relevance to the topic. As a consequence 
the participating organizations differ per subject. For instance, the Border & Passengers workgroup 
consists of a different collection of members than the  Cyber Security workgroup. The role of chairman 
is assigned to the partner that is most qualified in relation to the topic (Interview B1). Not all 
organizations that are active in a workgroup are members of the steering committee. This is decided 
in order to ensure that the platform remains compact and runs efficiently. If necessary a relevant party 
will be mobilized and invited to participate in a workgroup.  
Some issues are dealt with by the proper authority, in these instances it is not possible to have 
consensus since only one organization (e.g. the public prosecutor / OM) has the mandate to decide 
(Interview B4).  
Furthermore, interviewee B1 stresses that the individuals representing their organization should have 
the proper mandates to make decisions and allocate resources to support speedy decision-making. 
ECOSYSTEM CULTURE 
 
CULTURE 
The interviewees were asked on their opinion about the ecosystem’s culture, and were presented the 
four categories as described in the theory chapter: an innovative culture, a competitive culture, a 
bureaucratic culture and a community culture.   
 
All interviewees assert that the BPVS possesses an innovative culture. The senior executives of the 
participating organizations are all expected to come up with creative new solutions that do not pre-
exist. Interviewee B2 adds that it also reflects a community culture since these partners learn from 
each other and co-decide on creative ideas. Interviewee B3 also describes the culture as both 
innovative and community. “Community because the BPVS is a real network, we all meet each other 
at different events. We also go out for a dinner together every year”. The government partners truly 
cooperate as partners instead of just assuming the role of regulation enforcer as in airports around the 
world (Interviewee B2).   
Interviewee B1 further remarks that the culture can be bureaucratic depending on the context. This is 
mainly due to the aviation business’ characteristics with its inherent strict regulations.  Interviewee 
emphasizes that it is an innovative culture and supplemented by a community culture and sometimes 
a competitive culture. The latter is reflected in interactions between the private organizations (KLM 
versus Schiphol Group).  
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The observation confirms that the present members are actively looking for and open to new creative 
solutions to solve problems. The people seemed to know each other well and exchanged invitations 
for events that are not necessarily related to the BPVS. The language was informal and implied that 
people cooperate closely on a personal level.  
Individual organization’s culture 
Interviewee 1 describes his culture as a bureaucracy. Interviewee B2 – who represents the BPVS 
platform itself – adds that it depends on the contexts of the topics. Furthermore, he emphasizes that 
it is not about hierarchical or directive relationships in this platform. Interviewee B3 and B4 – both 
representing classic government organizations – regard their culture as innovative, especially 
compared to their counterparts in other countries.  
ECOSYSTEM FEATURES   
 
Sharing assets 
Partners raise financial resources to realize projects that are worked out together. BPVS’ major success 
story is the establishment of a new CCTV infrastructure on Schiphol’s premises (Interview B1). The 
Schiphol Group and the NCTV collaborated to realize this success. Both partners agreed to invest €4 
million each. This required individual leadership by both leaders to “just do it” and happened by 
circumventing conventional procedures.   
Interviewee B3 explains that the sharing of assets is often limited by legal regulations on the sharing 
of information. Organizations want to share assets in law enforcement but face restrictions (Interview 
B3). Interviewee B4 adds that the sharing of assets mainly occurs on a bilateral basis. Interviewee B4’s 
organization exchanges staff with interviewee B3’s organization. Furthermore, ideas are being worked 
out on the temporary employment of airline staff for border control tasks (Interview B4). This latter 
initiative reflects the spirit of sharing assets and the quest for innovative solutions. 
Growth stages and milestones 
Roughly four growth stages are proposed by interviewee B2. The first stage entails the Commissie 
Oord’s formal investigation into the diamond robbery affair. The second phase commenced with the 
creation of the BPVS platform under the leadership of Ruud Oord who headed the investigation 
commission. The third stage was the consolidation of the platform. The current and fourth stage is 
reflected in the introduction of new topics in the last 2,5 years – especially cyber security and the 
heightened terrorist threat – which are forced upon BPVS by the external environment. Now that BPVS 
has proven its worth people are part of it because they experience the added value themselves. There 
is no external driving force necessary anymore (Interview B4).  
The early days required Ruud Oord’s personal leadership in response to the political pressure that led 
to the creation of the BPVS cooperation structure. According to interviewee B3 Ruud Oord was a true 
connector. The early days also required a search for what type of network to become and what topics 
the BPVS should cover. 
Interviewee B1 adds that the instalment of the CCTV system was an important milestone being the 
first concrete product that materialized under the BPVS platform. Another milestone – which is not 
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tied to a specific date – is that partners truly know each other on a personal level. “These are real 
personal relationships which extends as far as having one’s private cellphone numbers” (Interview B1).  
For Interviewee B3 the latest milestone is the instalment of the Joint Inspection Centre which is the 
result of a public-private partnership between Customs, KLM, Schiphol Group, Air Cargo Netherlands 
and other actors.   
 
Schiphol CEO Nijhuis remarks in an interview that the platform has also achieved a change in culture. 
“Parties no longer purely work from themselves, there has been an open culture in which common 
challenges lead to a joint quest for solutions that are effective and efficient” (NCTV, 2012, p. 5). 
Furthermore, he asserts that BPVS has contributed to designing more efficient processes. A report by 
the Ministry of Justice indicates that the BPVS has helped in reducing crime rates on Schiphol’s 
premises (Ministerie van Justitie, 2009, p.2).  
Another function of the platform is that it can be used for a powerful lobby to achieve more suitable 
regulation and more resources to be used for security (NCTV, 2012, p.5).  Interviewee 2 underlines this 
by explaining that the platform can be used to harmonize the communication of the ecosystem’s needs 
towards the political arena and the national government. One example mentioned is that the 
Marechaussee is in urgent need of more resources and personnel to keep up with Schiphol’s growth. 
 
GOVERNANCE STYLE AND RESILIENCE  
 
Network governance style 
The interviewees disagree about which type 
of network governance style best describes 
BPVS. Interviewee B1 regards it as a self-
regulating network since no actor can force 
another actor to take actions. However, he 
also  acknowledges that two parties are 
exceptionally powerful: the NCTV and 
Schiphol Group. Both exert power in their 
respective domain (public and private) but 
are not able to force others (Interview B1).  
Interviewee B2 is not sure and sees elements of all three. “I feel the urge to choose the NAO. But if 
Dick Schoof (director of the NCTV) really wants something to happen (…) he is very powerful and he is 
the prime-minister’s advisor… so Lead Organization is also applicable” (Interview B2).   
He distinguishes between the daily routine and specific topics or events. “In our daily routine it is an 
NAO but in specific projects or events, for example the NSS (Nuclear Security Summit), the NCTV is 
able to force things upon us. Then it is a Lead Organization” (Interview B2).  In the workgroups he sees 
elements of a self-regulating network. The platform lends itself for creating coalitions around current 
challenges and new projects.   
 
Interviewee B3 believes it is a hybrid between Lead Organization and a self-regulating network. He also 
mentions the exceptionally powerful NCTV and Schiphol Group but notes that they have no 
hierarchical power to force others. Interviewee B4 makes an interesting analysis: “in time sequence 
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you could see BPVS starting as a Lead Organization network under the political pressure during the 
creation stage. Then an administrative organization was set up that sustains the cooperation and 
eventually it becomes more of a self-regulating network” (Interview B4).   
He further adds that a self-regulating network would be ideal since everybody then recognizes the 
importance of BPVS but now it is more of a Lead Organization than a self-regulating network.  
The meeting confirmed this point: the steering committee’s chairman (which rotates between NCTV 
and Schiphol Group) seemed to be in charge of the meeting, the agenda and also requested partners 
to further discuss and explore bilateral cooperation. However, the individuals seemed free to express 
suggestions and raise new issues.  
Ecosystem’s resilience, dependencies and contingencies 
Dependencies are nothing new for interviewee B1 stating that “we have  been dependent upon 
organization X and Y for two centuries”.  (Revealing the names of the organizations would expose the 
interviewee’s home organization.) Usually it is not possible to step in when an organization fails to 
deliver. This means that there is a risk for the ecosystem’s resilience.   
 
The mutual dependencies between organizations are clear to all partners. According to interviewee B1 
everyone is aware of his necessary contribution to serve the common interest of all. In the platform 
everyone is held accountable for his share and issues are addressed. Interviewee B2 adds to this that 
in the daily operations the partners communicate intensively for operational purposes. Dependencies 
are “worked out in the daily lines. The parties have to deliver, this is all taken care of. We have never 
had to close Schiphol, but there are risks and shortages of staff and resources but I don’t consider this 
as contingencies” (Interview B2).   
 
Interviewee B3 explains that dependencies on other organizations are covered by covenants and in 
the law. He foresees no problems in this regard. Interviewee B4 believes that his organization is at its 
best in times of crisis and tensions. His organization’s strength lies in confronting crisis and challenging 
circumstances. He has confidence in the ability to face external shocks.  
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4.4 AIR FORCE MAINTENANCE ECOSYSTEM 
 
The Air Force maintenance case is covered in three interviews with individuals representing their 
organization. One respondent represents the Royal Netherlands Air Force [RNLAF], the other two 
respondents represent businesses of different sizes in the aircraft and aircraft component 
maintenance domain. The interviewees represent a diversified mix of organizations. For the sake of 
anonymity the names of participants and their (specific) organization will remain confidential. Their 
personal positions are on a senior executive level, meaning that they represent their organization in 
the interactions with partners. The next table provides information on the participants with respect to 
their anonymous participation in this research. 
Interview Type of organization Type of position Relation to the 
ecosystem 
 
C1 Royal Netherlands Air 
Force 
Senior officer Brokers and facilitates 
cooperation with 
partners 
 
 
C2 SME in Aerospace & 
Defense industry 
 
Director & founder Performs maintenance 
for the RNLAF 
C3 Large Dutch firm in 
Aerospace & Defense 
industry 
 
 
Director Performs maintenance 
for the RNLAF 
 
Table 4 – Characteristics of interviewees 
 
WHAT MAKES UP THE AIR FORCE MAINTENANCE ECOSYSTEM? 
This ecosystem comprises all the relevant parties that play a role in the maintenance, repair and 
overhaul [MRO] of the military aircrafts of the Royal Netherlands Air Force with Main Support Base 
Woensdrecht (Noord-Brabant, The Netherlands) as its focal point. The Logistics Centre Woensdrecht 
located at this air base is responsible for the logistics and maintenance for the entire RNLAF.  
The ecosystem has no overarching body or a formal platform as is the case in the HSD and BPVS. It is 
built up of bilateral partnerships and varying degrees of bilateral cooperation between the RNLAF and 
individual industry partners.   
 
The primary actors are the RNLAF, the industry in the aerospace and defense sector which consists 
mainly of SME’s (e.g. Airborne, Aeronamic, StandardAero), large original equipment manufacturers 
[OEMs] such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney, Honeywell and also Fokker, and research 
institutions such as NLR or TNO. The ecosystem has no clear cut boundaries and its members may also 
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be active in other sectors. Besides sustainment of the military fleet some parties are also active in 
civilian aircraft maintenance.  
Besides the Ministry of Defense other government actors active in this ecosystem are the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, the Province of Noord-Brabant, and local government such as the municipality of 
Woensdrecht.  
Figure 18 provides an illustration of the industry partners that are physically conducting their business 
on the RLNAF’s premises at Woensdrecht which reflects the close ties between the air force and 
industry. 
 
Figure 18 – An overview of the industry partners present at Air Base Woensdrecht. (Source: RLNAF PowerPoint). 
 
   
 
THE ECOSYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND MAIN PURPOSES  
 
Cooperation 
The cooperation between the RLNAF and industrial partners is based on multiple motivations. Parties 
are mutually dependent. The air force depends on the knowledge and capacity of the private 
businesses for the execution of certain work in the field of MRO. As a result of the smaller volumes of 
aircrafts and weapons systems - and parallel budget cuts in the last two decades for the MoD - the air 
force can no longer independently carry out all MRO-related tasks. Therefore, the air force has opened 
its gates for cooperation with private enterprises that possess the required skills and expertise, and 
whom are able to deliver this in a flexible and affordable manner. This enhances the RLNAF’s flexibility, 
affordability and availability of its aircraft fleet (Interviews C1, C2, C3).   
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On the other hand, the private businesses in the aerospace and defense industry desire to be a trusted 
partner of the RLNAF in order to create market opportunities both at home and abroad (Interview C2 
and C3). Besides direct benefits of executing assignments for the air force in terms of revenue and 
access to know-how and assets, a major motive for (Dutch) SME’s to partner with the air force is to 
gain access to markets abroad and to gain access to the supply chain of global giants such as Boeing 
and Lockheed Martin. The ‘launching customer’ function of the RNLAF is therefore valuable to 
businesses and explains their eagerness to collaborate (Interview C1).  
Main purpose 
For the RNLAF the main purpose of partnering with the industry is to improve the availability and 
affordability of its weapons systems. Furthermore, it should enhance the flexibility (Interview C1).  
 
For the private enterprises the main purposes are different. Interviewee C1 (representing the RNLAF) 
expects the industry to have commercial interests. First and foremost they want to earn money. Other 
purposes are the function of having the RNLAF as a launching customer that enables market entry 
abroad, and access to the RNLAF’s machines and equipment (Interview C1). Interviewee C2 confirms 
that his SME seeks the launching customer function and benefits from the increased confidence of 
potential (foreign) customers in his business as a result of being a trusted partner for the RLNAF. For 
the SME’s it is also a matter of helping the RNLAF to achieve flexibility and to become future-proof 
(Interview C2).  
The role of other government actors is not included in the data collection out of time and resource 
restraints but it is to be expected that the Ministry of Economic Affairs serves its purpose of creating 
business and employment growth for the Dutch economy. This is also mentioned by interviewees in 
terms of industrial participation requirements. It is expected that the Province of Brabant and the local 
municipality have similar objectives in terms of economic gains and employment growth. 
Different tiers of partners 
According to interviewee C1 there are clear power differences between tiers of partners in the 
aerospace and defense sector. The OEMs (e.g. Boeing) are exceptionally powerful since they own the 
data and necessary licenses that are required to be able to perform maintenance. Furthermore, OEMs 
are monopolists in the global market.   
The RNLAF has some leverage with the OEMs since it is an important customer for them. The RNLAF’s 
warm relationships with the OEMs enables the RNLAF to urge them to consider doing business with 
smaller Dutch industries whom otherwise would have no chance of getting access to OEMs.   
Another element is the requirement of industrial participation (IP) by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
This requires an OEM (e.g. Boeing) to assign a specific percentage of the total sum of its deal to a Dutch 
firm. The RNLAF then brokers an agreement with the OEM to task a Dutch SME to perform MRO 
activities for the RNLAF’s fleet, e.g. maintenance of rotor blades of helicopters (Interview C1). This 
exemplifies how the ecosystem functions and that there are multiple tiers of partners present in terms 
of influence. 
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ECOSYSTEM LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING  
 
Leadership styles  
When asked the question of which leadership style is applicable in this ecosystem interviewee C1 and 
C2 make an interesting distinction between the internal organization’s leadership and 
interorganizational leadership.   
Internally it requires all three leadership styles: engaging, involving and goal leadership. Since the 
recent shift towards partnerships with the industry generates fierce resistance within the RNLAF’s 
organization the leaders have to display all three styles. People fear losing their jobs and therefore 
resist change. This both requires participative leadership, involvement and transparent 
communication but it also requires directive leadership since nothing is achieved by endless 
negotiations (Interview C1).   
 
For the SME it is important to respect the differences between public and private actors and to lead 
by example in order to build trust (Interview C2). Directive leadership does not work and is perceived 
as threatening when it comes from a commercial enterprise. Sharing experience and knowledge helps 
to build trust and stimulates the RNLAF staff to adapt. Interviewee C2 emphasizes the importance of 
empowerment and having confidence in people. This is engaging leadership. Interview C3 confirms 
that directive leadership is not suitable in his interactions with the air force. 
On an interorganizational level the commitment of the top leadership is required. This is realized 
through a process of negotiating and finding mutual goals and overlapping interests (Interview C1).  
The leadership style is participative and about mutual consultation (Interview C1). Interviewee C2 
shares similar experiences. The achievement of a shared vision and commitment of the top-level of 
the RNLAF at Woensdrecht was only a first step. The challenges lie within the middle-management 
layer of organizations. This is the case for both the industry and the RNLAF. Middle managers have a 
more short term focus, for instance on generating revenue. This is where the resistance to changes 
and partnerships arises since partnerships require a longer time horizon before they effectively 
become profitable (Interview C1). The same phenomenon is visible within the RNLAF itself. Mid-level 
management resists changes and displays difficulties with adapting to new partnerships and making 
hard choices regarding which capacities to invest in and which ones will become obsolete. “This 
requires directive leadership otherwise it will not work” (Interview C1).  
According to interviewee C1 it is therefore essential that the interests of the middle management are 
aligned with the C-level management’s strategy on partnerships. Among organizations it is essential to 
have commitment from the organizations’ leaders. Within those organizations – especially within the 
OEMs – the C-level management ought to display directive leadership to make sure the middle-
management does what it has to do (Interview C1).  
For Interviewee C2 overcoming the initial reluctance and resistance from the middle-management 
within the RNLAF proved to be the most challenging and time-consuming aspect of partnering. His 
interactions with the RNLAF required engaging leadership instead of taking a directive approach. 
However, to accomplish next steps in the partnership all the layers have to be consulted which requires 
constant shifting between the hierarchical layers of the RNLAF at Woensdrecht. Sometimes, however, 
it is necessary to communicate with the highest level in order to overcome obstacles in the middle-
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management (Interview C2). This seems to imply that directive leadership is indeed a solution when 
executed internally by the RNLAF’s superiors on behalf of an industry partner in need of help. 
Interviewee C3 believes that the RNLAF employs primarily goal leadership internally.  
Decision-making and the governance structure  
The ecosystem differs from the HSD and BPVS in terms of formality and its external appearance. There 
is no formal structure or a public platform that represents the ecosystem. This ecosystem is based 
mainly on bilateral partnerships and loose arrangements. This section explains how the RNLAF and 
private industries arrange partnerships and structure their cooperation. 
There is no decision-making for the ecosystem as a whole, thus this section focuses on the interaction 
between the RNLAF and individual partners.  
In the first interactions with a business (e.g. an SME) the potential scope of the cooperation is discussed 
in order to outline which activities fall within or outside the scope. This is accompanied by the 
formulation of individual goals for both parties. These goals are compared and in the case of sufficient 
overlap the bilateral proceedings lead to cooperation which is further detailed and formalized in a 
Letter of Intent. This document also defines which milestones are to be accomplished (Interview C1).  
A governance structure is set up which consists of a steering committee that is supported by 
workgroups. This is again on a bilateral basis between the RNLAF and the private industry. For example, 
a steering group involves the CEO’s of Boeing and the Commander of Logistics Centre Woensdrecht, 
and / or the head of Programme Management at Woensdrecht (Interview C1). The monitoring of the 
partnership differs per partnership. 
In terms of tiers of partners there is a distinction between large corporations (the OEMs) and smaller 
SME’s. Decision-making and the governance of partnerships run smoother with SME’s. Their internal 
decision-making runs faster and they have shorter lines of communication compared with the OEMs 
(Interview C1).  
For Interviewee C2’s SME the governance and monitoring of the partnership worked as followed: in 
the initial interactions the meetings took place with the Commander of the LCW and his office. They 
appointed an official whom provided C2’s business with an interface and guidance to find their way in 
this new business environment. In the next phase the interactions were with the colonels whom are 
in charge of the maintenance organization and the programme management at Woensdrecht. Now 
that the partnership is fully operational the communication is mainly between the project managers 
closer to the work floor.   
ECOSYSTEM CULTURE 
 
Culture 
Interviewee C1 describes the ecosystem’s culture as “truly innovative”. He makes the distinction 
between the OEMs and the SME’s. The former are very large corporations and also more bureaucratic 
and old-fashioned. The SME’s -  according to interviewee C1 – are more agile, faster and innovative.  
Interviewee C2 recognizes the community culture and bureaucratic culture in his partnership with the 
RNLAF. It is bureaucratic because of the many hierarchical layers of the RNLAF. The LCW is like a village, 
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which resembles a community (Interview C2). Interviewee C3 adds that the aviation industry is 
inherently conservative and perhaps bureaucratic. Its many regulations (e.g. on airworthiness) demand 
that elaborate procedures are fulfilled. He also adds that the RNLAF has become much more opener 
and displays a strong ability to learn (Interview C3).  
Individual organization’s culture 
Interviewee C1 regards his own organization as an innovative element within the RNLAF organization. 
Interviewee C2 describes his business’ culture as both innovative and competitive. Interview C3 does 
not make a specific choice of culture but mentions the conservative nature of the densely regulated 
aviation business in which his company operates.  
ECOSYSTEM FEATURES   
 
Sharing assets 
This ecosystem displays many examples of the sharing of assets between partners. Industry partners 
utilize the RNLAF’s machines and equipment under certain conditions. For instance, the RNLAF uses 
80% of the capacity of its MRO equipment. Some facilities have no equivalent in the civilian industry 
so some industry partners are eager to use the RNLAF’s spare capacity of 20% for other purposes, such 
as maintenance work for civilian aircrafts or for foreign air forces. Interviewee C2 and C3 confirm from 
their own experience that assets are shared in their partnership. They also further add that their 
business is constantly looking to expand its services to the RNLAF in terms of sharing specialists and 
facilities in order to enhance their flexibility (Interview C2 and C3.) 
Growth stages and milestones 
This section reflects the bilateral interactions between the RNLAF and an industry partner. The first 
stage of consultation and determining scope is called the reconnaissance stage. Interviewee C2 
describes this as the entrepreneurial stage, or pioneering stage. After the initial stage a letter of intent 
is signed, which marks the transition stage. Interviewee C2 calls this the build-up stage. Then the 
collaboration takes off and enters the operational stage (Interview C1).  Interviewee C3 adds that it is 
essential to gain trust and build a strong reputation, and also to offer a strong marketing pitch.  
Milestones are formulated in the letter of intent. The operational agreements are formulated in a 
Concept of Operations document.  
GOVERNANCE STYLE AND RESILIENCE  
 
Network governance style  
 
This section deals with the network governance 
constellation based on Kenis & Provan’s (2008) 
three forms.  The illustration was presented to 
interviewees whom were asked to choose the 
form they recognized most in the HSD. The 
replies are diverse and different arguments 
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were put forward. Some interviewees mentioned hybrid forms (e.g. elements of an NAO combined 
with self-regulating elements) or that it depends on the context in which HSD partners cooperate. 
Interviewee C1 is convinced that today the ecosystem reflects a Leading Organization network in which 
the RNLAF is in the lead. The ideal situation would be a self-regulating network in which the RNLAF 
should be facilitating instead of being at the helm, according to Interviewee C1. His organization 
currently actively stimulates the industry partners to intensify their contact and help each other out to 
become truly self-regulating and eventually to become independent of the RNLAF’s interventions. 
Interviewees C2 and C3 regard their partnership with the RNLAF as an example of the NAO.  Interview 
C2 regards the management of the LCW as directors which are able to steer and influence the 
partnership.  
Ecosystem’s resilience, dependencies and contingencies 
This ecosystem has always had strong dependencies between partners. The RNLAF has always been 
dependent upon its suppliers. The resilience of the ecosystem is strong enough to face the withdrawal 
of the average SME. There will be enough substitutes ready to replace that gap (Interview C1). 
However, if an OEM would disappear for whatever reason then that would leave a gap that is difficult 
to fill.  
Besides legal arrangements and extensive contracts with detailed obligations and clauses there are 
ways to mitigate the dependencies upon the partners. According to interviewee C1 the RNLAF is able 
to reduce its dependency by cooperating closely with partners and thus have warm relationships 
instead of relying on a cold customer-supplier relationship. This gives Interviewee C1 more influence 
and makes signing contracts a bit easier. From the perspective of businesses  it is important to diversify 
clients and markets in order to not become too dependent upon one single customer, this is mentioned 
both by Interviewee C2 and C3.  
Some capacities will always remain within the array of capabilities of the RNLAF in order to stay self-
supportive. Critical capabilities cannot be given away to the private industry. Furthermore, the RNLAF 
is forced to take into account possible scenarios of changing loyalty of the industry partners. For 
instance, interviewee C1 notes that an SME could potentially be acquired by a foreign investor whom 
may not be a logical party for the RNLAF to cooperate with (Interview C1). In such instances the RNLAF 
still needs to be able to perform maintenance tasks independently and therefore preserve its 
capabilities. 
Another potential vulnerability for the ecosystems resilience is the change of individuals within the 
leadership of partner organizations. A new management team may display different priorities or a shift 
towards the pursuit of short-term gains. The latter course of action makes long-term commitment to 
strategic partnerships of which the potential gains are not always clear yet unattractive. This can 
destroy a partnership. (Interview C1). Interviewee C1 provides an example of an industry partner at 
Woensdrecht that displayed this sudden turn of priorities. Details remain confidential but it is clear 
that the impact of individual leaders within organizations is decisive for the success of the ecosystem.  
Interviewee C2 provides exactly the same opinion on the potential risks for the continuity of 
partnerships as a result of changes in leadership but sees this challenge primarily within the RNLAF 
organization. He regards the systematic three-year rotations of military officers as a challenge for 
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partners. The RNLAF’s commanders leave their position at a high pace which frustrates the 
sustainment of deep relationships between partners. 
As in all public-private partnerships an often heard frustration on the part of private enterprises is the 
government’s inability to make long-term plans and investment decisions. Interviewee C2 remarks that 
the RNLAF has gone through changes of its budget and policy priorities. Compared to businesses the 
RNLAF is less able to make long-term plans which is an obstacle to public-private partnerships 
(Interview C2).  
4.5 CROSS-CASE COMPARISON 
This section provides a raw representation of the data acquired by interviews on a cross-case basis. 
First the ecosystem’s main characteristics are covered in the first table. The second table highlights 
the ecosystem leadership and forms of governance. The third table in this section deals with the 
culture. In the next chapter – the Analysis – these results are interpreted in relation to the academic 
literature after which conclusions can be drawn. 
Table 6 presents a  brief overview of the results categorized per concept in the sequence of treated 
concepts in the Theory chapter.  
THE ECOSYSTEM’S MAIN  FEATURES. 
Table 6. Ecosystem features 
 HSD BPVS 
Air Force 
maintenance  
Shared purpose 
 
An overarching shared purpose 
(innovation for better security) 
but  inherent conflicts of 
interests and competition.  
 
An undisputed shared purpose: 
managing and improving Schiphol’s 
security. No competition or two-
sided purposes. 
Availability, affordability and 
flexibility of the RNLAF 
weapons systems. Industry 
partners have commercial 
interests. 
Conception (manmade or 
self-arisen) 
Man-made. The result of local 
government’s policy and 
collaborating businesses which 
took the initiative. Aims for 
growth and gathering new 
partners. 
Man-made. Born out of a crisis 
(diamond robbery and other 
security breaches and illegal 
activities) which created political 
pressure that led to the creation of 
the platform. 
More ‘natural’ collection of 
partners than HSD, on the basis of 
relevance and necessity. 
A natural self-arisen collection 
of partners which interact with 
each other without any 
direction from above or any 
supporting platform. Bilateral 
engagements to seize 
opportunities. 
Presence of a Keystone 
Organization? 
There is no reigning keystone. A 
combination of shared 
leadership by the founding 
partners, and the HSD Office 
taking up the management of 
daily operations. HSD comes 
closest to a keystone role. 
 
No reigning keystone present but 
two organizations are most 
powerful. Depending on the 
context all the partners employ 
shared leadership. In some 
instances the proper authority 
takes the lead (e.g. NCTV). 
The RNLAF is in the lead but 
cannot truly demand actions 
from OEMs but can steer 
bilateral partnerships. 
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Interdependency 
High, but differs per partner. 
Large partners are less 
dependent on the HSD. In 
general, for innovation and 
countering (cyber) threats all 
parties are interdependent.  
High, seems equal for all partners.  
High, RNLAF depends on the 
industry for its availability and 
affordability of aircrafts. The 
industry depends on the RNLAF 
for its business opportunities 
(launching customer), know-
how and facilities. 
Resilience 
Strong resilience. The presence 
of 250+ partners enables a 
robust core of expertise. 
Overlap and high diversity 
ensure that withdrawal of an 
important partner does not 
threaten the ecosystem. 
 
Moderate resilience. Partners are 
mutually dependent and enjoy 
limited ability to compensate for 
shortcomings. Partners offer unique 
qualities which cannot be replaced 
easily. Thus, it could be vulnerable 
especially if actors lack adequate 
resources. 
 
Moderate resilience. Partners 
are mutually dependent. SME’s 
can be substituted by others. 
OEMs are hard to replace. The 
RNLAF keeps certain in-house 
capabilities to remain self-
supporting in times of crisis or 
the termination of 
partnerships. The RNLAF’s 
bureaucratic nature and lack of 
long term continuity of 
leadership positions make long 
term strategizing difficult. 
 
Ecosystem Type (Valkokari, 
2015)  
 
 Business Ecosystem 
 Innovation Ecosystem 
 Knowledge Ecosystem 
 
Innovation Ecosystem, but 
possesses elements of all three. 
The presence of businesses 
generates both competitive 
and cooperative tendencies, 
also the pursuit of customer 
value is applicable. Knowledge 
exchange and strengthening 
human capital through the 
participation of universities and 
research institutes are also 
present. 
 
Innovation Ecosystem, but does not 
fully cover it. The logic of action of a 
business ecosystem is applicable (a 
platform sharing resources).  
 
This case seems unique and 
therefore appropriate to treat as a 
true security ecosystem. 
Innovation Ecosystem, but does 
not fully cover it. The logic of 
action of a business ecosystem 
is applicable. The RNLAF and 
the industry share resources 
and people.  
 
This case seems unique and 
therefore appropriate to treat 
as a true security ecosystem. 
Sharing of assets 
 
Very limited. However, in 
concrete projects assets are 
shared under the conditions 
that trust is high and 
contractual safeguards are 
arranged. 
 
 
Partners share assets, for instance 
public private financing of CCTV 
infrastructure. 
Assets are shared, such as spare 
capacity of RNLAF facilities and 
machines. 
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Table 7 presents the role of the leading organization(s) or keystone(s), the leadership styles that were 
mentioned by the interviewees and the network governance forms employed in the cases. 
ECOSYSTEM LEADERSHIP  
Table 7 – A cross-case overview of the leadership features 
 HSD BPVS 
Air Force 
maintenance  
Ecosystem leader / keystone 
 
HSD Board sets strategic goals 
and formulates focus. HSD 
Office offers a platform and is in 
charge of daily operations and 
policy preparation. The 11 
founding partners in the Board 
are collectively in charge. 
 
The BPVS leadership 
(presidency) is shared by the 
NCTV and Schiphol Group. In 
essence all partners are equal. 
There seems to be no keystone 
as intended in business 
literature. 
The RNLAF leads the ecosystem 
but is not able to steer the 
OEMs since they are 
monopolists and own 
data/licenses.  
Leadership Style 
 
The HSD Board itself employs 
goal leadership, setting goals 
and programming research 
areas. Depending on the 
context (e.g. projects) the 
leadership styles are more 
involving and engaging in daily 
operations. 
The appropriate leadership style 
also relates to the growth stage. 
 
No clear preference. The BPVS 
platform meetings display goal 
leadership: setting strategic 
goals. Lower down the chain in 
the implementation of projects 
the leadership style consists of 
engaging, involving and also 
goal leadership for achievement 
of project goals. The general 
view is that engagement and 
involvement strongly support 
goal leadership. 
 
Between organizations: 
engaging and involving. Within 
the organization: all three, with 
an emphasis on directive 
leadership to steer the middle-
management and enforce 
commitment to the 
partnerships. SME’s cannot 
employ directive leadership vis-
à-vis the RNLAF.  
Governance structure 
HSD Office runs daily operations 
and is supervised by the HSD 
Board (11 founding partners). 
Elaborate governance structure 
and checks and balances. 
 
 
The BPVS presidency rotates 
between the NCTV and Schiphol 
Group. Besides this, hardly any 
formal governance structures 
present. The whole platform is 
based on a Terms of Reference 
of 1 page. Interactions occur on 
three levels: platform level, 
steering committee level and in 
the workgroups. 
 
A Letter of Intent is used to set 
up the partnership which is 
monitored in the operational 
stage by a steering committee 
and workgroups. The letter of 
intent dictates the scope and 
mutual goals, and outlines 
milestones to be achieved. The 
operational stage is 
underpinned by a Concept of 
Operations document. 
Network Governance Style 
 
Unclear and depends on the 
context. Based on the data an 
NAO seems closest to the 
working of the HSD. The HSD 
Office provides a platform and 
facilitates/brokers partnerships. 
HSD Office is to certain extent 
also involved in the primary 
processes, so a hybrid between 
NAO and Lead Organization. 
 
Compared to the HSD it has 
clear self-regulating dynamics. 
NCTV and Schiphol Group are 
most powerful in some contexts 
but not amounting to 
dominance over others.  
The platform itself is not an 
independent administrative 
entity. Therefore, a hybrid of 
self-regulating network and 
Lead Organization network. 
 
Leading Organization network, 
with the RNLAF at the helm of 
the ecosystem as a whole. The 
RNLAF brokers and facilitates 
partnerships.  
Within bilateral partnerships 
with SME’s the RNLAF acts as an 
NAO. 
Self-regulating network would 
be ideal for the total ecosystem 
and is being worked towards. 
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Table 8 provides a cross-case comparison of the ecosystem’s culture and the individual organization’s culture. 
The next chapter provides an analysis of the relationships between these two. 
CULTURE 
Table 8 – A cross-case overview of ecosystem cultures  
 HSD BPVS 
Air Force 
maintenance  
Ecosystem culture 
The innovative culture is 
dominant, together with a 
community culture.  
 
For the HSD the innovative and 
community cultures are ideal.  
 
An innovative and community 
culture.  
Relationships between partners 
are very personal.  
 
An innovative culture. 
Individual organization’s culture 
 
Most organizations in the board 
display a bureaucratic culture, 
often accompanied by an 
innovative culture. It is expected 
that the numerous smaller 
organizations display a more 
innovative or competitive 
culture but these were not 
included in the data collection. 
 
Most organizations in the 
ecosystem are government 
actors which usually tend to 
display a bureaucratic culture. 
The context of security and 
aviation also dictates a 
bureaucratic culture. However, 
two out of four interviewees 
come from an innovative 
culture. 
The RNLAF interviewee regards 
his organization as innovative. 
The OEMs are expected to be 
bureaucratic and innovative. 
The interviewees from SME’s 
regard themselves as 
innovative and competitive. 
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5. ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the results. The structure of the conceptual model 
is followed with special attention to the subjects that are highlighted in the interview questionnaire: 
several ecosystem characteristics,  leadership styles, culture, network governance and growth stages. 
The Results chapter offered raw findings. This chapter relates these findings to the theory and aims to 
establish the foundation for practical recommendations for security ecosystems. The Theory chapter 
provided certain hypotheses or expectations about well-functioning ecosystems. This analysis will 
explain to what extent the cases lived up to these expectations, which elements are (not) present and 
it will provide additional insights into how security ecosystems actually function.  
Special attention is devoted to: (1) the relationship between the leadership and network governance 
styles of the ecosystem and its growth stages, (2) the relationship between the ecosystem’s culture 
and the organizational cultures,  and (3) the influence of the ecosystem’s context and different layers 
of collaboration. Additional remarks made by respondents that are not captured in the conceptual 
model will also receive further treatment because this provides valuable information on the success 
factors for ecosystems. This chapter concludes with a brief summary after which the next chapter 
presents the conclusion and recommendations. 
5.1 ANALYSIS AND CONNECTION TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
THE ECOSYSTEM’S MAIN  FEATURES 
 
Shared purpose 
Adner (2017) formulated a shared purpose as the common value proposition that actors pursue. For 
the HSD ecosystem the shared purpose is more ambiguous than the BPVS platform and the Air Force 
ecosystem since there are multiple sides to its main purpose and the actors bring more diverse 
individual interests. As Mäkinen and Dedehayir (2012) noted, shared leadership helps keystones to 
foster the pursuit of a shared value. For HSD this has taken shape in the collection of eleven individual 
board members that constitute the HSD Board. BPVS employs the same method of participating 
individual leaders from every organization. BPVS has a clear single shared purpose: strengthening 
Schiphol’s security while simultaneously enabling the airport’s smooth operation. The Air Force 
ecosystem implements shared leadership in its steering committees in which leaders of both partners 
are seated. Both the RNLAF and the industry partners pursue enhanced flexibility which contributes to 
the RNLAF ecosystem’s shared purpose of better availability, affordability and flexibility. 
Conception 
Mars et al (2012) argued that organizational ecosystems are not always self-emergent organisms 
arising from the bottom-up. The HSD is a clear case of intentional organizing and selection or exclusion 
of participants in line with Valkokari’s (2015, p.20) definition of man-made ecosystems. BPVS seems to 
have a more natural conception since a crisis forced these partners to intensify their collaboration and 
set up a platform. The Air Force ecosystem is truly natural since no external force or institution guided 
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these parties to cooperate. However, the RNLAF does actively facilitate and broker partnerships 
between industry parties.  
The ecosystems also differ according to Adner’s (2017, p.40) distinction between the ecosystem-as-
affiliation and the ecosystem-as-structure. BPVS and the Air Force ecosystem come closest to an 
ecosystem-as-structure which focuses on activity: the partners need to cooperate to achieve a desired 
outcome in the form of a value proposition (a secure Schiphol, or availability and affordability of the 
RNLAF’s fleet). HSD better fits the definition of ecosystem-as-affiliation which regards ecosystems as 
communities of associated actors, the presence of a leading organization and the achievement of 
synergy. All the HSD partners are affiliated through their (paid) membership of HSD. 
Keystone 
The cases in this study do not possess the essential element of a keystone organization that leads the 
entire ecosystem. There is no organization that has the power and resources to direct other partners 
and that provides a platform on which all others can leverage to add value, as in Iansiti & Levien’s 
(2004) definition. In our ecosystems of the HSD and BPVS, the leadership is shared among multiple 
partners. For the Air Force ecosystem the keystone role is carried out to a certain degree by the RNLAF 
itself. Both the BPVS and the HSD ecosystems provide a platform on which value is created and shared 
but this is not the product of a single organization, as in the earlier example of Airbus. HSD offers its 
partners a platform but the HSD itself cannot be considered the keystone since they do not possess 
the qualities of a keystone as intended in the business literature of Adner (2017) and Iansiti & Levien 
(2004).   
BPVS features shared leadership, as is clear from the rotating presidency between the NCTV and 
Schiphol Group but also from the interviewees’ experiences with the consensus-based decision-
making.  
Most interviewees agreed that a self-regulating network style would be ideal for their ecosystem which 
suggests that leadership by a single powerful keystone is undesirable. This is featured in the air force 
ecosystem in which the RNLAF is in the lead but even the RNLAF’s interviewee himself argued that a 
self-regulating network is desirable and should be actively pursued. 
It seems that the data in this research suggests that ecosystems in the security domain do not require 
the leadership of a single powerful organization or keystone and therefore differ from the business 
ecosystems outlined in the influential works of Adner (2006; 2017), Iansiti & Levien (2004) and Moore 
(1996). 
Interdependency 
The partners in the ecosystems all experience a shared fate. Their interdependency is high and partners 
cannot solely rely on their internal capacities. As Adner (2006) explains, the partners are mutually 
dependent for achieving innovation. This is clearly applicable to all cases.  
Resilience 
Resilience refers to the ecosystems ability to maintain its own inertia while being capable of coping 
with exogenous shocks with an innate generative ability to evolve endogenously (Wareham, Fox & 
Cano Giner, 2014). We have seen that nestedness, embeddedness and diversity confer more resilience.  
HSD has a broad array of many partners (>250) with overlapping expertise that can easily replace each 
82 
 
other. The ecosystem is robust. Compared to HSD the BPVS ecosystem is less resilient since the number 
of partners is much smaller, less diverse and the capabilities are often uniquely tied to one single 
organization. However, two interviewees expressed innovative ideas about using overlapping 
capacities and the exchange of personnel. Furthermore, compared to HSD the BPVS cooperation is 
more strongly embedded in legal obligations to deliver certain capacities. The presence of mainly 
public actors at Schiphol Airport is mandated in the law. They cannot suddenly withdraw from the 
ecosystem as opposed to private enterprises in the HSD ecosystem. 
The Air Force maintenance ecosystem is moderately resilient. The collapse of an SME in the aerospace 
and defense industry does not pose a problem to the ecosystem overall since substitutes can be found 
easily. However, if an OEM withdraws – being a monopolist – the ecosystem’s resilience becomes 
vulnerable. Furthermore, an industry partner's loyalty and orientation can change as a result of a take-
over or changes in its management. The RNLAF takes this scenario into account and maintains its own 
in-house capabilities to avoid becoming too dependent. Other resilience-related challenges come from 
the often changing leadership positions (rotating every three years) and limited ability to commit to 
long-term planning on behalf of the RNLAF.  
 
Ecosystem Type 
 
Valkokari’s (2015) three ecosystem types (business, innovation, or knowledge ecosystem) are 
presented  on page 18 and shown below.   
 
HSD possesses qualities of all three but the Innovation Ecosystems fits best since HSD’s main baseline 
is co-creation of innovation. Its partners are geographically clustered in the The Hague region and the 
regional hubs in the Netherlands. The membership structure thought out by Twynstra Gudde has 
different levels of collaboration. HSD Office performs the role of innovation broker and assists in 
arranging funding for projects. The logic of action perfectly suits Valkokari’s definition since the 
geographically proximate actors interact through the HSD with the help of HSD Office’s intermediation.  
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The BPVS is more challenging to capture in Valkokari’s categorization. Its baseline is to manage and 
improve Schiphol’s security, which requires innovative solutions but this is not an end goal in itself. 
The actors and roles are very much similar to the innovation ecosystem but also reflects the business 
ecosystem’s idea of having certain focal companies as a core, and other actors more loosely involved. 
The BPVS steering committee and workgroups are flexible and agile since they can invite non-
permanent members to join a workgroup based on the nature of the topic.  Thus they can keep the 
regular meetings compact and efficient, and if necessary they can expand the array of involved 
organizations to make use of their expertise and capacity.  
Valkokari’s (2015) knowledge ecosystem does not seem applicable. Compared to the HSD this 
ecosystem has more unique characteristics and could be a prime example of a security ecosystem with 
the shared purpose of creating a pure ‘security’ product: protecting an object of critical infrastructure.  
The Air Force ecosystem is also hard to categorize but seems to possess many qualities of the business 
and the innovation ecosystems. The interactions between the OEMs and the SME’s reflect global 
business relationships that are both competitive and cooperative. However, the ecosystem members 
are also geographically clustered in The Netherlands and more specific at Woensdrecht Air Base. The 
actors and roles fit the business ecosystem category, the RNLAF being the focal organization as main 
customer and keystone at once. The logic of action possess qualities of the business and the innovation 
ecosystem. The RNLAF operates as a platform sharing resources and assets (e.g. spare capacity), and 
the RNLAF benefits or aggregates other actors in the networked business operations (e.g. by urging 
OEMs to make use of the services and products of Dutch SME’s in their supply chains). At the same 
time however, geographicallhy proximate actors interact around hubs (i.e. Logistics Centre 
Woensdrecht in this case) facilitated by intermediating actors (e.g. the RNLAF actively facilitates 
cooperation between SME’s and OEMs to join forces in the quest for maintenance orders for weapons 
systems). In sum, this ecosystem clearly serves a commercial business purpose (for the OEMs and 
SME’s) and potentially enables innovation. Knowledge institutions are part of the ecosystem (e.g. NLR) 
but the data on this case did not provide knowledge ecosystem features.  
Sharing assets 
Creation and sharing of assets is an important task for the ecosystem’s keystone (Iansiti & Levien, 
2004). However, we have noted that the cases in this study do not have a single keystone. Nevertheless 
the data showed that in all three ecosystems assets are shared. A condition for this is a high level of 
trust, supplemented by legal safeguards in concrete projects. In the HSD the sharing of assets is rather 
limited which is surprising and not in accordance with the literature. In the BPVS and the Air Force 
ecosystems assets are shared which is in line with the consensus in business ecosystem literature. This 
has resulted in concrete tangible milestones. However, legal limitations on the sharing of information 
or liability issues are barriers to sharing of assets. 
ECOSYSTEM LEADERSHIP 
 
Ecosystem leader 
The literature distinguishes between ecosystem leaders or ‘platform firms’ and followers. Followers 
often fulfill specialized functions. We already noticed that the HSD and BPVS do not have a clear single 
leading organization. In HSD the leadership is shared between the eleven founding partners. This 
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seems to somewhat reflect Adner’s (2017) idea of keystone leadership. Adner (2017, p.48) asserts that 
the keystone does not have to be a single organization but can be a consortium of organizations. 
The HSD organization (Board + Office) provides the platform. The vast number of partners consist of 
many small niche players (mostly IT businesses) that fulfill specialized functions. This is in conformity 
with Iansiti & Levien’s (2004) concept of leader versus followers.  
The BPVS also reflects the presence of both leaders and followers. The powerful organizations employ 
a shared leadership approach, in particularly the NCTV and Schiphol Group. Smaller organizations that 
offer specific functions fulfil the role of niche players. E.g. the multiple air cargo companies involved. 
The Air Force ecosystem reflects a more classic keystone organization, i.e. the RNLAF itself. However, 
its power over OEMs is limited and we have shown that bilateral partnerships are guided by a steering 
committee and workgroups which are headed by representatives from both partners. The Network 
Administrative Organization is visible in the LCW management team’s ability to direct and steer the 
bilateral partnership with an industry partner.  
Benkler (in Kelly, 2015, p.8)  describes a platform as “a technical and organizational context in which a 
community can interact to achieve a specific purpose”. The HSD and BPVS exactly fit this description. 
Both ecosystems’ leaders are successful in implementing platform leadership through which 
collaboration and innovation are realized. 
Leadership style 
The theory chapter provided insights from different sources on the relationship between leadership 
style, organizational culture and organizational performance. According to Ogbonna & Harris (2000) 
the innovative and the competitive culture -  both externally oriented – have a positive effect on 
performance. An organization can arrive at this culture with the help of displaying engaging and 
involving leadership by its individual leaders. Furthermore, according to Dulewicz & Higgs (2005) goal 
leadership or instrumental leadership is focused on delivering results within a relatively stable context. 
This is in contrast to engaging and involving leadership styles which are suited to accommodate 
changes and highly transformational contexts.  
HSD and BPVS reflect clear goal leadership on an organizational level. A hierarchically superior body 
decides through collaboration and collective agreement on the ecosystem’s strategy and policy 
directions. This is visible in HSD’s Board and in BPVS’s biannual meeting and steering committee 
meetings. 
In the implementation of projects or similar daily operations the leadership styles seem to be different. 
On the one hand, the data shows that the engaging and involving leadership styles are employed in 
this context. On the other hand, interviewees argued – in particular for the BPVS case – that the 
workgroups require the delivery of results in projects. This demands directive leadership. However, 
overall “it remains important to engage, to warm up all parties for the higher cause (…)” (Interview 
B3).  
This is also visible in the Air Force ecosystem in which it was argued that the organization’s 
management (C-level) should display directive leadership in order to steer the middle-management to 
commit to the partnership strategy. This is necessary in order to overcome resistance to change and 
should be supplemented by engaging and involving leadership. The leadership on an 
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interorganizational level should display engagement and involvement after which goals are formulated 
that are implemented top-down through directive leadership within the individual organizations. 
For an SME’s collaboration with the RNLAF an engaging leadership style is most suitable in order to 
empower others and to prove that it is a beneficial asset to the personnel of the RNLAF. 
It seems that from an organizational perspective the goal leadership style is necessary for managing 
the ecosystem’s overall strategy and focus. However, lower down the chain in the collaboration 
between individuals from different organizations the leadership style entails more engaging and 
involving leadership but if resistance is met then directive leadership becomes crucial to the success 
of the partnership. 
Governance structure 
In line with the business literature the ecosystems in this study employ a governance structure and 
protocols that outline who participates, how they interact etc. This fits the requirements for well-
functioning ecosystems as formulated  in the theory (see: Kelly, 2015).   
HSD and BPVS operate as platforms which constitutes its main locus of coordination which reflects 
Valkokari’s (2015) conception of ecosystem governance.   
The BPVS ecosystems employs a light governance structure based on a single-page terms of reference 
document. The HSD employs more elaborate governance structures.  
The Air Force maintenance ecosystem makes use of mainly bilateral agreements which are laid down 
in a letter of intent and a concept of operations which provide the scope and (mutual) goals of the 
collaboration between partners. The operational stage of the partnership is monitored by a steering 
committee and workgroups. 
Network governance style  
This study uses the concept of network 
governance since networks and ecosystems 
are so much alike and academic knowledge 
on governance of ecosystems in a public 
(security) domain is still scarce. Kenis & 
Provan’s (2008)  three forms of network 
governance equip us with a useful lens to 
observe interorganizational cooperation. 
The ecosystem literature assumes that 
there is a keystone organization or a collection of organizations taking the lead which is reflected in 
the Lead Organization form. The self-regulating network seems not to be in line with business literature 
but is indeed mentioned by most interviewees to be the ideal situation for any ecosystem no matter 
how unrealistic this might be in practice.   
For the HSD case the NAO was mentioned most often. The formalized structure of the HSD Board and 
HSD Office’s tasks reflect the NAO form as described by Kenis & Provan (2008): an entity that has as 
its sole purpose the managing and coordination of the network and which does not engage in the 
primary process. According to Stadtler (2012) an NAO is most suitable for a network having a high 
number of participants, moderate levels of goal consensus and trust, and a high need for partnership-
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level competencies. The HSD matches these characteristics with its >250 partners, slightly ambiguous 
goals and various interests, moderate levels of trust as the result of competition, and a high need for 
high-end competencies in (cyber) security.  
However, it must be noted that Kenis & Provan’s (2008)  definition of a self-regulating network offers 
elements that might allow for the HSD to be considered a self-regulating network to a certain extent. 
The shared leadership approach employed by the eleven founding partners forms an example of the 
coordination of common activities on behalf of network members themselves. These partners all 
voluntarily and purposefully decided to cooperate and to set up the HSD which can be explained as 
self-regulation. 
The BPVS slightly fits into the self-regulating network category (Kenis & Provan, 2008). The platform 
fits Stadtler’s (2012) four required features of self-regulating networks. It has a small number of 
members, its levels of goal consensus and trust are high, and the need for partnership level 
competencies is lower. However, all interviewees mentioned the Lead Organization network as well, 
depending on the context. The label of self-regulating network is not fully just since there are power 
elements present and it is clear that the NCTV and Schiphol Group to a certain extent steer the 
network. Therefore, this ecosystem reflects a hybrid of Lead Organization and Self-Regulating network. 
The same label applies to the Air Force maintenance ecosystem. Interviewees mentioned the Leading 
Organization (i.e. the RNLAF) and the desire to arrive at a self-regulating network in the future. In 
bilateral collaboration the  role of the RNLAF resembles an NAO, being a monitoring entity supervising 
the partnership and being able to influence the industry partner. 
CULTURE 
 
Ecosystem culture 
As noted earlier the ecosystem literature demands an externally oriented culture (being either 
innovative or competitive). The data for all three ecosystems shows a clear presence of the innovative 
culture supplemented by the community culture. Elements of a bureaucratic and a competitive culture 
are inevitably present as well, the former primarily in the BPVS ecosystem and the latter primarily in 
the HSD ecosystem. Apparently interviewees interpret the community culture as one that helps 
partnering with other organizations. This differs from the definition of Ogbonna & Harris (2000) who 
regard a community culture as internally oriented and thus not suitable for an ecosystem. Based on 
the data it seems that ecosystem members regard the ecosystem as a community that shares a culture 
of cooperation and social cohesion.  
The Air Force maintenance ecosystem was described as mainly innovative but also having strong 
bureaucratic elements and a community-like culture at the Logistics Centre Woensdrecht. The 
organization consists of many hierarchical layers which are experienced as bureaucratic and slowing 
things down. 
The data shows that people enjoy their ecosystem as a community of like-minded people and 
organizations with a focus on delivering creative solutions. The next section explains how they 
characterize their own organizations. 
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Individual organization’s culture 
In the HSD and BPVS ecosystems the bureaucratic culture is dominant,  which is to be expected of the 
BPVS ecosystem with its large presence of government organizations and its richness of regulations 
that is inherent to aviation. However, the BPVS interviewees regard their public organizations as 
innovative first, especially compared to their foreign counterparts.  
  
The data on the HSD shows similar findings but has relatively more businesses in its ecosystem that 
bring an innovative culture, especially the numerous IT start-ups and SME’s. However, the major 
parties consist of governments (ministries and local government) and large corporations which are all 
bureaucratic to some extent as a result of their size or nature. 
The Air Force maintenance ecosystem was covered in only three interviews so these findings are 
relatively ill-informed but all interviewees regarded their organizational culture as innovative. 
However, the overall ecosystem’s culture was perceived to be innovative, bureaucratic and a 
community. Apparently interviewees have different experiences.  
Based on this data there is no causal effect of the individual organization’s cultures on the ecosystem’s 
culture as a whole, which is clearly an innovative and community culture in the HSD and BPVS cases. 
Apparently, the presence of strongly bureaucratic organizations does not ‘contaminate’ the overall 
ecosystem’s culture.  
This relates to one of Cusumano & Gawer’s (2002) levers of platform leadership: internal organization. 
In a platform leader organization some parts may display a logic of competition with others in the 
ecosystem while other parts of the internal organization display a logic of partnership. A solution 
proposed in the literature is to set up internal ‘Chinese walls’.   
One of the founding partner’s interviewees remarked that his department has received a separate spot 
in the organizational structure to make sure they are cut off from the company’s processes and to 
enable more disruptive innovation. His next quote reflects that there a different logics within the 
internal organization: “Of course I have competitors! When our salespeople pursue an assignment they 
face competition. The client has competitors. At the same time however, I think that cyber security is 
such a niche market with such fragmentation of knowledge and shortages that cooperation is truly 
essential” (Interview A2).  
Furthermore, a community culture can be interpreted as being open towards other organizations that 
are considered to be part of the community. In this light a community culture can be regarded as an 
externally oriented culture and is thus in line with Ogbonna and Harris (2000) whom claim that an 
external focus is beneficial to performance.  
According to several interviewees a combination of an innovative culture and a community culture is 
ideal, which seems to strengthen the assumption that a community culture entails an external focus 
instead of an inward attitude within an organization. 
Most important is the finding that there seems to be no relationship between an organizations’ 
individual culture and the ecosystem’s culture as a whole in all cases. 
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RESILIENCE 
 
The HSD ecosystem seems to be most resilient with its diverse and numerous collection of members. 
For the BPVS and Air Force ecosystems the level of resilience seems moderate. Vulnerabilities may be 
present in the fact that some members are hard to substitute in case of withdrawal or failure to 
deliver. Another prominent vulnerability is the change of individuals in organization’s top 
management. However, these scenarios are taken into account and countermeasures have been 
taken.  
Additional success factors 
Multiple interviewees emphasize the impact of individual leaders for the ecosystem’s success. 
Especially in the development stage of the ecosystem it requires the initiative of personalities to foster 
cooperation and to achieve tangible milestones. In the BPVS case this was the instalment of the CCTV 
system which required co-financing from partners. For this initiative the organization’s leaders had to 
step away from conventional procedures and “just do it”. In the Air Force ecosystem a similar analysis 
was made by interviewees. An essential success factor is the role of individual leaders within the 
RNLAF. The ecosystem approach requires military commanders with an entrepreneurial mindset and 
the courage to push beyond the boundaries that their bureaucratic organization places upon them. 
Additionally, it was mentioned that the individuals that have a seat in the platform meetings are issued 
with the proper mandate to speak and decide on behalf of their organization. Another clear 
commonality in the interviews was that partners ought to know each other personally in order to be 
truly involved. This also generates a sense of ownership which was mentioned by interviewees to be 
crucial for success.  
As became clear in several interviews it does not merely require goal leadership by these well-
established senior level individuals but also the ability to cooperate and connect with others.  
The platform leader -  such as the HSD Office – has an active role in daily operations and brokering 
partnerships but it operates from the background away from the spotlights. According multiple 
interviewees this type of leadership is important. The partner organizations should ‘shine’, not the 
facilitating platform organization or NAO in this case. We might describe this as a form of servant 
leadership on an organizational level.  
Furthermore, forms of  thought leadership or inspirational leadership were mentioned by one 
outspoken interviewee. This is to be used for challenging and inspiring the senior executives by 
learning from other fields or inviting experts to educate ecosystem leaders on latest developments 
(e.g. technology).  
One interview in the Air Force ecosystem delivered an interesting analysis that would require further 
research but seems to provide a suggestion on the explanation behind SME’s greater speed of decision-
making and agility. His observation noted that SME’s with whom he conducts business have a compact 
size of no more than 200 employees. This size enables them to cooperate better in partnerships with 
the RLNAF. According to him, this explains why partnerships between SME’s and the RNLAF are more 
successful than with large bureaucratic OEMs.   
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5.2 LEADERSHIP AND ECOSYSTEM GROWTH STAGES  
This section relates the ecosystem’s growth stages to the matching leadership style. These findings are 
based on the data and the normative opinion of interviewees. In the HSD case most interviewees 
counted three different growth stages. The BPVS is reflected in four distinct growth stages with special 
attention for the time period prior to the formal establishment of the platform. The Air Force 
ecosystem provided three growth stages in setting up bilateral partnerships: reconnaissance, 
transition and operational stages.   
Thus, we roughly identify three common growth stages: the creation stage, the consolidation stage, 
and the materialization stage. 
The results show that the leadership style changes along with the ecosystem’s maturity level.  
In the ecosystem’s creation the first and foremost leadership style is goal setting. The data shows that 
in order to set up an organizational ecosystem a great amount of goal-setting is to be done. For the 
HSD this meant the combined effort of several organizations to set up a separate organization and to 
establish clear focus areas and goals. The same goes for the BPVS ecosystem which required the 
leadership of individuals in the involved organizations to set up the BPVS structure and to establish its 
goals. The Air Force case somewhat differs, as the focus is more on bilateral interactions between two 
parties which are accompanied by forms of consultation and finding mutuality. Engaging and involving 
leadership are then more essential but the end product of this initial reconnaissance is a letter of intent 
outlining goals.  
 As the ecosystem matures the required amount of the three leadership styles changes. Goal-setting 
remains equally important but in order to foster partnerships and to achieve milestones through 
collaboration the need for engaging and involving leadership styles increases. In the data the engaging 
style was mentioned more often. In the long run after the ecosystem has consolidated the goal-setting 
style is supplemented by an engaging and involving style. Engaging leadership was mentioned most 
and has a strong presence in all the stages.  
In order to break through any resistance or reluctance in the middle-management goal leadership 
remains important within all organizations.  
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5.3 GROWTH STAGES 
This section presents an analysis of how the ecosystems mature and what this means for the different 
dimensions (i.e. leadership style, culture, network governance). The former section discussed that the 
leadership style changes along with an ecosystem’s maturity. This section presents a complete 
overview of how the HSD and BPVS cases developed from (pre- ) creation up until today. The Air Force 
ecosystem is presented in the form the bilateral process of two partners seeking to cooperate. 
 
Table 9 represents the BPVS case. The table shows that the culture, form of network governance and 
the collection of leadership styles change along the way. In the early phase goal leadership is a 
necessity in order to successfully build an ecosystem structure and to formulate clear directions. This 
also requires some level of formalization, e.g. in the BPVS case this means agreeing to a terms of 
reference and setting up the biannual c-level meetings, workgroups and steering committees. As a 
result of this a culture of community and innovation grows. 
Table 9 – Growth stages and the dimensions of the BPVS ecosystem 
BPVS 
Platform 
Pre-creation stage Creation stage Consolidation stage 
Materialization / 
Revitalization stage 
Dimensions:         
Stage 
description 
A crisis provided the 
momentum and window 
of opportunity for the 
instalment of the BPVS 
platform. 
 
The investigative 
Commission under the 
leadership of Ruud Oord 
recommended to 
improve the 
communication between 
partners involved in the 
security measures of 
Schiphol Airport. 
The BPVS platform is 
created under the 
leadership of Ruud Oord 
who previously headed the 
investigative commission.  
The platform is 
created and goals are 
set. This stage then 
delivers the first 
tangible results. 
For instance, the 
establishment of the 
CCTV infrastructure 
which could be 
realized thanks to the 
initiative of individual 
leaders. 
The platform has achieved 
tangible results and 
milestones. Developments in 
security threats urge the 
platform to adopt new topics 
which creates new energy.  
Leadership 
style 
 \ 
This stage required the 
setting of clear goals and 
formulating focus. 
Individual leadership is 
required to foster initial 
collaboration.  
Goal leadership 
remains important at 
the top level. The 
implementation of 
projects reflects a 
more engaging 
leadership style. 
Engaging and involving 
leadership support the 
continuous goal-setting 
leadership style. 
Culture  \  
No dominant culture 
(expected) 
A community culture 
has grown combined 
with an innovative 
culture. 
A community and innovative 
culture.  
91 
 
Network 
governance 
 \  
BPVS starts as a self-
regulating network 
BPVS is a self-
regulating network. In 
some contexts it 
reflects Lead 
Organization, e.g. 
when the NCTV 
enforces actions. 
This stage displays a self-
regulating network 
 
The HSD ecosystem’s growth stages are presented in table 10 on the next page. The HSD differs from 
BPVS because there is no pre-creation stage mentioned. The HSD is much larger than BPVS with its 
>250 partner organizations from many different branches (i.e. a true triple helix collection). HSD is also 
much more complex in terms of multiple purposes, different interests and its shared leadership set-up 
of eleven founding partners. Compared to BPVS the HSD represents much more of an ecosystem leader 
or keystone-led ecosystem since HSD Office plays a very active role in brokering partnerships, 
facilitating projects and determining what strategic directions should be prepared for. Nevertheless 
many partners are able to cooperate independently of the HSD Office’s brokering services which 
reflects a form of self-regulation. This has grown over the years and would not have been possible 
without the employment of goal leadership and establishing focus in the HSD’s early days. 
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Table 10 - Growth stages and the dimensions of the HSD ecosystem 
Hague 
Security Delta 
Pre-creation stage Creation stage 
 
 
Consolidation stage  
 
 
Materialization / Revitalization 
stage 
Dimensions:         
Stage  
description 
Interviewees did 
not mention any 
stage prior to the 
creation 
HSD was created by the 
joining of forces by public 
and private actors. The 
local municipality of The 
Hague and a consortium 
of businesses and 
research institutions 
being the driving forces. 
This stage is about 
attracting new partners 
and creating 
momentum through 
achieving milestones.  
Some interviewees expect the HSD 
to come up with big concrete results 
in its current stage. Another expects 
the HSD to achieve a stronger 
international status. This can be 
described as the materialization of 
the ecosystem. The HSD has become 
a successful and well-known cluster 
with 250+ partners. 
Leadership  
style 
 \ 
The early stages require 
a goal leadership style, 
to provide focus and 
select themes. 
Goal-setting and 
programming remain 
important but the 
variety of many (new) 
partners requires finding 
a common direction for 
which a certain level of 
consensus seems 
necessary. Engaging and 
involving leadership 
styles supplement the 
goal leadership style.  
Involving and engaging leadership 
supplement a goal leadership style. ‘ 
Culture 
 \  
There is no dominant 
culture yet but 
communication to the 
outside world and 
attracting partners are 
crucial. Externally 
oriented cultures 
(innovative or 
community cultures) 
seem appropriate.  
Culture becomes more 
visible. The ecosystem 
needs an innovative and 
community culture. 
Bureaucratic and 
competitive tendencies 
are inevitable but should 
remain manageable. 
A community and innovative culture.  
Network 
governance 
 \  
The platform needs the 
energy of one or multiple 
organizations in order to 
arrive at a self-regulating 
network in the long term. 
In this first stage an NAO 
or Lead Organization 
style is implemented by 
the HSD Board (11 
founding partners) and 
HSD Office. 
HSD Board and Office 
remain in charge to 
provide a platform. Thus 
somewhere between 
NAO and Lead 
Organization. 
The HSD is not yet self-
supportive (financially). 
The hybrid of NAO and Lead 
Organization is still applicable. 
However, the HSD ecosystem has 
self-regulating forces. Partners 
connect and collaborate 
independently without needing HSD 
Office’s intervention. 
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This page presents the Air Force ecosystem’s growth stages in table 11. This ecosystem consists 
mainly of bilateral partnerships between the RNLAF and individual partners. The growth stages 
therefore represent the process from the very first interactions up until the operational cooperation.  
Table 11 - Growth stages and the dimensions of the Air Force maintenance ecosystem (the bilateral partnering process) 
 
 
 
Air Force 
maintenance 
ecosystem Reconnaissance stage Transition stage 
 
 
Operational stage  
Dimensions:       
Stage  
description 
Initial contacts are made. 
Opportunities for finding 
overlapping goals (a shared 
purpose) and consensus on 
the scope of the potential 
cooperation are looked 
after. 
The reconnaissance has resulted 
in agreement on the scope and 
goals. A Letter of Intent has 
been signed and preparations 
are made for the operational 
stage.  
The partnership results in 
operational cooperation. Projects 
are carried out. Assets are 
shared. 
 
Underpinned by a Concept of 
Operations. 
Leadership  
style 
 
 
 
A consultative style, similar 
to engaging leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
No data  
All three leadership styles are 
present. 
An SME displays engaging 
leadership style towards the 
RNLAF. 
The RNLAF employs all three 
styles, with an internal emphasis 
on directive goal leadership to 
align all hierarchical layers with 
the partnership goals. The same 
holds for OEMs. 
Culture No data 
 
 
 
 
 
No data 
Ecosystem as a whole: innovative 
and bureaucratic. The RNLAF 
brings a bureaucratic culture but 
consists of different components. 
The SME’s deliver an innovative 
culture. 
 
Not sufficient data to make a 
clear-cut statement. 
Network 
governance 
 
No governance yet. 
 
 
 
 
No governance yet. 
The RNLAF is in the lead. As 
director and influencer of the 
bilateral partnership.  
 
Not sufficient data to make a 
clear-cut statement. 
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5.4 LAYERS AND CONTEXTS OF ECOSYSTEM LEADERSHIP 
This section analyzes the influence of the context and different layers within ecosystem cooperation 
on the leadership styles and culture. We have identified the importance of goal leadership for the 
executive level interactions between organizations. This included the role of individual leaders that 
take the initiative to foster collaboration and reach agreement on goals and the ecosystem’s directions. 
Some interviewees mentioned that these men and women have to be able to cooperate and to involve 
others but the key message remained that goal leadership or directive leadership is a priority for the 
internal leadership in an organization. 
However, this assertion only applies to the C-level of organizations, i.e. the CEO’s, top-civil servants 
and similar high-ranking officials. This study also discovered that the appropriate leadership style and 
culture is different in the operational sphere. The implementation of projects by a collection of 
partners requires much more of an engaging style. Especially in the context of highly specialized 
expertise (e.g. cyber security) a directive leadership style is ill-placed. The professionals in the field 
possess all the expertise and instructing them in a directive fashion is not advisable. Furthermore, 
formulating goals and focus areas without consulting the professionals from the operational level will 
probably generate a risk of missing out on opportunities and designing flawed strategic plans. 
In the case of collaborating commercial businesses, these individuals cooperating intensively in a 
project probably also display a different culture since they cannot regard their counterparts as 
competitors because that would obstruct their mutual success. This latter point emphasizes the 
importance of thinking through one’s internal organization and the use of so-called Chinese walls to 
adopt a correct role when facing competitors.  
The context in which partners operate influences the culture and leadership styles. For example the 
HSD operates in the pre-competitive domain of innovation which enables competitors to collaborate 
for the attainment of innovation which is in their common interest. This diminishes competitive forces 
and allows for a community and innovative culture. This requires less of a goal-setting style. 
What also came up during the interviews is that the ecosystems should function – according to several 
interviewees - as mouthpieces to signal messages to the government on behalf of the whole 
ecosystem. Such a role inherently requires the engagement of partners and cannot be realized through 
purely goal leadership.  
For the BPVS ecosystem the analysis of the leadership styles worked the other way around. In the 
workgroups the teams have to deliver results and live up to expectations from the other partners. In 
these settings a goal leadership style is sometimes essential to ensure that results are achieved. 
However, on the steering committee level the interactions are very much engaging and involving. 
There is not much room for directive leadership since all the present parties are formally equal to one 
another in most instances. The cooperation on this level is all about engaging and involving each other, 
knowing one’s counterparts personally. The observation of one of their meetings confirmed this 
picture. 
In sum, even though this study’s main finding entails the importance of goal-leadership in setting up 
successful ecosystems it should be noted that the context and hierarchical layers within an ecosystem 
may influence the appropriate styles. 
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The Air Force ecosystem showed that the interactions between organizations are very much 
accompanied by an engaging leadership style. The leadership styles within the organization, in 
particular the RNLAF and OEMs whom are both large bureaucratic organizations, are different. Three 
layers were identified: the C-level, the middle management, and the work floor. The first and the latter 
layer are willing to partner with external organizations because they respectively see the long-term 
strategic benefits and experience the advantages of learning from the knowledge and know-how of 
the new partner. The middle layer often resists changes and this requires directive leadership from the 
C-level to make sure that the partnership strategy is adhered to. This is displayed in Figure 19.  
 
 
 
Figure 19 – Interorganizational leadership and internal leadership in a bilateral partnership 
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5.5 SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS 
This section briefly summarizes the most important findings that were presented in the analysis. We 
have seen that all three cases do not adhere to the business literature’s definition of ecosystems. In 
our cases there is no single organization that demonstrates such power that it is able to lead the 
ecosystem. This role of keystone is taken up by multiple organizations through shared leadership. 
With regards to leadership it has become clear that on an organizational level the ecosystems both 
require clear setting of goals and directions, i.e. goal leadership. This is supplemented by engaging and 
to a lesser extent involving leadership. In the early stages of the ecosystem’s growth the goal 
leadership element is relatively larger compared to engaging and involving leadership. During its 
growth these three components become more equally present. Furthermore, in the implementation 
of projects the leadership styles differ. Engaging and involving leadership styles become more 
important. However, in the context of large bureaucratic organizations the middle management layer 
is often reluctant to follow the partnership strategy and resists changes. This demands a goal 
leadership style from the C-level in order to align the middle layer. This, context determines the 
appropriate style. Besides goal-setting individual leaders have to display an engaging style and need to 
be able to connect with others. Personal ties between network partners determine success. 
Most importantly is that in the HSD and BPVS cases a collection of partners provide a platform on 
which other partners can connect and that provides direction and stability. This platform leadership is 
supplemented by a network governance style that ideally is self-regulating. However, for the HSD an 
NAO and Lead Organization styles are present, probably as a result of its high number of partners and 
complexity of the relationships. The BPVS platform provides an example of a hybrid between Lead 
Organization and a self-regulating network.  
The Air Force ecosystem is unique to the extent that its interactions are bilateral and there is no formal 
platform present. However, Logistics Centre Woensdrecht performs a hub function and physically 
connects with its partners. 
The dominant cultures in all cases are innovative and to a lesser extent a community culture. Most 
individual organizations display a bureaucratic culture which suggests that there is no relationship 
between the individual organization’s culture and the culture of the ecosystem as a whole. Some 
interviewees noted that the innovative and the community cultures are ideal for their ecosystem. 
This chapter concluded with the connecting of ecosystem growth stages to the appropriate leadership 
style, governance and culture. In the early phases both cases required clear goal and focus provided 
by a strong leader. The leadership is provided by organizations but executed by individuals whom act 
as initiative-takers to achieve tangible results. The efforts should be aimed at arriving at an innovative 
and community culture. A self-regulating network style is aimed for as well. For the BPVS this has been 
achieved but it has not been possible for the HSD to arrive at complete self-regulation, but self-
regulating dynamics have appeared. The Air Force ecosystem is still in its early stages compared to the 
BPVS and HSD. It consists of bilateral partnerships which arise out of an engaging and involving 
leadership style between organizations but requires all three styles within the organizations to align 
all layers to the partnership’s objectives. 
The latter point is a factor in the choice of the appropriate leadership style in any ecosystem. The 
leadership employed by the highest hierarchical body differs from the appropriate style lower down 
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the hierarchical chain. As opposed to the C-level’s goal leadership of the ecosystem as a whole, the 
implementation of projects and other collaborations in the operational domain reflects more engaging 
leadership. In these collaborations skilled professionals of different partners cooperate intensively on 
concrete projects. This requires a different leadership style that consults and supports these 
professionals. This is about empowerment and allowing subordinates to take decisions.   
However, when the middle-management obstructs the implementation of the partnership 
arrangements, the C-level needs to step up and display directive leadership to align all organizational 
layers to pursue the partnership approach. Figure 20 tries to capture the key message of this analysis. 
 
Figure 20 – The maturity levels and leadership styles of the security ecosystems in this research.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This section presents this research’s conclusion. First, the research goal and method is summarized. 
Second, the major findings are presented in which the central research question is addressed. This 
generates recommendations that may be relevant for practitioners. Lastly, this chapter concludes 
with a discussion of this research’s limitations and possible avenues for further research. 
Method and goal 
This qualitative research started with an extensive literature review of the ecosystem approach and 
relevant concepts for its leadership, governance and culture. This enabled the construction of a 
conceptual model as depicted on page 37.  The case-study method entails three cases that represent 
an ecosystem in the security domain. Based on the literature an interview questionnaire is used to 
collect data in fourteen interviews with individuals in leadership positions in their respective 
ecosystem. The data enables the answering of the central research question: How can leadership on 
an organizational level stimulate collaboration between actors in the security ecosystem?  
The findings 
The first and foremost finding in the three cases is that security ecosystems differ from classic business 
ecosystems in the sense that they do not possess one single powerful keystone organization (e.g. an 
Airbus, Microsoft or Wal-Mart) that is able to steer and improve the entire ecosystem. The security 
ecosystem’s management is much more a matter of shared leadership between multiple organizations 
that have purposefully chosen to collaborate within a platform-like structure. This has self-regulating 
dynamics which are less compatible with the classic academic concept of keystone strategy. 
Leading an ecosystem requires a considerable degree of goal leadership. The organization(s) or 
platform of organizations that decide on the ecosystem’s directions should offer clear goals and focus 
on specific themes. This leadership style is to be supplemented by a degree of engaging leadership and 
to a lesser extent involving leadership. The ideal culture for security ecosystems is a combination of 
innovative and community culture. The extent to which a culture is externally oriented determines its 
appropriateness for this type of ecosystem. Bureaucratic and competitive cultures ought to be 
minimized. It is possible for organizations to create an innovative and community culture for the overall 
ecosystem while displaying a different culture within their individual organization. 
The function of leadership differs per ecosystem growth stage. In the early phase of the ecosystem’s 
creation the need for clear goals and directions is paramount. This requires the initiative of individual 
leaders whom decide to collaborate and to set up a platform in which their respective organizations 
participate. This can either take the institutional form of a separate administrative entity or leading 
organization, or it can remain a relatively informal gathering of partners. What matters most is that 
this collection of partners employs platform leadership in which a strategy is formulated and goals are 
made clear. After the successful creation of an ecosystem the first tangible results prove that the 
ecosystem has its own inertia and self-regulating dynamics will appear. Partners know each other and 
efficiency improves. As the ecosystem matures the governance style shows more self-regulating 
forces. Goal leadership remains present but remains supplemented with an engaging style. 
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Lower down the hierarchical chain within organizations the implementation of initiatives by multiple 
partners requires different leadership styles with a stronger emphasis on engaging and involving 
leadership for the work floor, again accompanied by an innovative and community culture. A directive 
goal leadership style is ill-placed in this context of collaborating skilled professionals but – as we have 
seen – is essential for alignment of the middle management in the case of any reluctance or resistance 
from their part to adhere to the partnership approach. 
In the end the leadership aims at alignment of the partners’ interests in order to achieve a shared 
purpose. Despite the presence of conflicting individual interests between businesses, governments 
and research institutions the ecosystem leaders are able to establish a joint effort by presenting clear 
goals, providing a platform for partner interaction and the sharing of assets. Ecosystem leadership 
ultimately boils down to personal relationships, trust and commitment by individual leaders who think 
beyond their organizational boundaries to pursue the shared purpose of strengthening (national) 
security. This requires an entrepreneurial mindset, the courage to travel beyond organizational 
boundaries and conventions, and the ability to truly connect with others. 
In sum, the leadership styles between organizations’ top-management (C-level) are mainly engaging 
and involving. This is about consulting each other, exchanging knowledge and experience, and finding 
common ground to proceed on. The collection of ecosystem members together employs goal 
leadership to steer the ecosystem as a whole, this takes shape in a shared leadership platform, steering 
committee or a similar body underpinned by a governance structure. Within the interorganizational 
cooperation three layers are identified: the C-level, the middle management and the ground level. In 
the operational domain the ground level specialists (e.g. engineers and IT professionals) are willing and 
able to cooperate with counterparts from other ecosystem partners. They employ engaging and 
involving leadership. Their middle management may have interests that oppose deep collaboration 
with partners, which requires the C-level to adopt directive goal leadership to convince middle-
managers to open up to ecosystem partners. 
6.1 CONTRIBUTION TO ACADEMIA 
The main contribution to academic knowledge of this research lies in the identification of different 
growth stages  and their subsequent distinctive leadership style. Existing academic literature does not 
cover an ecosystem’s maturity process in terms of distinct stages. Ecosystem guru Ron Adner stresses 
the importance of timing for the success or failure of innovation in his book The Wide Lens (Adner, 
2012) and he highlights the process of other ecosystem members’ adoption of new initiatives but it 
does not detail specific growth stages. Besides this, as with this book most literature on ecosystem 
topics has a focus on business and the pursuit of commercial goals. This research adopts a new 
approach by extending the ecosystem concept to the public-private cooperation in the security 
domain. The security ecosystems showed a pre-creation stage in which a sequence of events or 
(political) agents cause organizations to interact and join forces in a platform or a structure, which 
marks the creation stage. Then an ecosystem is supposed to consolidate itself and become a force 
known to the outside world by appealing to new potential partners. Then the materialization stage 
commences, which is characterized by the achievement of tangible milestones and added value. 
Another novelty provided by this research was the identification of effects on the leadership style as 
the result of having different layers within the organization of ecosystem members. Despite the fact 
that this study primarily focused on leadership on an organizational level (i.e. between ecosystem 
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members) the interviews provided insights that led to the inclusion of the internal hierarchical layers 
within organizations. For a partnership between organizations to succeed – and thus to make the 
ecosystem approach happen – it is essential that all layers are aligned and willing to deliver. The data 
showed that middle-management layers may display reluctance to the cooperation with external 
parties. These different interests arising out of the internal organization’s layers have an effect on the 
leadership of the ecosystem as a whole and are therefore included. Thus far no academic publication 
provided the connection between ecosystem’s interorganizational leadership and individual 
organization’s internal leadership. The middle-management’s willingness to carry out the partnership 
approach is a mediating factor that determines the success of the collaboration in an ecosystem. 
 
6.2 PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Setting up a platform to lead an ecosystem not only requires the right leadership style but also 
the right leaders. It is important to ensure that the individuals representing their organization 
have the mandate to make decisions and allocate resources. This enables speedy decision-
making. Furthermore it requires individuals who can cooperate and connect with others on a 
personal level, and are able to understand and respect differences between public and private 
actors. Preferably, changes in the management of ecosystem organizations remain limited. For 
the quality and continuity of relationships the leadership position of individuals and their 
priorities should remain stable.  
 
 The organization that facilitates the ecosystem should lead from behind. This means that it 
brokers and assists partners from the background but does not publicly claim successes 
achieved by the ecosystem partners for its own gain.   
 
 Any ecosystem cooperation should be underpinned by a clear governance structure and a 
scoped shared purpose that outlines the main goals, who participates and what to focus on. 
This can take different shapes, for instance in a terms-of-reference, a letter of intent or a more 
elaborate membership structure and statutes.   
 
 For the continuity of an ecosystem it is important that the major partners experience added 
value. Often, the dominant organizations are less dependent on the ecosystem platform 
because they are already well-connected and can broker partnerships independently. Keeping 
them onboard nevertheless is essential.   
 
 Being aware of the context and organizational layers in the ecosystem can help understand 
what leadership style is appropriate.  
 
 In order to protect the ecosystem’s resilience organizations should avoid dependencies on one 
single actor, if possible. In the case of unavoidable dependency on a supplier it is essential to 
maintain close cooperation and warm ties in order to mitigate dependencies and build a 
foundation that is resistant to shocks and contingencies. Furthermore, ecosystem members 
should think strategically about which competencies to give up to partners and which 
capacities should be kept in-house.   
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 In order to foster an innovative and community culture among all ecosystem partners it is 
advisable to install Chinese walls between different elements within an organization. The 
department that participates in the ecosystem interactions should be free of a competitive 
stance towards partners since this obstructs fruitful cooperation. A solution that has been 
adopted by organizations involved in this research is the separation of the security services 
department from the primary process and to create a direct line to the C-level which occupies 
a seat in the ecosystem’s shared leadership board.  
 
 In the domain of innovative security solutions the large organizations may potentially lack the 
agility to quickly absorb innovation which is a reason for them to participate in an ecosystem 
and get in touch with start-ups or SME’s to achieve flexibility. For small businesses this 
constitutes an opportunity for cross pollination, expansion and more. Security ecosystems can 
learn from the start-up culture. The dominance of large well-established organizations brings 
the risk of shaping the culture towards a bureaucratic culture and missing out on 
opportunities. This could be counterbalanced by forms of inspirational leadership or thought 
leadership, e.g. by inviting young entrepreneurs or inspiring experts to share their thoughts 
with C-level leaders that decide on the ecosystem’s strategy.   
A more practical approach for smaller and more agile partners is to display leadership by 
example to entice the large bureaucratic partner to adapt and become more flexible. The 
emphasis is then on empowerment and sharing knowledge and experience with the lower 
layers in order to influence them.  
 
6.3 LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH 
 
This section deals with the research’s validity and threats to the quality of the findings. Yin (2009) 
outlines three options for guaranteeing research and data quality: (1) construct validity for data 
collection purposes, (2) internal validity for data analysis purposes, and (3) external validity for 
generalization purposes. These three aspects receive attention in this section. Furthermore, this 
section covers how this research combats threats in terms of validity and reliability of the case study. 
Safeguard 
The case study research design is vulnerable to acquiring only limited levels of validity and reliability 
as a result of its limited amount of cases. Triangulation offers a solution: employing several forms of 
data collection and processing in order to strengthen the foundation on which claims and new insights 
can rest (Van Thiel, 2010, p.99). This means that every case entails the use of multiple interviews from 
different individuals representing all involved organizations in order to crosscheck statements made in 
interviews. This offers a holistic view of the ecosystem under review and reflects the experiences and 
opinions of all relevant parties. If available additional documents were used. For the BPVS case an 
observation was used to gather information. 
Construct validity  
This term deals with the translation of theoretical concepts into operationalized terms that are being 
used in the data collection (interviews and content analysis) to discover the concepts in practice. Yin 
(2009) emphasizes the importance of identifying the correct operational measures for the concepts 
(e.g. “keystone” or “goal consensus”) used in this study. “A valid study is one that has properly 
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collected and interpreted its data, so that the conclusions accurately reflect and represent the real 
world that was studied” (Yin, 2011, p.78).  
Using multiple sources of evidence and seeking the help of informants to review the analysis are 
measures to limit threats to construct validity (Yin, 2009). This study uses the concepts found in 
multiple academic articles and formulates the interview questions accordingly. A critical review by the 
thesis supervisor limited potential ambiguity. Furthermore, the interviewees were given an 
explanation of concepts such as the leadership styles and cultures before they were asked to reply. 
Internal validity  
When it comes to internal validity, the method of process tracing could be of help. Internal validity 
entails the quality of the research: was it done correctly?   
Process tracing is a form of analysis that combines multiple types of evidence for the verification of a 
single inference. Process tracing is used to reveal causality by linking non-comparable pieces of 
evidence together to explain why X led to Y. The method requires the researcher to formalize the 
different steps in the causal chain (Gerring, 2006). For example: how does leadership stimulate the 
cooperation between organizations and thus what steps are necessary to get from A (employing 
leadership) to B (achieving cooperation and attaining the shared purpose of the ecosystem)? The 
process tracing method works to support the formal research design, it is thus auxiliary. Since this 
study almost entirely depends on interviews the combining of multiple types of evidence is not 
feasible. However, comparing across the interviews per case and comparing interviews across cases 
allows some form of process tracing. This is supplemented with evidence from documents. 
External validity  
The generalizability of research findings is addressed in this section. This is about the extension of 
research findings from a particular study on a sample population to the population at large. Yin (2009) 
distinguishes between statistical generalization and analytical generalization. The former entails 
making inferences about a whole population on the basis of data collected about a sample. A 
qualitative multiple case study is not fit for this purpose. Generalizing from qualitative research is made 
difficult because of its particularistic nature. It is conducted on very specific situations and people 
under certain circumstances (Yin, 2011). A small number of data collection units (e.g. a multiple case 
study) cannot be representative of the whole population, therefore analytical generalization is not a 
primary goal of this research. 
Analytic generalization is feasible. This is made up out of a two-step process. Step one: researchers 
make a conceptual claim about how their new insights could likely inform a particular set of concepts 
or hypotheses. The second step is about the application of the same theory to implicate other similar 
situations (Yin, 2011, p.100). So opposite to attempts of generalization to a whole population this 
approach focuses on seeking to develop and discuss how its insights may have implications for 
enhanced comprehension of certain concepts. This is possible with our multiple case study on 
leadership in security ecosystems.  
 
Yin (2009) further argues that multiple cases resemble multiple experiments which forces the 
researcher to opt for a different case selection logic: replication. Since this research has a limited 
capacity with regards to including cases this multiple case-study design is better off to aim for literal 
replication. This means selecting cases that presumably are similar. This necessitates a theoretical 
framework that states conditions under which a particular phenomenon may be found. The latter is 
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the case for this study and explains why the choice was made to include three relatively similar cases 
of security ecosystems. However, in hindsight, the dissimilarities between cases turned out to be 
considerable. 
Other general measures to enhance validity are the use of ‘rich’ data (i.e. cover the interviews with 
detailed and varied data), employing respondent validation (i.e. asking participants for feedback about 
the interview report or transcript), and the use of comparisons with results obtained from different 
settings or groups (Yin, 2011, p.79). This study compares the findings within the multiple cases and 
uses secondary sources (e.g. public statements and reports) to supplement the data. As an extra, the 
author attended one of the meetings between all the key partners at Schiphol Airport to experience 
himself how the leaders communicate and how decisions are taken. 
Limitations and threats to validity 
As with all qualitative research based on interviews this research potentially suffers from erroneous 
interpretation of the concepts. It is possible that interviewees misinterpret concepts such as ‘engaging 
leadership’ or ‘community culture’. Furthermore, the data is based on how interviewees assess the 
situation, which may or may not be a correct reflection of reality. A particular challenge was to 
correctly interpret the interviewees’ input about which leadership style and which network 
governance form they identified. Since many interviewees could not decide on one specific answer 
and saw elements of multiple options it was a challenge to process this into concrete findings. Since 
the explanation of the concepts to the interviewees was sometimes time-consuming it led to time 
shortages during some interviews which diminishes the quality of the replies. 
This research is based on a multiple case study. Due to time and resource constraints only a very limited 
sample of partners was involved in this research. Especially the Hague Security Delta with its >250 
partners offers plenty of relevant partners that were not included. The number of cases (three) is 
rather limited and therefore renders the potential of generalization of the findings equally limited.
   
6.4 AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
An interesting avenue for further research is the influence of power differences between ecosystem 
partners. Does money buy power? In the HSD ecosystem there is a formal membership structure with 
different price tags and privileges that come along with it. However, it was claimed that partners’ 
investment of time and energy determines the added value they gain from their membership. Is this 
truly the case? And if so, can small organizations influence the ecosystem’s strategy or (re)define the 
shared purpose when the dominant players are opposed?  
In terms of contributing to the academic ecosystem construct it would be interesting to further work 
out the identification of ecosystem growth stages and the potential effects of these stages on the 
suitable leadership styles in order to come up with an ecosystem maturity model. 
Another possibly interesting direction for further research is the relationship between the ecosystem 
concept and the legal/financial structures that can be used to implement collaborations between 
partners, for example public-private partnerships or an old-fashioned supplier-client contract. 
‘Ecosystem’ has become a popular term and is used to describe interactions between organizations 
that may or may not fit the definition of ecosystem at all.   
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The concept requires a clearer demarcation. Differentiating forms of interactions from other bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements through an extensive comparative analysis of multiple cases could be 
meaningful. 
Another promising approach would be the identification of critical success factors of bilateral 
ecosystem collaboration between organizations. An interesting starting point would be: Why do SME’s 
cooperate more successfully with one another than large corporations and government actors?  
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Dear sir or madam, 
Thank you for participating in this research by allowing me to interview you. This Master’s thesis 
research is about the following question: 
How can leadership on an organizational level stimulate cooperation between actors in a 
(national) security ecosystem? 
This research is conducted by Dennis Neven, a graduate student of Leiden University currently doing 
an internship for PwC (Advisory) in Amsterdam. The questions asked will be about your personal 
experience and your views on this topic. The research aim is to come up with insights on how 
leadership on an organizational level can contribute to cooperation between organizations in an 
ecosystem that revolves around security.  
 
The consent form that is forwarded to you prior to this interview clarifies the conditions and provides 
more details regarding your position and what you may expect. The researcher would like your 
permission to audio-record this interview for processing purposes only. The transcript will not be made 
public. If you have any further requests regarding anonymity or the use of citations this will be taken 
into account. Please sign the consent form to indicate your wishes and/or express your request orally. 
  
Please feel free to ask further questions, indicate any wishes or to provide the researcher with 
additional information during or after this interview. 
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Interview Script 
Start 
 Thank the participant  
 Introduce myself, my study and the internship at PwC 
 Explain the notion of informed consent (participant signs the form) 
 Explain confidentiality if necessary 
 Show participant the recording device 
 Turn on audiorecording device (only with participant’s consent) 
 Prepare writing materials for taking notes 
Personal Introduction 
Please tell me about yourself and your organization. (Position – career – education background – 
experience) 
Ecosystem   (Explain ecosystem as a concept) 
How would you briefly describe the cooperation with partners in your ecosystem? 
What is the main purpose that thrives your collaboration in this ecosystem? 
How would you describe the expectations of external partners towards the ecosystem? 
What are the different tiers of partners that collaborate? 
Ecosystem  Partners 
Can you please describe / draw the ecosystem network in which your organization participates? 
Ecosystem Leadership 
How would you describe the leadership styles of the partners in the ecosystem?  
 Engaging leadership  (participative / empowerment / consulting subordinates ) 
 Involving leadership (supportive / welfare of group members / motivation ) 
 Goal leadership ( instrumental /directive ) 
 Other styles that you might experience? 
How does decision-making take place in your ecosystem? 
Culture 
How would you describe the culture of the ecosystem? 
 - Innovative (entrepreneurial, growth, acquiring resources, take risks) 
 - Competitive (goal accomplishment, measurable goals, production oriented) 
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 - Bureaucratic (very formalized, structured, permanence and stability) 
 - Community (loyalty, tradition, like family, mentors, high cohesion and morale) 
How would you describe the culture of your own organization? 
 - Innovative (entrepreneurial, growth, acquiring resources, take risks) 
 - Competitive (goal accomplishment, measurable goals, production oriented) 
 - Bureaucratic (very formalized, structured, permanence and stability) 
 - Community (loyalty, tradition, like family, mentors, high cohesion and morale) 
To what extent do the leading organization(s) and the others share their assets? 
How do you think that organizational leaders can steer organizations in the ecosystem to jointly 
pursue the shared purpose? 
Elements of ecosystem governance  
What would you consider the most important growth stages?  
What governance structures are used for the cooperation between organizations? 
What governance protocols are used for the cooperation between organizations? 
 Please tell me about the function of these governance structures or protocols? 
How would you describe the network governance style?  
(Shared governance / NAO / Lead Organization:  present illustrations to the respondent) 
Resilience 
How does your organization cope with risks such as a high dependency on another organization? 
 
Are there contingency plans in place in case an organization fails to deliver or external shocks harm 
the ecosystem? Please tell me about this.  
 
 
Room for notes/additional follow up questions  
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Is there anything I might have forgotten to ask you? 
Are you available for follow-up questions? 
END 
 
 Thank the participant 
 Any questions? 
 Interested in the final report? 
 Do you happen to know anyone who I could interview? 
 Wrap up 
 
 
 
 
